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Preface 
This is a collection of papers presented at a workshop on "Modeling Epistemic 
Propositions" held on September 13 and 14 at the Humboldt University in 
Berlin during the 17th German Conference on Artificiallntelligence (KI'93). 
The workshop was the first of its kind in Germany and its goal was to provide 
a forum for researchers that are interested in problems of epistemic modeling. 
Modeling epistemic and doxastic propositions, i.e., knowledge and belief, 
is one of the main themes of research in knowledge representation. One of 
the reasons is in the fundamental goal of Artificial Intelligence: the ability of 
a system to refiect its own knowledge, to consider what information is held 
by other systems, and to take into account the knowledge and the intentions 
of human users is a necessary precondition for intelligent behavior. 
There are, however, also pragmatic reasons that suggest to describe men-
tal states differently from the physical world. For instance, in natural lan-
guage systems special operators are used to represent beliefs, intentions, and 
other mental modes. When specifying distributed systems or multi-agent sy-
stems, epistemic operators are employed to distinguish between descriptions 
of the state of the world and representations of an agent's information about 
it. In most cases, such specifications are only descriptive in the sense that 
theyare used to inferproperties of the specified system. Recent work, howe-
ver, also aims at executing them. In user rnodeling, knowledge of the system 
is separated from the user's knowledge in a similar fashion. Several authors 
like Levesque and "Reiter proposed to conceive integrity constraints as des-
criptioris of the legal epistemic states of a knowledge base and therefore to 
formalize them in logics with epistemic operators. Finally, several approaches 
to formalize non-monotonie reasoning are based on epistemic operators. 
During the workshop, eight papers were presented, David Pearce gave an 
invited talk, where he compared recent approaches in Philosophy and Ar-
tificial Intelligence, and Christoph Lingenfelder and Rolf Socher-Ambrosius 
held a tutorial on the semantics and proof theory of modallogics. 
The focus of the workshop was on the logic based formalization of know-
ledge and belief. Since the work by Moore in the early 80'ies, modallogics 
have been generally accepted for this purpose. Not surprisingly, most contri-
butions to the workshop followed this approach. The papers centered around 
three main topics: 
III 
• different axiomatizations of epistemic modalities, their advantages and 
drawbacks, and their adequacy (Pearce, Thijsse and Wansing, Wagner, 
Rollinger) 
• inference procedures for epistemic logics (Hustadt, Laux) 
• applica.tions of epistemic logics to · Artificial Intelligence (Becker and 
Lakemeyer, Blok, Donini et al.). 
In the call for papers, we proposed as a further topic the combination 
of epistemic logics , with other special purpose logics, like logics for temporal 
or non-monotonics reasoning. We also would have liked to see contributions 
following a paradigm other than modal logics or even criticizing the logic-
based approach per se. Unfortunately, we did not receive submissions of this 
kind. . 
We would like to thank the authors for their contributions and all the 
participants for the 'lively discussion during the sessions. We feel that the 
workshop has met its goal . to establish contacts between researchers from 
different sites in Germany that would not have come together otherwise. At 
the end of the workshop it has been suggested to hold a second event of 
this kind during the German Conference on Artificial Intelligence in 1994. 
We hope that we will see the participants again at "Modeling Epistemic 
Propositions" during KI'94 in Saarbrücken. 
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Abstract 
We discuss several recent approaches to the modelling of knowledge ope~ators in Philo-
sophical Logicand Artificial Intelligence. Particular attention will be given to the follow-
ing topics: . 
1. The representation of several different modal operators within the same system (e.g., 
knowledge, belief, memory) 
2. Epistemic logics based on nonclassical concepts of inference (e.g., partial and con-
structive inference) 
3. Epistemic operators in the area of nonmonotonic knowledge representation systems. 
Our main aim is to point out so me connections between these areas, in particular 
. between (2) and (3). 
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An Epistemic Extension of CLASSIC as 
Interaction Language for CLASSIC Knowledge 
Bases 
Andreas Beeker and Gerhard Lakemeyer 
Universität Bonn 
Institut für Informatik III 
Römerstraße 164, 53117 Bonn 
e-mail: becker@gmdzi.gmd.de.gerhard@cs.uni-bonn.de 
As shown by Levesque, the interaction with a knowledge base ean be viewed 
in functional terms eonsidering the operations ASK and TELL, by whieh queries 
ean be put to the system and new information ean be added to the system, 
respectively. In partieular, Levesque emphasizes the fact that the expressive-
ness is enhanced eonsiderably by an epistemie interaction language, even when 
the knowledge base eonsists only of fust order logie (FOL) formulas and does 
not eontain any epistemie operators. Interestingly enough, epistemie ASK- and 
TELL-operations ean be redueed to ordinary non-epistemie operations. 
The inter action language for knowledge ba.ses written in the eoneept language 
Classie, whieh ean be eonsidered a first order logie fragment, so far consists of 
Classie expressions in eombination with metalogical eoncepts to inerease expres-
siveness. The project presented in the paper aims at an epistemie extension of 
Classie (K-Classie) in order to get a more powerful interaetion language for op-
erations like ASK and TELL. Essentially, the inerease in power results from the 
ability to talk not only about the applieation domain when interacting with the 
knowledge base, but also about its knowledge about the domain. Apart from 
defining the extended language, we investigate whether redudion procedures 
similar to Levesque's approach ean be applied. Moreover, integrity eonstraints 
are dealt with, which ean be formulated as special epistemie queries that aIways 
must return the answer 'yes' for the particular integrity eonstraint to be fulfilled 
and whieh ean therefore be viewed as specifie ASK-operations. Finally, epistemie 
assertions as arguments for TELL-operations ean be used, aIllOng other things, 
to introduee the Closed World Assumption loeally for single eoneepts or roles. 
- 3-
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On the eontribution of eontextual 
information to the semanties and 
pragmaties of foeus 
Peter I. Blok 
University of Leuven 
University of Groningen 
o. Introduction 
Focus is one of the most troublesome concepts . of .linguistic theory. The main 
source of the confusion is the fact that the phenomena and their theoretica1 
description are being mixed up. E.g., a constituent is assumed to be in focus when 
it is intonationally stressed as weIl when it is prominent in a discourse. In this 
paper we will try to avoid this kind of confusions and limit our definition of focus 
to the phenomenal side: . 
For a constituent to be in focus it is a necessary condition that it either contain a 
sub-constituent with contrastive intonation aI stress or is syntactically marked by 
means of a c/eft or left dislocation construction. 
Hence, we will consider focus to be a syntactic phenomenon. The problem is, of 
course, what contribution to the meaning of a sentence the focus has. 
The phenomena we will deal with are the following three paradigmatic cases of 
focus: 
I Stress in senten ces with a so-ca1led focus adverb, like only. 
11 Stress in negated sentences. 
III Sentences with stressed constituents which do not fall under I or 11. 
In the examples that fall under I, the position of the stress influences the truth 
conditions of the sentence, as is illustrated in (1): 
(1) a 
b 
J ohn only introduced Bill to Sue 
John only introduced Bill to Sue 
c J ohn only introduced Bill to Sue 
-5-
(l)a and (l)b are not necessarily true in the same models.1 
In negated sentences, case n, the truth conditions are not affected by the position 
of the stress: 
(2) a John didn't introduce Bill to Sue 
b John didn't introduce Bill to Sue 
(2)a and (2)b are true in the same models. However, their use is different: a 
speaker uttering (2)a seems to indicate that J ohn introduced someone else than · 
Bill to Sue, whereas a speaker of (2)b indicates that John introduced Bill to 
someone else. 
Case In encompasses sentences like (3)a and (3)b: 
(3) a John introduced Bill to Sue · 
b John introduced Bill to Sue 
Clearly, (3)a and (3)b have the same truth conditions. Moreover, a speaker of 
(3)a or (3)b does not seem to have to say more than wbat (s)be said. This 
distinguishes case III from case 11. We will call case III bare focus (BF). 
To be sure, the typology just introdueed remains at tbe observationalleve~ but 
it mirrors the complexity of the phenomena involved. It also illustrates the fact 
that focus is not a coherentphenomenon in traditionalsemiotics: in case A the 
stress influences the semanties, wbereas in cases 11 and III it has repercussions for 
the pragmatics only. Many linguists find this quite puxzling. Since the syntactic 
pbenomenon (i.e. stress) is the same in I, TI, and m, they argue, the 
interpretation should have something in common as weIl. Most contemporary 
focus tbeorists (Rooth, von Stechow, Krifka) try to give a semantic description of 
what focus constructions have in common. In order to do so, they bave to 
postulate a second level of semantic interpretation, besides the normal denotation, 
which is allegedly determined by the focus structure of the sentence. In the next 
section we will investigate this so called alternative semantics (AS). 
1 It is not quite c1ear what the truth conditions of (l)c are; but they will be different from those 
of (l)a and (l)b. 
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2. Alternative Semantics 
We will now take a brief look at the most prominent paradigm in focus theory, 
so called Alternative Semantics (AS), as proposed by Rooth (1985). The central 
idea is this. In the examples in (1), only is in pre-VP position. Because of this 
syntactic reason, only is assumed to take the VP for an argument. But then, only 
denotes the superset relation. It is the other argument of only which makes the 
interpretations of the sentences in (1) differ. This argument is the so called P-set. 
Intuitive1y, P-sets are defined recursively in the following way: if a basic expression 
b is unfocused, its P -set, 11 b 11, is the singIeton set containing its denotation. 
Hence, the P-set of "Sue" in (l)a is {Sue}, where Sue E De. If a basic expression 
is focused, its P-set is the whole domain of the type of the focused expression. 
Therefore, the P-set of "Bill" in (l)a is De. P-sets of complex expressions are built 
by taking the Cartesian product of the P-sets of their sub-constituents. Less 
intuitive, but formally more correct, P-sets are sets of objects corresponding to 
what Montague (1974) calls meanings, i.e. functions from in<lices and assignments 
into Extensions. It is important to notice that P-sets are more than meanings only: 
meanings correspond to words in the language, whereas P-sets consist of all 
functions of the appropriate type in the model. For (1) we get the followingP-
sets: 
P-set 
II(l)all = IlintroduceBilltoSuel1 = {PI3yP= ["introduceytoSue]M} 
11 (l)b) 11 = 11 introduce Bill to Sue 11 = {P 13y P= ["introduce Bill to y]M} 
11 (l)cll == Ilintroduce Bill to Suell = {PI3Y P== ["Y(Bill to Sue)]M} 
The meaning of (l)a then becomes: "for all functions in 11 (l)all there is just one 
true of John, i.e. the one in which y is Bilr, and analogously for (l)b and (l)c. 
The second order translations which resemble the proposed analysis most are, 
respectively, 
(4)a \fP([P{j) A 3y P = ">"x introduce(x,y,s)] - P = ">..x introduce'(x,b,s» 
(4)b \fP([P{j} A 3y P = ">..x introduce(x,b,y)] - P == ">..x introduce'(x,b,s» 
(4)c \fP([P{j} A 3Y P = ">"x Y(x,b,s)] - P = ">..x introduce'(x,b,s» 
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These representations serve to make it dear that the only difference between (1)a . 
through c is the domain of quantification. Note, however, that (4)c is nonsensiCal: 
if there is only one three pIace relation true of J 000, Bill and Sue, it means that 
John,Bill and Sue are the only members of the domain. We will come back to 
Ws important point below. 
In (2), the P-set plays a slightly different role; the implicature is defined as the 
proposition that the intersection of the properties of John and the P-set isnot 
empty: 
(5) "(2)a" ~ 3P3y(P= "AX introduce(x,y,s) A PU}) 
The function of the focus in (3) is quite puzzling: in Rooth (1992) it is described 
as the expression that the focused item was chosen from the P-set. However, 
couldn't that be said of the unfocused counterpart as weU? If Bill wasn't chosen 
in lohn introduced Bill to Sue, it would have been another sentence. In the 
traditional presupposidon analysis of (3) we are stuck with the problem why ( the 
utterance of) the sentence would presuppose what is being said. The existential 
presupposition is entailed by (3)a, but by its unfocused counterpart as weU. Itmay 
be dear that these kinds of "explanations" are not satisfactory at all. We will come 
back to tbis further on. 
The basic idea of AS then is that focused sentences are interpreted relatively to 
the P-set. The P-set is a set of semantic entities of the type of the argument of 
the focus operator (like only), and varying over the domain of the focused ele-
ment. 
3. Discussion of AS 
AS claims to be a general theory of focus. However, as already pointed out above, 
it has little to say about the pragmatics of BF constructionS. Moreover, despite its 
intentions, it turns out that semantically the force of AS is limited to focused 
proper names only. The problems that arise with sentences like 
(6) John only swims 
are typical forthe whole approach. We will, therefore, discuss tbis point more 
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extensively here. 
The intuitive, but clearly incorrect translation of (6) is (7): 
(7) VP ([P E I I "swim' I I] 1\ PU)] .. P = "swim)2 
The P-set of (6) are all functions {flf(w,g) E D(s,(e,t))}3 
This set contains, among others, trivial properties like ["(to be oneself)]M, ["(to 
be John)]M .... In order ot make sense of (6), we should ban these from the P-set. 
Let us defme trivial properties as 
(8) T = {fl for all (w,g): f(w,g)(w)G) = 1} 
Moreover, if John swims, it is also true that he swims or plays tennis. We can 
easily avoid this problem by demanding that every property John has is a logical 
consequence of swim. We get, then, 
(9) (6) iff VP([PU} 1\ P E (I I "swim' 1 I - T)] .. O(swim'G) .. PU}» 
This, however, cannot be correct either. There will always be properties in the P-
set of "swim' which are neither logical consequences of "swim' nor necessary 
properties, but which intuitivelydo not influence the truth conditions of (6). The 
kind of properties I am referring to are contingently present in the model, and 
may even not be the denotation of a word in the language. E.g.: Let De be {j,b,s} 
and let f be a function such that 
for any w,g, f(w,g)(wo) = U,b} 
f(w,g)(wl ) = {b} 
Certainly, fEil "swim 11. But the existence of such an f would intuitively not 
2 This fonnula is a mixture of syntax and semantics, but its intention will be c1ear. For a proper 
syntactization of the concept P-set, vide de Mey (1993) or Blok (1993). 
3. Cf. note 2. 
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make (6) false, as long as fis not the denotation . of properties like walle, 
"play_tennis etc. Therefore, under this analysis, (6) is true iff De = ü}. And that 
is clearly not what we want. 
Note that similar problems arise when we try to compute the generalized 
conversational implicatures and presuppositions of (10)a and b respectively: 
(10) a John doesn't swim 
b Johnswims 
3PPü} is not very spectacular as implicature, nor as presupposition. 
In order to avoid these and related problems, Rooth (1985,1992) proposes to 
restrict the P-set by some contexl set, that is, a set of contextually given 
alternatives. The proposed interpretation of (6) then becomes 
(11) 'v'P([P E (I 1 "swim 1 I nC) A PÜ}] -4 P = "swim) 
But then, C will always be a (proper) subset of the P-set. Hence, 11 "swim 11 n C 
= C. Therefore, there is no point computing the P-set at all. If we are to give a 
semantics of sentenCes like (6) or a pragmatics · for (10), we will have to 
concentrate on context sets, not on P-sets. An even more striking point is that the 
proper alternative of a focused word may be of a different type than the word 
itself, as in 
(12) John didn't introduce·Bill to Sue, he just taJlced to them! 
Introduce is a three place relation, whereas talk_ta is a two place relation. 
Nevertheless, the example (U) is very weU possible and shows that in its coDtext, . 
talk_ta is among the alternatives of introduce. 
4. Awareness sets 
From the above, it foUows that there is no way to control the semantically defmed 
set of alternatives. We will to have abandon the approach and look for a more 
syntactic alternative. The problem at hand has strong resemblances with the so 
called problem of logical omniscience. In epistemic logic, one often wants to 
- 10-
conelude that an agent knows or believes a proposition without bis knowing or 
believing all of its logieal consequenees. Here, the modalities are restrieted to 
given awareness sets of "relevant" propositions. These sets are syntaetie in the 
sense that A(p) is true just if p E A. Hence, A is a set of syntaetie objects (cf. 
Fagin and Halpern 1988). Moreover, if 1= P ~ q, and 1= A(P), it is not necessarily 
the case that A( q), ete. The awareness sets we need have slightly different 
properties. Since we have dealt with the problem of logical consequence by the 
adjustment of the consequent, as in (9), we can admit anything logical derivable 
from the "core" elements.The problem is, however, how these "core" elements 
enter the awareness set. Notice that this is indeed a logical problem like the 
elassical problem of (un)awareness: alternatives are defined as objects of a certain 
semantic type. These can be computed automatically from the model. Given one 
alternative, all the others foUow immediately. This automatie procedure should 
somehow be limited, just as the "automatie generation" of logical eonsequences 
in the elassical case. Let us call this problem A. Problem Bisthe foUowing. Let 
a speaker utter (6) with the background assumption that the relevant set of · 
propositions is {John swims, John bikes, John walks}. Let a hearer interpret this 
sentence with the background assumption that the relevant set is {John swims, 
J ohn bikes, J ohn worles}. And let it aetually be true that J ohn worles, besides that 
he swims. What about the truth 'of the sentence in such a model? The sentence 
. is true with respect to the awareness set of the speaker, whereas it is false with 
respect to the awareness set of the hearer. One could say, of course, · that the 
awareness set is a variable of the truth relation. But this would not provide us 
with a more general description of the use of sentences like (6) in discourse. That 
is, it is not very satisfaetory to neglect two party situations by the argument that 
they cannot straightforwardly be described as a special case of one party 
situations. As we will argue below, the situation is just the other way around. 
A. 
In the literature, proposals have been made to define the syntactic property of 
"alternative" in a lexical fashion. Gabbay and Moravcsik (1978) thereto introduced 
a lexical semantics based on the notions "core meaning" and "shades of meaning". 
Intuitively, the core meaning of a word eonsists of its formal properties like 
logical type together with more lexical semantic properties like the sort of 
arguments it takes, the meaning postulates it is subject to ete. The shades of 
meaning make a word to what it is: swim and wa/k have the same eore meaning, 
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but they do not have the same shades of meaning. A range 0/ incompatibles is a 
set of words which have the same core meaning, but a different shades of 
meaning. It 'seems as ' if this range of incompatibles is exactly what we are after 
for our awareness set. The disappointment is that the construction of ranges of 
incompatibles is not compositional. Take for example the intransitive verb "tb eat 
apples" in lohn only ears a/l,ples. Whatis its range of incompatibles? It is not 
lexically given, since it is a complex expression. The range of incompatibles of eat 
will be something like {~ chew ... } and the range of incompatibles of apple 
will be {banana, time, ... }. But then, it may be clear that the awareness set we are . 
looking for does not contain drink a banana. The relevant word may be work or 
kiss a woman, who knows. But it certainly has nothing to do with the 
subconstituents of the focused expression. As such, this problem seems unsolvable 
to me from a logical or linguistic point of view. It is a problem of AI. 
But there is more. Compare the sentences (13) and (14): 
(13) John only walks andtalks 
(14) John only walks or talks 
As pointed out above, thereis no problem admitting lohn walles and lohn talks 
to the awareness set in (13). If John walks and talks, he necessarily walks and he 
equally talks. But what is the meaning of (14)? If John walks, does it make the 
sentence false? Not so, in my opinion. On the other hand, if the speaker knows 
that John walks, (14) is a pragmatically awkward expresSion. Hence, what a 
hearer of (14) pragmaticallyinfers is (among -other things) the following4; 
(15) 'v'p [(Lsp 1\ ~p) - (p = John walks or talks)] 
that is, lohn walks or talks is the onlyexplicit knowledge of the speaker. And here, 
lohn walks and lohn talks are ceitainly members of A. Pragmatically, we may 
then assume that awareness sets are closed under sub-formulas. But we should 
keep semantics and pragmatics strictly apart. 
B. 
4 L should be taken here KD45; cf. Blok 1993. 
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As we have seen, (6) should be interpreted re1ative to an awareness set. A 
speaker will, of course, think that it is c1ear which set (s)he is aware of. This boils 
down to the assumption 
(s stands for speaker, h for hearer). One could say that if the speaker is not 
entertaining this assumption, the locution is not felicitoos. On the other hand,the 
speaker may err with respect to this. Wbat about the truth conditions in such a 
case? Although the locution is more or less a misfire, this does not imply it 
should not havea meaning. In my view, the situation should be modeled as 
follows: if the sentence is true in A s u Ah, the sentence is true. If there is a 
counter example inAs nAh' it is false.1f there is a counter example inAh which 
is not in A s or the other way around5, the sentence is true nor false. 
Standard partial logic provides os with the following possibility: given the truth 
table 
<P 1/1 <p1\1/I <pxxl/l <P~I/I 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 ... ... ... ... 
1 0 0 ... 0 
... 1 ... ... 1 
... ... ... ... ... 
... 0 0 ... ... 
0 1 0 ... 1 
0 ... 0 ... 1 
0 0 0 0 1 
(Blamey 1986, p.7) 
and "V" also in the usual partial way: 
5 This last situation is pragmatically unlikely because of the quality maxim which says: try to 
make your contribution one that is true! 
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M,g p 'v'p q> iff M.~/a ... q> for any a E D(M) 
M,g 1 'v'p q> iff for some a E D(M), M'~/a 1 q> 
we can translate the sentence as 
(17) 'v'p ([(~(p) xx Ah(p)) " Vp] ... P = "'John swims) 
For instance, let ~(p') be true, i.e. p' E Aso and 'let Ah(p') be true also, i.e 'p' E 
A h . Moreover, let rp] = 1. Then, the antecedent of (17) is true for p'. If p' ~ 
"'John swims, (17) is false, as required. 
Now, let ~(p') be true and Ah(p') be false; this is the situation in which the 
awareness sets of speakerand hearer do not match. The first conjunct of the 
antecedent of (17) is "'. If rp] = 1, the whole antecedent is "'. If p' = "'John 
swims, it confirms (17). If p' ~ "'John swims, (17) is "'. If rp] = 0, the antecedent 
becomes false, and henre the implication true. 
What we see, then, is that for (17) to be true, it has to be true for all p E A s u A h' 
i.e. for all p EAs uAh , either vp must be false or p = "'John swims. However, for 
(17) to be false, the counter example should be iIiAs nAh. 
It is important to observe that if the meaning assignment function itself is total, 
the approach collapses into a 2 valued system if the assumption (16) turns out to 
be true: if A s = A h , ~(p) xx Ah(p) equals ~(p) for all assignments. This is; of 
course, exact1y what we want: the speaker assumes that (s)he is "relevant", and 
that the sentence is unambiguously true. The one agent case is, then, a special 
case of two (or more) agent case. 
There may be an unsatisfactory aspect to this analysis: the syntactic representation 
of the senten ce differs with the number of participant in the discourse. It may be 
dear that if there are two hearers (17) would be altered into 'v'p ([«~(p) xx 
Ah1(P)) xx Ah2(p)) " Vp] ... P = "'John swims), etc. What we may prefer is a 
unique representation which interpretation differs along the number of awareness 
sets involved. A way to achieve this is the following simple semantics, amended 
with restrictive quantification: 
Let M be <D,W,V> 
Let p,q be constants of L. Then 
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M,w,g .. p iff V(p,w) = 1 
M,w,g 1= ""'P iff M,w,g I ~ P 
M.w.g 1= P A q iff M,w,g 1= p and M,w,g 1= q 
Let P be a variable of L 
M,w,g 1= P iff g(p)(w) = 1 
M,w,g 1= \t'p q iff for all 'i which differ from g at most with respect to p, 
M,w,'i 1= q 
Restrictive quantification 
Let P be an unquantified, formula of L 
M,w,g I=W P iff M,w,g 1= P 
M,w,g 1=1jI \t'p q iff for all assignments 'i which differ from g at most with 
respect to p such that there is arE Ijt such that for _all w, 
V(r,w) = 'i(p)(w), M,w,'iI=W q 
hence, 
M,w,g ~ ~ \t'p q iff there is an assignment g' which differs from g at most with 
respect to p such that there is arE Ijt such that for all w, 
V(r,w) = 'i(p)(~), M.w,g'~ 1jI q 
Two agents: 
M,w,g I=w,,, \t'p q iff for all assignments 'i which differ from g at most with 
respect to p such that there is arE (Ijt u cp) such that for all w, 
V(r,w) = g'(p)(w), M,w,'iI=W q 
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and 
M,w,g 9 v,., Vp qi.ff there is an assignment g which differs from g at most with 
respect to p such that there isa rE (1\1. n cp) such that for all w, 
V(r,w) = g(p)(w), M,w,g9 v q 
Box 
M,w,g, ~~ O(p) i.ff for all w', M,w',g~ P 
Now we will check whether we get the intended truth conditions. First for the one 
agent case: 
M,w,g ~~ Vp [p - D(swimG) - p)] 
iff for all assignments g such that g'(p) E 1\16, g(p)(w) 
V(swimG),w') = 0 or g(p)(w') = 1 
Second for the two agent case 
M,w,g ~+,., Vp P - O(swimG) - p) 
iff ..... such that g'(p) E 1\1 u cp 7 ... 
M,w,g 9 +,., Vp p - O(swimG) - p) 
iff there is an assignment g' such that g E 1\1 n cp and 
o or for all w', 
g'(p)(w) = 1 and there is a w' such that V(swimG),w') = 1 and g(p)(w') = 1 
This is indeed what we had in mind. 
Note that the two agent case still collapses into the (2 valued) one agent case if 
6. This abbreviates the more correct fonnulation in the definitions above. 
7 cf. note 6. 
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assumption (16) tums out to be true. 
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Queries, Rules and Definitions 
as EpistemicSentences 
in Concept L~guages 
Francesco M. Domm· Maurizio Lenzerim· 
Damele Nardi· Werner Nuttt Andrea Schaerf* 
Abstract 
Concept languages have been studied in order to give a formalaccount of the basic 
features of frame-based languages. The focus of research in ooncept languages was ini-
tially on the semantical reconstruction of frame-based systems and the computational 
complexity of reasoning. More recently, attention has been. paid tothe formaliza-
tion of other aspects of frame-based languages, such as non-Plonotonic reasoningand 
procedural rules, which are necessary in order to bring concept languages closer to 
implemeIited systems. In this paper we discuss the above issues in theframework 
of concept lan~ages enriched with anepistemic operator . . Inparticular, we show 
that the epistemic operator both introduces novel features in the language, such as 
sophisticated query formulation and closed world reasoning, and makes it possible to 
provide a formal account for some aspects of the existing systems, such as rules and 
definitions, that cannot be characterized in a standard first-order framework. 
1 Introduction 
Structured or taxonomical representations of knowledge have been studied in Artificial 
Intelligence with the aim of providing for both a compact representation and efficient 
reasoning methods. Semantic networks and frames are weil known examples of this kind 
of knowledge representation languages. 
Concept languages (also called terminological languages or description logics) have 
been studied for several years in order to provide a formalization of structured knowledge 
representation languages and to analyze the computational properties of the associated 
reasoning tasks [3,5,6, 19,28]. However, concept languages are given a set-theoretic first-
order semantics and leave out several aspects of practical systems. Therefore, it seems 
now appropriate to enrich such languages both to explore novel language features and to 
account for some of those aspects that cannot be easily described in a standard first-order 
framework. 
This need is discussed in the literature (see for example [11, 29]) and can be easily rec-
ognized bylooking at recent knowledge representation systems based on concept languages 
° Dipartimento di Informatica e Sistemistica, Universita di Roma "La Sapienza", Via SaJaria 113,1-00198 
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such as [2, 30]. Work in this direction has al ready begun with proposals of extending con-
cept languages to deal with different forms of non-monotonie reasoning (see for example 
[1, 23]). 
We propOsed in [7] to enrich concept languages with an epistemic operator defined . 
in the style of [14, 15, 25]. While the main emphasis of that paper was to show that 
answering queries formulated in the epistemic concept languages can be done byextending 
the calculus for instance checking developed in [10], here we aim at discussing · in more 
detail the advantagesprovided by such an extension both for enhaJ}cingthe capabilities 
of concept languages, and for formalizing non-standard features of existing systems; 
In particular, we focus our attention on the use of the epistemic operator in order (1) 
to definea more powerful query languagej (2) to he able to formulate queries requiring 
some forms of clOsed world reasoningj (3) to formalize the notion of procedural rulej(4) 
to precisely characterize weak forms of concept definition. All these aspects show that the 
epistemic operator turns out to be flexible enoughto account forseveral different not ions 
in an elegant and uniform way. . . . 
With regard to Point (1), we provide several examples that showhow the new query 
language allows one to address both aspects or the extern al world as represented in the 
knowledge base, and aspects of what the knowledge base knows about theextetnal world. 
It is worth noting that one advantage of the extended query language is the formalization 
of integrity constraints, which are viewed as sentences referring to what the knowledge 
base knows about .the .world (see [7]). This aspect, however, isnotfurtherdiscussed in the 
present paper. 
With regard to Point (2), we show that acarefulusage of the epistemic operator allows 
one to express queries whose processing (orces the system to assurne complete knowledge 
about (part of) the knowledge base. Note that this approach is different from assigning a 
closed world semantics to the knwoledge base itself. In fact, the nonmonotonicity is not 
in the semantics of the knowledge base, but a form of non mono tonic reasoning is achieved 
by the system when answering special kinds of queries. 
Points (3)and (4) are concerned with the formalization of two important features of 
some existing systems. In particular, systems like [2, 12,22,30] include suitable struCtures 
for the representation of procedural rules, enabling both behavioral models of objects and 
expertise in an application domain to be expressed. We propose to express procedural 
rules as special epistemic sentences in the knowledge base. While procedural rules are 
usually defined informally in existing systems, we show that a nice formalization of these 
features can be achieved in our framework, thus clarifying both their semantics, and their 
interaction with the other parts of the knowledge base. Moreovet, we show that epistemic 
sentences provide an account for weak forms of concept definitions similarto those follnd 
in LOOM [16] and other systems. This formalization makes it clear that weak definitions 
provide a form of incomplete reasoning that is both computationally advantageous, and 
semantically weIl founded. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 recalls the basic not ions about the con-
cept language Ace, which is a powerful concept language (including concept conjunCtion, 
disjunction, negation, as weIl as existential and universal quantification of roles) , togeth-
er with its usage in the definition of knowledge bases. Section 3 presents the epistemic 
concept language .ACCK, obtained by adding an epistemic operator to Ace. Section 4 
elaborates on the features of AceK when used as a query language over knowledge bases 
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expressed in ACC. Section 5 focuses on some forms of closed world reasoning that can be 
expressed with the epistemic operator. Section 6 proposes a formalization of procedural 
rules as special classes of epistemic sentences, while Section 7 discusses the use of epis-
temic sentences in expressing weak forms of concept inclusions and definitions. Finally, 
conclusions are drawn in Section 8. 
2 Concept Knowledge Bases 
We make use of the concept language ACC (see [5, 28]) to define a knowledge base. l 
Like any concept language, .ACC allows one to express the knowledge abou t the classesof 
interest in a particular application through the notions of concept and role. Intuitively, 
concepts represent the classes of objects in the domain to be modeled, while roles repre-
sent relationships between objects. Starting with primitive concepts and roles, one can 
construct complex expressions by means of. various concept forming operators. 
The syntax and semantics of .Ace are as follows. We assume that two alphabets of 
symbols, one for primitive concepts, and one for primitive roles, are given. The letter A 
will always denote a primitive concept, and the letter P will denote a role, which in A.ce 
is always primitive. The concepts (denoted by the letters C and D) of the language A.ce 

















We use parentheses whenever we have to disambiguate concept expressions. For ex-
am pie, we write (3P.D) nE to indicate that the concept E is not in the scope of 3P. 
An interpretation I = (ßI, .I) consists of a nonempty set ßI (the domain of I) and 
a function .I (the interpretation function of I) that maps every concept to a subset of ßI 
and every role to a subset of ßI X ßI such that the following equations are satisfied: 








{d1 E ßI I Vd2 : (dl! d2) E pI -t d2 E CI} 
{d1 E ßI 13d2 : (dl! d2) E pI A d2 E CI}. 
1 Although we restrict our attention to ACC, our framework can be applied to other languages as weIl. 
- 21 -
An interpretation I is a model for a concept C if CI is Iionempty. A concept is 
satisjiableif it has a model and unsatiBfiabie otherwise. We say that C is Bubsumed by D 
if CI ~ nI for every interpretation I. 
In terminological systems, the knowledge base includes both an intensional part, called 
terminology or simply TBox, and an extension al part, called assertional box or simply 
ABox. The TBox is constituted by a set of inclusion statements of the form 
C~D 
where C, D are concepts. Inclusion statements are interpreted in terms of set inclusion: 
an interpretation I satisfies C ~ D if cI ~ nI. An interpret~tion I is a mOdel for a TBox 
if it satisfies all of its inclusions. AB pointed out in [4], inclusions are more general than 
definitions, since definitions like A == C can be expressed as A ~ C and C ~ A.' Moreover, 
cyclic definitions are admitted and interpreted by the descriptivesemantics [19] . · 
The ABox is constituted by a Set of assertions that specify either that an individual 
is instance of a concept or that a pair of individ uals is instance of a role. Let 0 be an 
alphabet of symbols, called individuals. Syntactically, assertions are expressed in terms of 
membership statements, of the form 
C(a) 
P(a,b) 
where a and bare individuals, C is a concept, and Pisa role. C(a) means that a is 
an instance of C, while P(a, b) means that a is related to b by means of P. In order to 
give a formal semantics to assertions,the interpretation must be enriched with an injective 
function from 0 to t:,.I, Le. eCl,Ch individual is associated with a unique domain element 
(Unique Name Assumption). Therefote an interp·retation is now a tripie I = (t:,.I, .I, r I ), 
and an assertion C (a) is satisfied by I if r (a) E CI. Similarly, an assertion P( a, b) is 
satisfied by I if (rI(a),rI(b)) E pI. 
To summarize we define an ACC-knowledge base as folIows: 
Definition 1 . An ACC-knowledge base is a pair ~ = (T, A), where T is aset 0/ inclusion 
statements, and A is a set 0/ membership assertions, whose concepts androies belong to 
the language ACC. An interpretation I is a model /or ~ = (T, A) i/ it is a model tor both 
T and A. 
We say that ~ is satisfiable if it has a model. The set of models of ~ is denoted as 
M(~). ~ logically implies u (written ~ F u), where u is either an inclusion statement or 
a membership assertion, if every model in M(~) satisfies u. 
The most common kind of query to a knowledge base ~ is asking whether C(a) (or 
P(a, b)) is logically implied by~. Notice that the semantics associated with concept 
languages is an open world semantics: the answer to a query Q will be YES if Q is true in 
every model for ~, NO if Q is false in every model, and UNKNOWN otherwise. 
It is weil known (see for example [4]) that query answering in ACC-knowledge bases is 
reducible to satisfiability. A calculus for knowledge base satisfiability in ACe is presented 
in [9] and shown to be complete and terminating. 
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3 An Epistemic Concept Language 
In this section we present the epistemic concept language ACeK" previously introduced 
in [7], wh ich is an extension of ACe with an epistemic operator. Generally speaking, we 
follow [25], and use KC to denote the set of individuals known to be instances of the 
concept C in every model for the knowledge base. The syntax of ACeK, is the following 


























The semantics of ACeK, is an adaptation to the framework of concept languages of 
the one proposed in [14, 15, 25]. As in the cited papers, some issues typical of first~order 
modal systems arise. Such issues concern the interpretation structures and are dealt with 
by the following assumptions: 
• every interpretation is defined over a fixed domain, called 6 (Common Domain 
Assumption)j 
• for every interpretation the mapping from the individuals into the domain elements, 
called 'Y, is fixed (Rigid Term Assumption). 
An epistemic interpretation is a pair (I, W) where I is an interpretation and W is a 


















{d1 E 61 Yd2 .(db d2 ) E RI,w --+ d2 E CI,w} 
{d1 E 613d2.(dl,d2 ) E RI,w /\ d2 E CI,w} 
n (C.7,w) 
.7EW 
~ 23 ~ 
(KP)I,W = n (p7,w) . 
.1'ew 
Notice that, since the domain is fixed üidependently of the interpretation, it is mean-
ingful to refer to the intersection of the extensions of a concept in .different interpretations. 
It follows that KC is interpreted in W as the set of objects that are instances of C in 
every interpretation belonging to W. In this sense, KC representsthose objects known to 
be instances of C in W. Notice also that if one discards K and W in the equations, one 
obtains the standard semantics of ACe. 
An ACCIC-knowledge base \11 is a pair \11 = (T, A), where T is a set of inclusion 
statements and A is a set of membership assertions, whose concepts and roles belong to 
the language ACCIC. The truth of inclusion statements and membership assertions in an 
epistemic interpretation is defined in a straightforward way. An epistemicmodel for qI is 
a pair (I, W), where I E Wand W is any .maximal set of interpretations such that for 
each :J E W, every sentence (inclusion or membership assertion) of \I1is true In (gi W). 
Notice that the semantics of an ACCIC-knowledge ba.se could be equivalently defined 
in terms of an accessibility relation on a set of possible worlds. More specifically, the 
constraints posed by the semantic equations on KC and KP, correspond to.a structure · 
of possible worlds each one connected with all the others. Therefore, theaccessibility 
relation would · be an equivalence relation, as in the modal system S5. However, the 
epistemic models of a knowledge base correspond to S5 models with a maximal set of 
worlds. In partieular", irE is an ACe-knowledge base, Le. it does not contain epistemie 
operators, then its epistemic models are all the pairs (I, M (E» for every I E .M (E). . 
An ACCIC-knowledge base \11 is said to be satisfiable if there existsan epistemie model 
for \11, unsatisfiable otherwise. \11 logically implies an assertion u, written \11 FC(a), if u 
is true in every epistemic model for q,. 
4 ACCK as-a Query Language 
In this section, we use ACCIC as a query language to ACC-knowledge bases. First of all 
we introduce the notion of epistemic query. 
Definition 2 Given an ACC-knowledge base E, an ACCIC-concept C, and an individual 
a, the answer to the query C(a) posed to E isYES if E F C(a), NO if E F ..,C(a), and 
UNKNOWN otherwise. Moreover, the answer set ofC w.r.t. Eis the set {a E OE I E F C(a)}, 
where OE is the set of individuals appearing in E; . 
To answer epistemie queries posed to an ACC-knowledge ba.se E one can check whether 
E plus the negation of the query is unsatisfiable. "In [7], we defined asound and complete 
calculus to answer epistemie queries to an ACC-knowledge ba.seconsisting of an ABox 
only. Although such a calculus does not consider the TBox, it can besuitablyextended in 
order to treat inclusion statements in the spirit of [4, 9]. We donot present the extended 
calculus in this paper. ·It isreported in [8], where the decidability of the problem of 
answering epistemie queries to an ACC-knowledge base is proved and its computational 
properties are discussed. 
Our goal here is to show that the use of epistemic operators in queries allows for a more 
sophisticated interaction with the a knowledge representation system. For this purposewe 
• 
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AdvCourse ...:. Course n 'v'ENROLLED.Grad, 
BasCourse ...:. Course n 'v'ENROLLED.Undergrad, 
IntCourse == Course n 3ENROLLED.Grad n 3EHROLLED.Undergrad, 
3TEACHES.Course ~ Grad U Professor, 
Grad == Student n 3DEGREE.Bachelor, 
Undergrad ...:. Student n .Grad 
The TBox Ti 
Professor(bob), TEACHES(bob, ee282), TEACHES(john, cs324), 
TEACHES(john, cs221), Course(cs221), Course(cs324), 
IntCours e ( ee282), ENROLLED( ee282, pet er), ENROLLED( cs221, mary) , 
ENROLLED(cs221, susan) , ENROLLED(cs324, susan) , 
ENROLLED( cs324, peter) , Undergrad(peter) , Student( susan) , 
Student (mary), DEGREE(mary, bS), Bachelor(bs) . 
The ABox Al 
Figure 1: The ACC-knowledge base ~l 
provide an example of an ACC-knowledge base and discuss various kinds of queries that 
can be posed to it using the language ACCIC. 
In Figure 1 we show an ACC-knowledge base ~l = (Ti, Al) describing information 
about a university. The TBox Ti contains information about the various c~asses of persons 
working in the university and the courses supplied by the university. We use D ...:. C as a 
shorthand for C ~ D and D ~ C. The ABox Ar keeps track of the actual persons and 
courses involved in the university, together with the relations between them. The ABox 
Al is also shown in graph form in Figure 2. 
It can be easily shown that ~l is satisfiable and that it hasseveral different models. 
In fact, it does not have complete knowledge about the" represented world. For example, 
since EE282 is an intermediary course, ~l knows that at least one graduate student is 
enrolled in EE282, hut it doesn 't know who shejhe actually is. Similarly, EI knows that 
Susan is either a graduate or an undergraduate, without knowing which one. 
Notice that the information in Ti plays a. role in the deduction of properties of indi-
viduals in Al. For example, EI knows that Mary is a graduate student, hecause she has 
a bachelor's degree and thus, according to Ti, she falls under the description of graduate 
student. 
We consider now various AceIC queries directed to ~l. In particular, in order to 
understand the role of the epistemic operator K, we consider both ACC queries and 
modified versions of them including K. The comparison between their respective semantics 
highlights the role of K in the query language. 
We start with a pair of queries involving one single existential quantifier: 







Figure 2: A pictorial representation of the ABox 
• Query Ib: EI F 3KENROLLED.KGrad( ee282) ? Answer: NO. 
Query la asks whether there is a graduate student enrolled in EE282;The answer is 
YES because EE282 is an intermediary course and therefore, according to Ti, there is at 
least one graduate student eilrolled in it. However, as we already mentioned, the name of 
the enrolled student is unknown. It might "either be one of the indlviduals named in EI 
or a different one about whom no information is given. Moreover, it is not even ensured 
that it is the sameone in all models. 
On the other hand, Query Ib asks whether there exists an individual who is known 
both to be enrolled in EE282 and to be a grad uate student. In other words, it asks ror an 
individual, say fred, such that both the assertions ENROLLED{ ee282, fred) and Grad(fred) 
hold in every model for EI. Such an individual does not exist, thus the answer to the query 
is NO. 
The next pair of queries shows the interaction of the epistemic operator with the 
disjunction constructor: 
• Query 2a: EI F Grad U Professor(john) ? Answer: YEs. 
• Query 2b: EI F KGrad U KProfessor(john) ? Answer: NO. 
Query 2a asks whether John is either a graduate student or a professor. Theanswer 
is YES, and it can be derived by the fact that it is stated in the ABox that he teaches two 
courses, and, a.ccording to the TBox, everybody who teaches at least one course is either 
a graduate student or a professor. 
Query 2b, instead, asks whether he is either known to be a graduate student or known 
to be a professor. It is easy to verify that none of them is true and therefore the answer 
to this query is NO. 
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We consider now queries that involve also universal quantifiers: 
• Query 3a: EI F VTEACHES.(IntCourse U -.Course)?(bob) Answer: UNKNOWN • 
• Query 3b EI F V'KTEACHES.?K(IntCourse U -.Course)(bob) Answer: YEs. 
Query 3a asks whether every course taught by Bob is an intermediary one; The answer 
is UNKNOWN because there are models for EI in which Bob teaches only intermediary courses 
as weU as models in which he teaches also courses that are not intermediary. . 
Query 3b, instead, asks whether everything that is known to be taught by Bob is also 
known to be either an intermediary course or not to be a course. Since the · only thing 
taught by Bob is EE282, and it is indeed an intermediary course, the answer toQuery 3b 
is YEs • 
. In the above example the addition of K haschanged the answer from UNKNOWN to YES. 
Notice that it is also possible that Query 3a could be answered NO and Query 3b still be 
answered YES: Suppose that the assertion 3TEACHES.AdvCourse (bob) is added to EI and . 
then the same queries are asked. Query 3a now gets the answer NO, becauseAdvCourse 
and IntCourse are disjoint concepts. However, the set of known courses taught by Bob 
is not changed, and therefore the answer to Query 3b is still YES. 
We now consider some queries involving nested quantifiers: Queries 4a and 4b involve 
two levels of existential quantification. The innerm08t quantifier is carried by the concept 
IntCourse, which haB existential quantifiers in its definition in 7i . 
• Query 4a: EI F 3TEACHES.IntCourse(john) ? Answer: YES • 
• Query 4b: EI F 3KTEACHES.KIntCourse(john) ? Answer: NO. 
Query 4aasks whether John teaches an intermediary course. At a superficial reading 
of the query, it might seem that the answer should be NO. The answer NO is supported 
by the fact that none of the courses taught by John is known to be an intermediary 
course, i.e. neither IntCourse( cs221) nor IntCoUrse( cs324) is a logical consequence of 
EI. Nevertheless, the correct answer is YES, and in order to get it,one must reason by 
case analysis: As we have already remarkEKl, the knowledge . base does not provide the 
information as to whether Susan is a graduate or an undergraduate; however, since she is 
a student, according to 7i, she must either be one or the other. This fact ensures that 
in every model for EI either Grad(susan) or Undergrad(susan) holds. Consider now the 
set of models for EI in wh ich Grad(susan) holds. In each of these models, the course 
CS324 is taken by both a graduate (Susan)and an undergraduate (Peter), thus it is an 
intermediary course . . Similarly, consider the set of the remaining models for EI, i.e. the 
ones in which Undergrad(susan) holds. It is easy tosee that in every model for this set 
the course CS221, this time, is taken by both a graduate (Mary) and an undergraduate 
(Susan), and therefore it is an intermediary course. 
In conclusion, in every model for EI either CS324 or CS221 is an intermediary course. 
It follows that in every model for EI John teaches an intermediary course, proving that 
the correct answer to Query 4a is YES. 
On the other hand, Query 4b asks whether John is known to teach a course that is 
known to be an intermediary course. The courses known to be taught by John are CS221 
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and CS324 and the only known intermediate course is EE282, therefore none of them is 
within the conditions required by the query. 
Query 4a shows how, in sorne cases, the first order semantics might not agree withthe 
intuitive reading of a query. In fact, most people tend to readQuf;lry 4a as requiring the 
reasoning pattern that is actually associated with the semantics of Query 4b. In öther 
words, they tend to rule out the case analysis from the computation. One good reason 
to do so is that case analysis generally makes reasoning harder. In fact, as · proved in 
[26], the problem of answeringqueries with existential quantifica.tiqn under the firs.t order 
semantics, is in general coNP-hard. Whereas, as shown in [7], queries involving existential 
quantification only of the form 3KP.KC canbe answered in polynornial time .w.r.t. the 
size of the knowledge base. However, there are a.Iso cases in which the intuitionagrees 
with the first order interpretation. For this reason, in our opinion, it is important to have 
the operator K j which gives the possibility to choose between the two alternative readings 
of the query. 
Regarding the interaction between the epistemic operator and the quantifiers, notice . 
that we have always considered queries of the form 3KP.KC and VKP.KC,i.e. queries 
in which the K operator is placed in front of both the concept and the role. Su.ch queries 
usually have an easy intuitive interpretation. and therefore are themost interesting; Nev-
ertheless, it might be worthwhile to consider even other possible variations of them, for 
example queries like 3KP.C or VP.KC. Such queries are perfectly legal inA.L:CK, howev-
er, in some cases, they may lack an intuitive meaning. The reason is that they amalgamate 
A.L:C-concepts with epistemic ones, resulting in something to which it is usually hard to 
give an intuitive meaning. 
In other cases, though, they can playa useful role. AB an example consider the following 
queries: 
• Query 4c: EI 1= 3KTEACHES.lntCourse(john) ? . Answer: YES. 
• Query 4d: EI F 3TEACHES.KlntCourse(john) ? Answer: UNKHOWN . 
Notice that Query 4c gets the same answer (YES) as Query 4a. In fact, since 
TEACHES(john, cs221) and TEACHES(john, cs324) are known, the addition of K in front 
of TEACHES does not change the answer to the query. Query 4d, instead, is answered 
UNKNOWN because the only known intermediate course is EE282 and we can neither prove 
nor exelude that John teaches it. 
The fact that Query 4c gets the answer YES and Query 4d the answer UNKNOWNmay 
help us understand the answers to Query 4a and · 4b. In particular, it clarUies which 
is the actual reason that makes Query 4a and 4b different: It teils us that theincom-
pleteness of the knowledge base is related to the concept IntCourse and not to the role 
TEACHES. In fact, TEACHES(john, cs324) and TEACHES(john, cs221) are both true iriE1, 
while IntCourse(cs324) and IntCourse(cs221) are not-only their disjunction is true. 
5 Closed World Reasoning 
The reason for the open world semantics of concept languages is that they are generally 
used in applications where one has to account for incomplete information. For example, 
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even if all the known courses taught by Bob are intermediary, one does not want to 
conclude that all possible courses that Bob teaches are intermediary. 
On the other hand, there are situations where it is natural to query a knowledge base 
under the Closed World Assumption. Referring to the knowledge base EI of Figure 1, 
consider the following examples: 
• Query 5a: EI F V'rEACHES.3ENROLLED.T(john) ? Answer: UNKNOWN 
• Query 5b: EI F'v'KTEACHES.3ENROLLED. T(john) ? Answer: YES 
Query 5a gets theanswer UNKNOWN because there is a model for EI where John teaches 
a course z, butthere are no students enrolled in z, i.e. z is not an instance of the concept 
3ENROLLED. T. On the other hand, the correct reading of Query 5b is as folIows: Is it true 
that for every course z that John is known to teach, there is at least one studentenrolled 
in z? It is easy tosee the answer to the query is YES. 
The above example shows that the use of K allows one to pose queries to a knowledge 
base E asking the system to assume complete knowledge on a certain individual a and a 
certain role P in E (john and TEACHES in the example). In particular, assumingcomplete 
knowledge on a and P here means assuming that for every pair (a, b)such that E V= P(a, b), 
the assertion P(a, b) is false in E. It is clear that this kind of reasoning is a form closed 
world reasoning. " 
We show here that under certain restrictions, our query language allows us to aehieve 
at least the expressive power of the (naive) Closed World Assumption (CWA) (see [24]). 
The restrictions affect both the content and the language of the knowledge base. We say 
a knowledge base is simple if it does not contain inclusionstatements. In the following we 
consider simple knowledge bases where the ABox is expressed in the language A.co, whose 
concepts are formed according to the rule: 
C,D --t A I-.A I Cn D I VR.C. 
More complex languages and knowledge bases and more powerful forms of closed world 
reasoning (e.g. Generalized CWA [18]) require a " more sophisticated treatment, which is 
outside the scope of this paper. 
We brieHy reformulate the CWA in the setting of a simple A.co knowledge base E. Let 
E CWA be the knowledge base obtained from E by adding -.A(a) or -.P(a, b), respectively, 
for every assertion A(a) or P(a, b) that is not entailed by E. Now, for any concept C the 
statement C(a) follows from E under the CWA, written E FCWA C(a), if C(a) follows 
from ECWA. 
In the following, we assurne that the ACC-concepts used for querying a knowledge base 
are in negation normal form, i.e. negations signs are pushed down until they only occur in 
front of primitive concepts (see [28]). Given an A.cC-concept C in negation normal form, 






3P.C = 3KP.C 
VP.C = VKPZ1. 
The above transformation puts an epistemic operatorin front of every primitive concept 
and primitive role. Now, it is possible to show that, if Eisa simple ACo-knowledge base, 
Cis an ACC-concept, and a is an individual, then E FCWA C(a) if and only if EF C(~). 
Moreover, checking whether E F C (a) an be done.in time polynomial in the size of both 
the query and the knowledge base. This is in sharp contrast to answering queries that 
are formulated with arbitrary ACC-concepts, which is a PSPACE-hard problem even ror 
a fixed ACo-knowledge base. 
Intuitively, the reason for the above result is that foran ACo-concept C the assertion 
C(a) is logically equivalent to a finite set ofHorn clauses and, therefore, simple ACo 
knowledge bases are equivalent to sets of Horn dauses. AB aconsequence,if such a 
knowledge base is satisfiable, it always hasone minimum model, say Zo. Hence, evaluating 
a query under the CWA amounts to evaluating it in Zo. Now, putting a K in front of every 
primitive concept A and role P has the effect that Aand P are taken aS theintersection 
of their interpretations in all models of E, Le., they are interpreted in Zo. This explains 
why dosed world reasoning can be enforced through the use of K. Thatqueries can be 
answered in polynomial time is due to the fact that on the one hand the Horn clauses 
corresponding to a simple ACo-knowledge base do not contain function symbols and on 
theother hand that toncepts have a hierarchical structure that makes them suitable for 
efficient bottom up evaluation. 
Notice that transforming a query C into C implies answering the query · under the 
assumption that the knowledge about every role is complete, like for example in [19, p. 
113]. On the other hand, as noted in [13], there are situations where wewould like to apply 
the dosed world assumption only to some of the concepts and the roles of the knowledge 
base. 
We argue that the use of epistemic operators as described in the previous sections is a 
natural way to achieve such a flexible way of interacting with the knowledge base. Indeed, 
the careful introduction of the epistemic operator into the query induces the system to 
answer queries under the assumption that part of the knowledge base is complete, in 
contrast to assigning a dosed world semantics to the knowledge base itself. 
Consider the following query to the knowledge base EI given in Section 4: 
• Query 4e: EI F 3KTEACHES.K(Course n 3IDlROLLEO.Grad n 
3ENROLLEO. (Student n -.KGrad)) (j ohn) ? Answer: YES. 
Notice that Query 4e is syntactically equal to Query 4b, except that the concept 
IntCourse is replaced by the ACCK-concept 
Course n 3ENROLLED.Grad n 3ENROLLED.(Student n -.KGrad). (1) 
Concept (1) differs from the definition of IntCourse in the fact that Undergrad is repla.ced 
by (Studentn -.KGrad). Concept (1) should be interpreted as the concept describing the 
courses that are intermediary under the assumption that every student is an undergrad-
uate, unless the contrary is known. In fact, a course belongs to such a concept if both a 
graduate and a student not known to be a graduate are enrolled in it. It is easy to see 
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that the course CS221 is an instance of Concept (1), and therefore the answer to Query 
4e is YES. 
Notiee that asking queries like Query 4e is completely different from giving some kind 
of closed world semantics to the knowledge base; In fact, in our framework the knowledge 
base is perfectly monotonie, whereas using the epistemie operator the queries can be 
formulated in such a way that the reasoning which is required to comj>ute the answers is 
nonmonotonie. 
6 Rules as Epistemic Statements 
In the previous sections we considered knowledge bases constituted . by indusions and 
membership assertions in A.cc. We now consider the case where epistemic sentences 
of a special kind are introduced into the knowledge base, · and show that this extension 
formalizes the usage of procedural rules (or simply rules), as provided in many practieal 
systems based on concept languages. In fact, systems such as CLASSIC [2] and LOOM 
[17], in addition to inclusions and membership assertions provideanother mechanism for 
expressing knowledge, by means of ~calle<l rules. Such rules are sentences the form 
C=}D 
where C, D are concepts. The meaning of a ruleis "if an individual is proved to be an 
instance of C, then derive that it is also an instance of D" (see [2]), and its behavior ofrules 
is usually described in terms of a forward reasoning process that adds to the knowledge · 
base the assertion D(a) whenever C(a) is proved to hold. We call procedural extension of 
a knowledge base E w.r.t. a set of rules the knowledge base resulting from such a forward 
reasoning process. 
Rules in the context of frame-based systems are often defined· informally. Attempts to 
precisely capture the meaning of such rules are based either on viewing them as knowledge 
base updates (see for example the TELL operation of [14]), or on ad hoc semantics (see 
[27]). Our aim in this section is to show that rules can be nicely formalized as partieular 
epistemie sentences. 
In the following we consider ACCK-knowledge bases of the form (7, A), where 7 = 
7'u1l with 7' being a set of A.cc-inclusion statements, and 1l a set of epistemic sentences, 
each one of the form 2 
KC~D 
where C and D are A.cc-concepts. We call these sentences trigger rules, since they are 
our formal counterpart of the rules C =} D. We also call C the antecedent and D the 
consequent of the trigger rule. As a notational convenience we write the ACCK-knowledge 
base (7,..4) as (E, 1l), where E = (7', A). 
From the definition of the semantics of A.ccK-knowledge bases it follows that an 
epistemic interpretation (I, W) satisfies the trigger rule KC ~ D if (KC)Z'w ~ DI,w. 
Intuitively, the set of epistemie sentences 1l rest riets the set of models for E to the maximal 
subsets that satisfy every trigger rule in 1l. More precisely, it can be shown that if (I, W) 
is an epistemie model for ~ = (E, 1l), then W is a maximalsubset of M(E) such that for 
lIn [7] we used the notation KC ~ KD. The two notations are equivalent in the semantics we give. 
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each .1 E W, (.1, W) satisfies every sentence in 'Tl. Beca.use of the form of such senten ces, 
it can also be shown that there exists only one maximal su bset W of M (E) stich that for 
all .1 E W, (.1, W) satisfies every sentence in ~. • . 
Observe that when a concept C is equivalent to T, i.e. CI = d fo~ every interpretation 
X, a trigger rule KC !;;; D is equivalent totlie iitClusion T !;;; D. Besides this case, however, 
trigger rules are not expressible by iriclusions. Indeed, the main difference betweenrules 
and inclusions is that the formers are intended to provide a reasoning mechanism which 
applies them in onedirection only, namely from the antecedent to the consequent. Our 
formalization of rules with the epistemic operator correctly captures this property, as 
shown in the following example. 
Consider the knowledge base ~ = «0, {-.B(a)}), {KA !;;; B}), and observe that there 
exists an epistemic model (X, W) of ~ such that -y(a) f/ -.AI. Therefore, -.A(a) is .not a 
logical consequence of~. 
In order to characterize the notion of procedural eXtension we nowintroduce the con-
cept of first-order extension of an ACCK.;.knöwledge ba.se (E, 'Tl);The first..:order extension 
of ~ = (E, 'Tl), where E = (T,A),is the AL:C-knowledge base ER, which is·the least 
solution (w.r.t. to set inclusion) of the following equations: 
where 
X = (T,A') 
T = Tu {T !;;; D I KC !;;; D E 'Tl and X t= T !;;; C} 
A' = Au {D(a) I KC ~DE 'Tl and X t= C(a)}. 
We do not delve into the details of the computation of the first-order extension . . We 
simply remark that the solution of the above equations is unique and can beincrementally 
constructed starting from E in a number of steps wh ich is polynomial w.r.t. the size of 4>. 
First-order extensions are linked to the semantics by the following property. Let ~ = 
(E, 'Tl) be an A.cCK-knowledgebase, let (X, W) be an epistemic model for ~, and let 
Ex be the first-order extension of 4>. Then W coincides with the set of models foi the 
AL:C-knowledge base ER. In other words, the result of the forward reasoning process on 
a knowledge ba.se and set of trigger rules, which is represented by the least solution of the 
above equations, is correctly captured by the semantics of the ALCK-knowledge base ~, 
where the trigger rules are expressed as epistemic sentences. 
We now show an example of the usage of rules in our framework. Consider the ALCK-
knowledge ba.se ~ = (E, 'Tl): 
E (0, {TEACHES(bill, cs248), Grad(bill)}) 
'Tl = {KGrad!;;; 'VTEACHES.BasCourse}. 
The first-order extension of ~ is 
ER = (0, {TEACHES(biÜ, cs248), Grad(bill), VTEACHES.BasCourse(bill)}). 
Obviously, ER t= BasCourse(cs248). From the semantics, one can verify that for ev-
ery epistemic model (X, W) for 4>, we have -y(bill) E (YTEACHES.BasCourse)I.W and 
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,( cs248) E BasCourseI,W, Le., both the assertion 'v'TEACHES.BasCourse (bill) and 
BasCourse(cs248) are logical consequences of~, as one would expect~ 
It is worth noting that the calculus for answei"ing epistemic quei"ies, mentioned in 
Section 4, can be effectively used in the computation of thefirst-order extension of an 
ACCK-knowledge base. In fact, the application of a trigger rule KC !; D requires to 
compute the answer set of the query KC, which can be done by means of that caIculus. 
7 Weak Inclusions as Epistemic Statements 
Recent studies on the formal properties of <:oncept languages [4, 20, 21] show that one of 
the critical aspects of the implementation ofknowledge representation systemsbased on 
concept languages is the treatment of indusions. This problem is addressed for example in 
LOOM [16] by adopting a weak form of indusion, which applies only to known individuals 
and disregards many inferences based on the use of contrapositives. 
In this section we argue that the dass of epistemic sentences used in the formalization 
of trigger rules can be regarded as a form of weak indusion which may lead to significant 
computational advantages in comparison to indusion statements as defined in Section 2. 
To this purpose we introduce the notion of weakening of an ACCK-knowledge base, 
wh ich is the A.cCK:-knowledge base obtained by replacingevery indusion statement C !; D 
by the epistemic statement KC !; D. More formaIly, let ~ = «7, A), 'Tl) be an ACCK-
knowledge base as d~fined in the previous section. The weakening of ~ is the A.cCK-
knowledge base 
~- = (E', 'Tl') 
where 
E' = (0,A) 
and 
'Tl' = 'Tl U {KC !; D I (C !; D) E 7}. 
Intuitively, every inference we can. mak.e in ~- can be done in ~ as well, while the 
converse of course is not true. Hence, ~- can be regarded as a sound approximation of~, 
where the lost inferences are traded with a gain in the efficiency of reasoning. Before ad-
dressing in more detail this computational aspect, we present an example of the weakening 
transformation. 
Consider the knowledge base ~l = (EI! 0), where EI = ('Ti, Al) is the knowledge base 
used in Section 4. The weakening ~l will be «0, AI), 'R.I), where 'R.I is shown in Figure 3. 
Recall that all definitions of the form C == D are a shorthand for C !; D and D !; C. 
It can be verified that all quei"ies asked to EI in Section 4 have the same answer in 
~l' except for queries 4a and 4d, reported here for the sake of dai"ity . 
• Query 4a: EI F 3TEACHES.lntCourse(john) ? Answer: YES • 
• Query 4d: EI F 3KTEACHES.lntCourse(john) ? Answer: YES. 
These quei"ies receive the answer YES in EI because of a case analysis on Susan. Recall 
that, according to 'Ti, the TBox of EI, the two concepts Grad and Undergrad partition the 
concept Student. Being a student, Susan can be either a graduate or an undergraduate. In 
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KAdvCourse ~ (Course n 'v'ENROLLED.Grad), 
K(Coursen VENROLLED.Grad) ~AdvCourSQ, 
KBasCourse ~ (Course n VENROLLED.Undergrad), 
K(Course ri VENROLLED.Undergrad) ~ B~Course, 
KlntCourse !; (CoUrse n 3ENROLLED.Grad n 3ENROLLED~Undergrad), 
K(Course n 3ENROLLED.Grad n 3EHROLLED.Undergrad) ~ IntCourse, 
K3TEACHES.Course ~ Grad U Professor, 
KGrad ~ (Student n 3DEGREE.Bachelor), 
K(Student n 3DEGREE.Bachelor) ~ Grad, 
KUndergrad ~ (Student n -,Grad), 
K(Student n -,Grad) ~ Undergrad 
Figure 3: . The trigger rules of 4>1' obtained by weakening the indusions of Ti 
the first case, the course CS221 is an inetrmediary course, while in the second ·case CS324 
is an inetrmediary course. Hence, in both cases John teaches an inetrmediary course. 
On the co nt rary, it is easy to see that this does not happen in 4>1' as shown by the 
following queries. 
• Query 4f: 4>1 F 3TEACHES.lntCourse(john) ? Answer: UNKNOWN. 
• Query 4g:4>1 F 3KTEACHES.lntCourse(john) ? . Answer: UNKNOWN. 
This is because in 4>1 the two c~ncepts Grad and Undergrad do not partition the concept 
Student. What we just know is that individuals known to be undergraduates areinferred 
to ·be students and nongraduates, and vice versa, that individuals known to be students 
and nongraduates are inferred to be undergraduates. Since Susan is in neither of the two 
conditions, we cannot infer. anything about her. In fact, there are now epistem:ic modelsfor 
4>1 where Susan is neither a graduate nor an undergraduate. Therefore, the two queries 
4f and 4g receive the answer UNKNOWN. 
One can alao verify that contrapositives are not applicable in 4>1. Compare the answer 
to -,3DEGREE.Bachelor(peter) in the two knowledge bases: 
• Query 5a: EI F -,3DEGREE.Bachelor(peter) ? Answer: YES. 
• Query 5b: 4>1 F -,3DEGREE.Bachelor(peter) ? Answer: UNKNOWN. 
In fact, in EI Peter is known to be an undergraduate, hence a student who is a nongraduate. 
Since graduates are defined as students with a bachelor's degree, we can infer that Peter has 
none by using the contrapositive of the indusion . (Student n 3DEGREE.Bachelor) ~ Grad. 
Instead, in 4>1 we only can infer tha.t Peter is a student and a nongraduate. This does not 
activate the contrapositive of the trigger rule K(Student n 3DEGREE.Bachelor) ~ Grad. 
Let us now go back to the computational advantages of weakening an ACCK-knowledge 
base. In order to show such advantages, consider an ACCK-knowledge base 4> = (E, 'R), 
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where E = (T, A), and let ~- = (E',1l'), where E' = (0, A), be its weakening. Further-
more, assurne that no rule in 1l' has an antecedent which is equivalent to T. 
Extending the resultsof the complexity analysis carried out in [4, 9], one tan show 
that query answering in ~ can be solved · in exponential space and double exponential 
time [8]. Since query answering in ACC-knowledge bases withinclusions is known to 
be EXPTIME-hard [4], we do not expect to find any a1gorithm working in polynomial 
space, unless EXPTIME = PSPACE. On the other hand query answering in ~- amounts 
to solving the same problems in Ex" which is the first-order extension of E' = (0,A) 
w.r.t.1l'. Observing that Ex' is a knowledge base constituted by an ABox only, we know 
from [7] that this problem can be solved in polynomial space. Since the size of ER' is 
polynomially related to the size of ~-, and therefore of ~ too, the above observation 
shows that weakening the inclusions of an ACCK-knowledge base leads toan exponential 
decrease of the space required for query answering. 
We can conclude that the notion of weakening proposed here provides a form of incom-
plete reasoning that is both computationally advantageous and semantically well-foimded. 
8 Conclusion 
In this paper, we discussed the advantages of using an epistemic operator both for en-
hancing the capabilities of concept languages, and for formalizing non-standard features 
of existing knowiedge'representation systems based on concept Ianguages. We have shown 
that the epistemic operator 'is flexible enough to account for several different nations in 
an elegant and uniform way, namely epistemic queries, closedworld reasoning,procedural 
rules and weak forms of coneept definition. 
At the same time, we believe that our investigation on the epistemic operator raises a 
numbei of interesting issues related to the use of concept languages in practical systems, 
which we intend to address in future work. First of all, it is wonh analyzing whether 
the claSs of epistemic sentences proposed for formalizing rules and definitions can be 
extended so as to capture more aspects, while retaining the nice computational properties. 
Moreover, it would be interesting to analyze whether epistemic sentences are powerful 
enough to express ~me form of default reasoning. 
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Abstract 
The most natural means for specifying a non-classicallogic is by means of a Hilbert 
calculus. U sually, the semantics of a non-classicallogic is given in terms ·of possible 
worlds. Given an axiomatization of a non-classicallogics, the correspondence prob-
lem in these logics is to find for every given Hilbert axiom an equivalent property of 
the accessibility relation (van Benthem (1984)). For mechanizing deduction in non-
classical logics it is very important to find these correspondences Ohlbach (1991). 
So far the method for finding the correspondences was mostly by intuition and the 
verification required complex proofs van Benthem (1984). 
SCAN is an algorithm which offers a method for computingthe correspondences 
fully automatically. Moreover, since SCAN preserves equivalences, the tomputed 
correspondence axioms are guaranteed to be complete in the sense that a formula 
is derivable in the Hilbert calculus if and only ifit is valid in the ffames which are 
models of the computed correspondence axiom. 
In this paper we present the SCAN algorithm and an application of it to the problem 
of collapsing modal operators in multi-modal logics: Given a Hilbert calculusfor 
modal operators Dm, and D m2 we have to ensure that 
doesn't hold for all formulae P, because this is in general an unwanted consequence 
of the given axiomatization. 
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1 Introduction 
Except for time wherewe have a precise mathematical model, all the other not ions 
used to describe mental attitudes of agents are fuzzy. What is 'belief', 'knowledge', 
'intention' etc. in mathematical terms? Nobody knows, therefore the only wayto use 
these notions in a computer system is by means of approximations - formulations 
which are mathematically precise, but which do not necessarily reflect all aspects of 
the reality. Since the application defines the necessary degree of the approximation, 
a method is needed for specifying the approximation on a very abstract level and 
compiling it as automatically as possible into a mechanizablededuction system. 
In Gabbay and Ohlbach (1992), Szalas (1992), and Simmons (1992) a method for 
transformation a Hilbertcalculus into predicate logic was proposed, which can be . 
applied to this problem. 
As an example, suppose, Want, Believe and because-operators are to be defined. 
Nobody has an idea what these notions me an in precise mathematical terms. But 
everybody would agree to some basic correlations between them, for example if you 
want R because you believe that R implies Q then in reality you want Q, or formally 
Want R because Believe(R -t Q) -t Want Q 
This is an Hilbert axiom correlating the Want-Operator with Believe, because 
and -t. With a growing number of modal operators like Want or Believe, it will be 
hard to tell wether the correlations are still consistent with each other. Furthermore, 
if we have chosen multiple modal operators to describe different mental attitudes, 
these modal operators shouldn't become equivalent. An equivalence like 
V R: Want R f-+ Believe R 
is usually an unwanted correlation, although the set ofaxioms can still be consistent. 
In such a situation, we say that Want and Believe collapse. 
In the sequel we will introduce a method for second-order quantifier elimina-
tion. Gabbay and Ohlbach (1992) and Allgayer, Ohlbach, and Reddig (1992) have 
shown the usefulness of second-order quantifier elimination for the mechanization of 
non-classical logics. In this paper we will focus on the application of second-order 
quantifier elimination to the problem ofaxiomatizing consistent modal logics with 
non-collapsing modal operators. 
2 Hilbert Calculi for Non-Classical Logics 
The most natural means for specifying a logic for fuzzy notions like Want or Believe 
is by means of a Hilbert calculus. A Hilbert calculus consists of some axioms, i.e. for-
mulae or formulae schemata respectively which are apriori considered true, together 
with so me production rules for generating from the axioms other true formulae (tau-
tologies). The axiomatization of normal modal logic (Chellas 1980) which may be 
used as a basis for axiomatizing 'belief' etc. is an example for a Hilbert calculus: 
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Example 1 (Hilbert Calculus for Normal Modal Logic) 
Axioms: all axioms of proposi tional logic 




Q (Modus Ponens) 
(Necessitation Rule) 
Implicitly there is always a substitution rule allowing to consider the propositional 
variables (P, Q, ... ) as placeholders for arbi trary formulae. Different variants of the 
logic manifest themselves by additional Hilbert axioms. 
Usually, the semantics of a modal logic is given in terms of possible worlds. 
Hilbert axioms like the K-Axiom above correspond to particular properties of the 
possible worlds structure. For example, the Hilbert axiom 
VPDP-+P (1) 
corresponds to the reflexivity of the accessibility relation. The correspondence prob-
lem in these logics is to find fora given Hilbert axiom an equivalent semantic 
property of the accessibility relation (van Benthem 1984). For mechanizing de-
duction in non-classical logics it is very important to find these correspondences 
(Ohlbach 1991). So far the method for finding the semantic properties of the acces-
sibility relation was mostly by intuition and the verification required complex proofs 
(van Benthem 1984). 
In the following section, we will introduce an algorithm for second-order quanti-
fier elimination, which can be used to mechanize the finding of semantic properties. 
3 The SCAN Algorithm 
SCANI is the first algorithm which offers a method for computing the correspon-
den ces fully automatically. Moreover, since SCAN preserves equivalences, the com-
puted semantic properties are guaranteed to be compleie in the sense that a formula 
is derivable in the Hilbert calculus if and only if it is valid in the frames which are 
models of the computed corresponding semantic properties. 
Definition 2 (The SCAN Algorithm) 
Input to SCAN is a formula Q' = 3P1 , • •• ,Pn 'IjJ with predicate variables Pt, . .. ,Pn 
and an arbitrary first-order formula 'IjJ. 
Output of SCAN - if it terminates - is a formula <.pOl which is logically equivalent 
to Q', but not containing the predicate variables Pt, . .. , Pn . 
SCAN performs the following three steps: 
lSCAN means 'Synthesizing Correspondence Axioms for Normal logics.' The name has been 
chosen before we realized that is applicable in a general context. 
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1. 1jJ is transformed into · c1ause form using .second order skolemization. That 
means the resulting formula has the form: 3Pl,"" Pn3h, ... , fnt/J' where the 
fi are the Skolem functions and t/J' is a set of clauses. From the algorithrn's 
point of view, the quantifier prefix can be ignored. Therefore t/J' is treated as 
an ordinary c1ause set with the usual Skolern constants and functions; 
2. All C-resolvents and C-factors with the predicate variables PI, ... j Pn have to 
be generated. C-resolution ('C' for constraint) is defined as follows: 
P(SI, ... , Sn) V C P( ... ) and -.P( ... ) 
...,P( t l , ... ,tn ) V D are, the resolution literals 
C V D V SI =I t l V ... V Sn =I tn 
and the C-factorization rule is defined analogously: 
P(SI"'" Sn) V P(tl, ... , tn) V C 
P( SI, ... , Sn) V C V SI =I t l V ... V Sn =I tn 
Notice that only C-resolutions between different c1auses are allowed (no self 
resolution). AC-resolution or C-factorization can be optimized by destruc-
tively resolving literals x =I t where the variable x does not occur in t with the 
refiexivityequation. C-resolution and C-factorization takes into account that 
second order quantifiers may well impose conditions on the interpretations 
which must be formulated in terms of equations and inequations. 
As so on as all resolvents and factors between a particular literal and the rest 
of the clause set have been generated (the literal is 'resolved away'), the clause 
containing this literal must be deleted (purity deletion)~ If all clauses are ' 
deleted this way, this means that a is a tautology. 
All equivalence preserving simplifications may be applied freely. These are for 
example: 
• Tautologous resolvents can be deleted. 
• Subsumed clauses can be deleted. 
• Subsumption factoring can be performed. Subsumption factoring rneans 
that a factor subsurnes its parent clause. This may be realized by just 
deleting some literals. For example Q(x), Q(a), where xis avariable, can 
be simplified to Q( a). 
• Subsumption resolution can also be performed. Subsumption resolution 
means that aresolvent subsurnes its parent clause, and this again may 
be realized by deleting some literals Ohlbach and Siekmanrt (1991). For 
example the resolvent between P V Q and ...,p V Q V R is just Q V R such 
that ...,p can be deleted from th~ clause. (An instance of this operation 
is realized as so called 'uni Ldeletion' in the OTTER theorem prover. ) 
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If an ernpty clause is generated, this means that a is contradictory. 
3. If the previous step terminates and there are still clauses left then reverse 
the skolemization. A method for reversing the skolemization in a set F of 
clauses is (1) to abstract all arguments of all occurrences of Skolem functions 
by variables, i.e . . f(st, ... ,Sn) is replaced with f(XI' ... ' Xn) and additional 
literals Xi #- Si are added to the clause where the Xi are fresh variables and (2) 
to consistently rename all variables such that the arguments of all occurrences 
of the Skolem function are the same. If this is possible and F[f(Xb ... ' xn )] 
is the result then \lXI, ... , xn 3y F[y] is the solution. This process is repeated 
for all Skolem functions. 
If it is not possible to rename the variables consistently, the only 'chance is 
to take parallel Henkin quantifiers (Henkin 1961) or leave the second-order 
quantification. 
The step from the Hilbert axioms to the second-order formulae is explained in 
detail in Gabbay and. Ohlbach (1992). For our purposes it is enough to assurne that 
we have semantic definitions for the modal operators and other connectives in the 
Hilbert axioms, which can be used to rewrite the axioms to second-order formulae. 
We illustrate how the SCAN algorithm can be applied by computing the reflex-
ivity of the accessibility relation from the axiom OP --+ P. 
Example 3 We start with the formula 
a=VP:OP--+P 
and semantic definitions 
V P: w 1= op {::} V w': R( w, w') ~ w' 1= P 
and 
V P: w 1= P --+ R {::} w 1= -,p V R, 
where R is the accessibility relation on worlds. 
Since SCAN accepts only existentially quantified predicate variables, a is negated 
and then the semantic definitions are applied as rewrite rules until 0 and --+ disap-
pear. The result is put into clause form. 
We obtain the two clauses: 
-'R(w, w') V P(w'), 
-'P(w) 
where w is a Skolem constant. Resolution with P-literals - only these resolutions 
are allowed - yields 




The two parent clauses are pure (no further resolutions are possible) and can be 
deleted. The single remaining clause -,R( w, w) is unskolemized to :J w: -'R(w, w) 
and negated yielding V w: R(w, w) which is the desired result2• 
4 DetectingCollapsing Modal Operators · 
The need for a tool like SCAN be comes apparent if we consider aset of Hilbert 
axioms specifying not only a single modal operator, but multiple, interacting modal 
connectives. For the standard Hilbert axioms describing a. single modal · operator 
the corresponding properties of the accessibility relation are well-known. For multi-
ple, interacting modal operators the corresponding results are less accessible. With 
SCAN we can compute the corresponding properties of the accessibility relation 
automatically .. 
But we can do even more. The first step after specifying a set of Hilbert axioms 
for multiple, interacting modal operators is to exhibit their consistency. In a second 
step, we have to show .that the modal operators do not collapse, j,e. 
Dm! P H D m2 P 
shouldn't hold for distinct modal operators Dm! and D m2 . 
The first step can be done with the aid of SCAN and any first-order refutational 
theorem prover. We use SCAN to find the correspondence axioms of the given 
Hilbert axioms. If SCAN terminates and produces a set of first-order formulae for 
every axiom, we feed the first--order refutational theorem prover withall these for-
mulae to find an inconsistency. Of course, the problem of proving the inconsistency 
of a set of first-order formulae is only semi-decidable. In case our set of formulae is 
consistent, the theorem prover may not terminate. 
In the second step, we want to show that 
-,V P: Dm! P H Dm2 P. 
holds for modal operators Dm! and D m2 . We use SCAN to eliminate the second 
order quantifier V P. We will get a corresponding first-order semantic property (if 
the process terminates). This first-order semantic property can be proven using a 
first-order refutational theorem prover. 
Example 4 van der Hoek (1992) considers the following Hilbert axioms for a multi-
modal logic of knowledge and belief: 
-,DbelietJe false 
-, D know P --+ D know -, D know P 
D know P --+ DbelietJe P 





2In this particular example we get the "relational" translation of the O-Operator (Moore 1980, 
Ohlbach 1991). A slight modification of the semantics of 0 yields the more compact and compu-
tationally more efficient "functional" translation (Ohlbach 1991). 
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Axiom (2) says that we don 't believe anything that is false. Axiom (3) is the axiom 
of negative knowledge introspection, i.e. if we don't know P, then we know that we 
don't know P. Axiom (4) defines that knowledge is 'stronger' than believe. Axiom 
(5) is intended to model the attitude of an agent who thinks that he is very critical 
in adopting believes: he only believes P if he believes that he knows P. 
SCAN produces the following corresponding semantic properties in dause form 
Rbelieve (Wl' f( Wl)) 
-,Rknow(Wl,W2) V -,Rknow(Wl,W3) V R know (W2,W3) 
-,Rbeiieve(Wl' W2) V ....,Rknow(W2' W3) V Rbeiieve(Wl, W3) 





where WI, W2, and W3 denote (universally quantified) variables and f is a Skolem 
function. (6)-(9) say that Rbelieve is serial, contained in Rknow, transitive over 
(Rbelieve, Rkow), and R know is eudidean. 
Now is there actually a difference between knowledge and believe provided the 
given Hilbert axioms hold? We al ready know that for all P 
holds. Now we want to check if the converse is also true. That is, we check if 
(10) 
is an additional consequence of the .Hilbert axioms. The corresponding semantic 
property of (10) is 





where v and ware Skolem constants. Resolution of dause (8) with (12) and (6) 
yields 
Now dause (7) can be resolved with dause (13) and (11) giving 
The resolvent of dause (14) and dause (9) is 





Resolution of dause (15) and (6) yields the empty dause, i.e. We have proven the 
inconsistency of this set {(6), ... , (12)) of dauses. 
So, 
0knaw P +-+ °belietJe P 
actually holds for all P. Every dause of the semantic properties corresponding to 
the considered Hilbert axioms has been used in the proof above. Therefore,all four 
Hilbert axioms together force the collapse of knowledge and belief. We have to 
abandon at least one of them to get back to a set ofaxioms where knowledge and 
belief are distinct operators.3 
5 Limitations of SCAN 
The SCAN algorithm can produce first-order semantic properties only for those 
second-order Hilbert axioms where such corresponding properties actually exist. 
From modal lögic we know cases where a Hiibert axiom has a semantic property 
which is only second-order axiomatizable. The most well-known example is the 
McKinsey axiom 
V P: Oop -+ OoP. 
SCAN produces the following property of the accessibility relationfor the McKinsey 
axiom: 
(
V :3 ) (('R.(a,x) -+ R(x,I(x)))/\ 
Va - VI :3 x (R(a, y) -+ R(y,g(y)))) -+ 
9 Y ('R.(a,x)/\R(a,y)/\I(x)=g(y)). 
Because of the quantification over functions, this is still second-order. In such a 
case, we will not be able to make further investigations. 
Furthermore, SCAN cannot invent a good axiomatization of a non-classicalla"gic. 
For example, the McKinsey axiom combinedwith the transitivity axiom 
OP -+ oOP, 
corresponds to a first-order axiomatizable property of the accessibility relation, i.e. 
atomicity of the accessibility relation 
Vx::3y:(R(x,y)/\ Vz:R(y,z) -+ z = y)) 
(van Benthem 1984, page 203). Therefore, the combination of these two axioms is 
suitable for a mechanization using a first-order theorem prover. Of course, there is 
no way for SCAN to give a hint that the McKinsey axiom should be combined with 
the transitivity axiom to get a usable set of semantic properties. 
3 van der Hoek (1992) also proved the collapse of knowledge and belief. The advantage we get 
using SCAN is the ability to perform such checks automaticaIly_ 
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6 Conclusion 
Cohen (1991) claims that AI is suffering a methodological malaise, because AI is 
dominated by two largely distinct camps: model-oriented researchers and system-
oriented researchers. One of the problems is that the results . of model-oriented 
researchers migrate only slowly to the system-oriented researchers and on the other 
hand, the real problems which system-oriented researchers arefaced with, arolise 
only slowly the interest of model-oriented researchers. 
SCAN can be seen as a tool developed by model-oriented researchers to help 
system-oriented researchers to solve their problems in their own way. SCAN is a 
tool for playing with different axiomatizations of non-classical logics. It can be 
used, as we have done in this note, to examine the consistency of an axiomatization 
or detect the collapse of modal operators in a modal logic. Another impörtant 
application of SCAN is the development of deductive systems for non-classicallogics. 
See Ohlbach (1991). 
This illustrates, how SCAN reducesthe . routine work of researchers, yielding 
more room for the art of inventing axiomatizations of non-classicallogics. 
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Abstract 
In multi-agent systems a group of autonomous intelligent systems, called agents, co-
operates in order to achieve certam goals. However, each of these agents can only perform 
actions that are based on his local knowledge and on his local beliefs. In the literature 
knowledge of agents is mostly represented under the view that knowledge is true belief. 
On the other hand, if agents are acting in a (real) world their knowledge often is obtained 
by perception and communication, and hence typically is not true. Thus, the use of 
belief-where agents may have false beliefs-seems more appropriate than knowledge for 
formalizing the reasoning and dedudion of a knowledge base. 
In this paper we present a language .ACCs that extends the concept language .ACe 
by a modal operator 0, which is indexed by agents. Thereby, 0iCP represents the fact 
"agent i believes cp". This belief operator will be interpreted in terms of possible worlds 
using the weIl-known modal logic KD45. In this approach an agent is said to believe a 
fact cP iff cP is true in all worids he considers possible. 
The language ALes provides a uniform formalism to describe both, a world agents 
are acting in andthe beliefs agents have about this world and about their own and other 
agents' beliefs. Thus, it can be seen as a two-dimensional extension of ACC which allows 
both, reasoning about objective facts that hold in theworld and reasOning on the level of 
possible worlds. We will give sound and complete algorithms to check consistency of the 
represented beliefs and to decide whether an ACCs-sentence is logically entailed by the 
beliefs of agents. Hence, when acting in a worldagents can use bellefs which are explicitly 
represented as weIl as implicit beliefs that areentailed by their knowledge base. 
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1 Introduction 
Research on the field of multi-agent systems deals with the question how a, group of au-
tonomous intelligent systems, called agents, can cooperate in order to 3.ch.ieve certain goals 
(see, e.g., [6, 14]). As an example, a forwarding agent a and a; shipping agent b may cooperate 
in order to carry out overseas transportation orders. 
Although the tasks that multi-agent systems are re4uired to petform a.te normally stated 
in terms of the global behavior of the system, the actions that an agent performs can depend 
only on his local knowledge and on bis Iocal beliefs. Thus, there isa elose rela.tionship .between 
knowledge, belief, and action in multi-agent systems (see, e.g., [27, 28, 15]). Suppose, in the 
above example agent a wants to offeraprice for carrying out some transportation order 01. 
U he believes that there is no other forwarding agent who also can carry out 0]., he will most 
likely offer another price as in the case where he believes thatthere is a competitor for this 
order. And if he even knows that there is no competitor for this order,; he perhaps offers 
an exorbitant price. In a recent paper [20] we investigated how knowledge of agents · can 
be represented on the basis of terminological logics, wherebywe used the classicalView of ' 
knowledge as true belief. That means, an ' agent knows 'P Ü he believes that 'P holds and 'P 
actual does hold. On the other hand, as pointed' out ' in, say [23], the knowledge represented in 
a knowledge hase typicaJ.ly is not true. Thus, the use of beliefs-whereagents may havefalse 
beliefs-seems moreappropriate than knowledge for formalizing the rea.sQning and deduction 
of a knowledge base. In the current paper we concern with the question how agents can be . 
equipped with beliefs about the world they are acting in, about beliefs of other agents, and 
also about their own beliefs. Thereby, it . should be -taken into cOilsideration that different 
agents may have different beliefs about the same notions. Forexample, forwarding agent a 
may believe that company XY is a richcompanyand a good dient, whileforwarding agent 
B believes thatcompany·XYis rich but not agood dient. Using the languageALCB, which 
is presented in the next section, this can be formalized by 
Do ( oompany XY: rich-company n good-client) and 
D6(company XY: rich-company n ...,good-dient) 
respectively, where Di'P is to be read as "agent i belleves 'P". 
Since the work ofHintikka [17], modallogics have widely been accepted to be an adequate 
formalism for representing knowledge and belief of agents. The intuitive idea hereis that 
besides the real world agents can imagine a number of other worlds (situations) to be possible. 
By imposing various conditions on this possibility relation, we can capture .a number of 
interesting axioms. For example, if we require thatthe worldthat the agent finds himself in 
is always Oile of the worlds he considers possible (which amounts to sayingthat the possibility 
relation is reflexive), then it follows that the agent does not know false facts. When using 
a possibility relation which captures axioms of knowledge (belief) an agent is said to know 
(believe) a fact 'P iff 'P is ttue in all worlds he thinks to be possible. For example, an agent 
knows (believes) that there exists a monster of Loch Ness if there is such a monster in all 
worlds he considers possible. To express the bellefs of an agent a in this approach a binary 
operator BELIEF (a, 'P) is used, where 'P is a formula over some logical language C. U we 
want to devise a formalism for representing the beliefs of agents we have to take two decisions. 
Firstly, we have to decide what-the general properties of belief are we want this formalism 
to capture. Secondly, we have to choose a suitable logical representation language C which 
allows to describe the beliefs of agents. 
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There are many approaches to determine axioms characterizing belief (see, e.g., [22,28, 
24, 25, 26, 11, 16]). We will use the following axiomatization which haB been most commonly 
used in the literat ure. The first of these properties states that an agent does not believe 
false facts. That means, an agent cannot believe both a fact and its negation, though he can 
believe facts which actually do not hold in the world. Secondly, if an agent believes a fact 
then he believes that he believes it (positive introspection), and if he does not believein a fact 
then he believes that he does not believe in it (negative introspection). Fromthis it folIows, 
e.g., that agents believe that their beliefs are true (weak reflexivity). Finally, the probably 
most important property is that agents can reason on the basis oftheirbeliefs. For example, 
suppose agent a believes that each truck which is owned by John can be used to transport 
gasoline and he believes that John owns the truck truck-l. In this case, agent a must be able 
to condude that John's truck truck-l can (probably) be used to transport gasoline, a.ri.d thus 
may negotiate with John for a transportation order. 
As logicallanguage to describe belief of agents we will use a terminologicallogic; Termi-
nological logics provide a well-inve&tigated and decidable fragment cif first-order logics that 
is much more expressive than propositional logic. They are based on the work ofBrachman 
and Schmolze [9] and have been developed as a structured formalism to describe the relevant 
concepts of a problem domain and the interactions between these concepts. Starting with 
atomic concepts (unary predi~at~) and roles (binary predicates), one therefore definescom-
plex concepts with the help of opera.tors provided by a concept language, and intetactions 
between (complex) concepts are expressed by a set of so-called terminological axioms. On 
the other hand, by so-called assertion al axioms, objects can be associated with concepts and 
relationships between objects can be defined viaroles. For example, we can use these logics 
to represent facts like "each truck which is ownedby John can be used to transport gasoline" 
or "John owns truck-l which is a truck". 
In the literature, a lot of concept languages have been considered (see, e.g., [8, 29, 3]). 
But they all have in common that they are only suitable for representing objective facts 
about the world, and knowledge or beliefs of agents can only be represented iJi a very limited 
way. Thus, we need an extended concept language which allows the representation of belief 
according to the above given (informal.) axiomatization. Since the work of Schild [31] it is 
known that the concept language A.cc provides a terminological logic which is a notational 
variant of the propositional modallogic K(m)' However, it is not investigatedthere how to 
extend this logic to a two-dimensionallogic which allows reasoning on boththe objectivelevel 
and the level of possible worlds. In order to combine both levels one has to define syntax 
and semantics of an extended language. Baader and Ohlbach [5] present a multi-dimensional 
extension of A.cc, where multi-modal operators can be used at all levels of the concept terms 
and they can be used tö modify both concepts and roles. However, the underlying logic is 
simply the basic modallogic K, and it is not yet dear how to extend their approach in such 
a way that modallogics differeni from K can be handled. Moreover, they could not succeed 
in proving completeness of their satisfiability algorithm. 
In this paper we will present a different extended language where (sequences of) modal 
operators are only allowed in front of terminolögical and assertional axioms. This language 
allows one to interpret the modal operators w.r.t. modal. logics different fromK, e.g., S4 
(see [20]) or KD45 (in the present paper). This language, called ACes, can be seen as 
a two-dimensional representation language with terminological and assertion al axioms as 
primitives where each primitive may describe apart of the world and each agent can believe 
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a set of such primitives to hold in the world. The modal operators, which are indexedwith 
agents, are interpreted in termsof possib.1e worlds in such a way that they satisfy theabove 
axiomatization of bellef, what aplounts in using the modallogic KD45; Thus, the resulting 
language provides a uniform formalism to describe both, a world agents area.ctingin as well 
as the bellefs agents have about this worM and about their own and other agents'belle~. We 
will give sound and complete algorithms for deciding satisfiability of ACCB-formulas a.ndfor 
testing whether an ACCB-formula is entailed by a given set of ACCB-formulas. Hence, when 
a.cting in a world agents can use bellefs which are expllcitly represented as well as implicit 
bellefs that are enta.iled by their knowledge base. 
2 Syntax and Semantics of ACCB 
In the concept language ACC concepts are built up from atomic concepts, the top concept T, 
the bottom concept 1.., and roles inductively by: Ea.ch atomic concept, T, a.ild 1.. are concepts. 
H C and D are concepts and R is a role, then C n D. (concept conjunction), Cu D (concept 
disjunction), ..... C (concept negation), V R.C (value restriction), and 3 R.C (exists restnction) 
are concepts. An interpretation I is a function over some non-empty domain ~.r which maps 
each atomic concept C to a subset Cl of ~I, each role R to a subset R I of I:!J.I X~I, T to 
~ I, and 1.. to 0. Furthermore, n is interpreted as set intersection, U as set union, and ..... as 
set complement w.r .t. ~ I. Thevalue and the exists restrictions are interpreted by 
[V R.C]I = {d E ~I I "Ir!: (d,d') E R I -+ d'E Cl} 
[3R.CjI = {d E ~I 13r!: (d,d') E RII\ d' E Cl} 
For example, if man and truck are atomie concepts and owns is a role we can define the 
eoncept of men who own trucks by man n 30wns.truck. 
The ta.xonomical knowledge of a problem domain can be defined byan ACC-TBox(ter-
minology), which consists of a finite set of terminological axioms. A terminological QXiom is 
of the form C = D (concept equivalence) or C -:j; D (negatedconceptequivalence) where C, 
D are concepts. An interpretation I satisfies C= D iff Cl = DI and it sa.tisfies C -:j; D iff 
Cl -:j; D I. An interpretation I satisfies an ACC-TBox T Hf I satisfies ea.ch axiom in T. For 
example, if carrier, person, and truck are coneepts and owns is a role, we can define exa.ctly 
the persons who own a truck to be a carrier by carrier = person n 30wns.truck. 
The assertion al formalism of ACC a.llows to introduee concrete objects by stating . that 
they are instances of concepts and roles: Hais an object and C a concept, then a : C is a 
concept instance. If a and bare objects and R is a role, then aRb is a role instance. Concept 
instances and role instan<:es aie ca.lled assertional axioms,and a finite set of assertion al axioms 
is ealled an .A.CC-ABox. An interpretation I maps objects to elements of its domain~Iand 
satisfies a : C iff aI E Cl, and aRb iff (al, 61) E R I • We assume that different objects in an 
ABox are mapped to different elements in ~.r (unique name assumption). An interpretation 
I satisfies an ACC-ABox A Hf I satisfies each axiom in A. As an example, if John and truck-l 
are objects, we can express that John owns truek-l whieh is a truck by the assertion al axioms 
John owns truck-l and truck-I: truck. Thus, we can deseribe the relevant concepts of a 
problem domain by terminological axioms, Le., by an ACC-TBox, and properties of objeets 
as well as relations between them by assertional axioms, Le., by an ACC-ABox. Wesay an 
interpretation I satisfies a set Ax1, ••• , AXn of terminologie al and assertion al axioms Hf I 
satisfies ea.ch of these axioms. We then write I 1= AX1! ... , Axn • 
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Now we will introduce the Ianguage ACC8 which extends ACC by a new operator 0i for 
each agent i. 1 We allow these operators in front of terminological and assertional axioms. 
Thereby, the operator 0i, read as "agent i belleves", allows us to express the bellefs agent 
i has about the world, about bellefs of other agents, and about his own beliefs. Therefore, 
we extend the definition of terminological and assertional axioms as folIows. H TA is a 
terminological axiom, then 0i TA and -,0iTA are terminological axioms as weIl. H CI ia a 
concept instance, then 0i CI and -'0i CI are concept instances as welle Finally, if R1 is a role 
instance, then 0i R1 is a role instance as welle Note, that we do not allow formulas of the 
form -,Oi( aRb). The reason for this restriction is that such axioms would be equivalent to 
stating that there exists a world in which the role instance aRb does not hold. And negation 
of roles is not allowed in ACC. These extended assertional and terminologicalaxioms are 
called ACC8-/ormulas and can, e.g., be used to state that agent i belleves that a carrier is a 
man who owns a truck by 0i( carrier = mann3 owns.truck). Analogously, the ACC8-formulas 
0i,Oj (vehicle-l : truck) and 0i-,0i (vehicle-l : truck) are to be readas "agent i believes 
that agent j doesn't believe that vehicle-l is a truck" and "agent i believes that he doesn't 
believe truck-l to be a truck", respectiveIy. Allowing 0i immediately in front ofeoncepts 
(possibIy Oie may be interpreted as "the Set. of individuals agent i believes to be a C") 
auses essential algorithmic problems and is out of the scope of this paper. 
We will interpret the operators 0i in terms of possible worlds, Le., besides the real world 
there exist a number of worlds agents consider to be possible. If agent i considers world w' 
possible at world w, we say w' is accessible /rom w by agent i. The accessibility relation of 
agent i is given by all pairs (w, w') such that w' is accessible from w by agent i. Since different 
worlds are possible in our approach,the interpretation of concepts and roles in ACC8-formulas 
depends on the world we are currentIy speaking of. That means, in different worlds concepts 
may contain different objects and rolesmay contain different pairsof objects. This · will be 
expressed by taking an additional parameter, the world parameter, intoconsideration when 
interpreting concepts and roles. ·Formally, we use the notion of a K -interpretation Kr which 
consists of a non-empty domain fj.Kr and maps objects to elements in fj.Kr while satisfying 
the unique name assumption, atomic concepts to subsets of fj.Kr X W, T to fj.K, X W, .1 
to 0 x W, and roles to subsets of fj.Kr X fj.Kr X W. Furthermore, n is interpreted as set 
intersection, U as set union, and , as set complement w.r.t. aKr x W. Finally, the value and 
exists restrietions are interpteted by 
[V R.c]Kr = {(d,w) I (d',w) E eKr for each d' with (d,d',w) E RKr} 
[3 R.c]Kr = {(d, w) I (d', w) E eKr for some d' with (d,d', w) E RKr}. 
Definition 2.1 A Kripke structure K is a triple (W,r,Kr). The re by, W is a ilon-empty 
set 0/ worlds, r is a finite set 0/ accessibility relations, one accessibility relation 1i /or each 
agent i, and Kr is a K-interpretation. 
lIn the following, we will abbreviate agents by numbers, and we suppose only a finite number of agents to 
be given. 
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The satisfiability of an A.cc8~formula. F in a Kripke structure K = (W,r,KI) and a world 
w E W, writtenas K, w F F, is recursively defined by: 
K,w 1= c = D 
K,wI=C~D 
K,wl=a:C 
K,w 1= aRb 
K,w 1= 0iG 
K,w 1= ""0iG 
iff {d I (d,w) E CK~l-: {d I (d,w) E DKI} 
iff {d I (d,w) E CKI} ~ {d I (d,w) E DKI} 
iff (a,w)ECK1 
iff (a,b,w) E RKI 
iff K, w' 1= G for each world w' with (w, w') E "Yi 
iff there is a world w' with (w, w') E "Yi and J(, w' li= G 
where G is an A.cc8-formula, C, D are concepts, a, b are objects, and R is a tole. A set 
Fit ... ,Fn ·of ACC8-formulasis satisfiable iff there exists a Kripke structure K,= (W,r,KI) 
and a world Wo E W such that K, Wo 1= Pi for i = 1, ... , n. We then write K 1= Fit; .. ,Fn • 
In the following we will use the not ion modality to denote (negated) indeXed ° opera-
tors, and ACC8~formulas without any modalities .are called ACC-formulas.For ex:a.mple, the 
ACC8-formula 0-ä...,Oj( vehic1e-l : truck) contains the modalities Oi and ""0j, and the .ACC8-
formula vehic1e-l : truck ia an ACC-formula. Furthermore, we use the standard notation 
OiF as an abbreviation for ""0i...,F. 
3 Testing Satisfiability of ACCs-formulas 
Using ACC8-formulas, a "real world" andbelief ofagents can be definedas follows. The real 
world is given by a finite set of ACC-formulas, and the belief of agentijsgiven by a fullte set 
of ACC8-formulas with the leading modalityOi. oe course, we do not <>nly want to represent 
a world and beliefsof agents, but we are interested in algorithms to test (i) consistency of the 
represented facts, Le., whether a given set of A.cc8-formulas is satisfiable, and (ii) whether 
an ACCB-formula is a logical consequence of a given set of ACC8-formulas. In this section we 
will give an algorithm for testing satisfiability of a sei of ACC8-formulas. Building upon this 
we will show how to decide whether ör not an ACC8-formula is a logical consequence !rom a 
given set of ACC8-formulaS in Section 4. . 
By definition, a set Fit ... , Fn of ACC8-formulas is satisfiable iff there ex:ists a Kripke 
structure K such that K 1= FIt . .. ,Fn • Of course, we are not interested in arbitrary Kripke 
structures to satisfy FI , ••. ,Fn , but only in Kripke structures which i1!terpret the belief 
operators ° in FI , •. . ,Fn in such a way that they satisfy the properties described in Section 
1. We therefore introduce the notion of KD45 Kripke structures. 
Definition 3.1 A set Fit ... ,Fn of ACC8-formulas is KD45-satisfiable iJJ there exists a 
K ripke structure K = (W, r, K 1) wh ich satisfies FI, ... ,Fn and which has the properties 
(P1) if K,w F 0iF then K,w F ""0i...,F 
(P2) if K, w 1= 0äFthen K, w F 0äOiF 
(P3) if K,w 1= ""0iF then K,w 1= 0i""0iF 
for each ACCB-formula F, for each agent i, and for each world w E W. A Kripke structure 
which satisfies (P1), (P2), and (P3) is called KD45 Kripke structure. 
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Property (P 1) corresponds to "an agent cannot believe in both a fact and its negation", 
(P2) to "if an agent believes somethingj then he believes that he believes it", and (P3) to 
"if an agent does not believe in a fact then he believes that he does not believe in. this fact" . 
The property "agents must be able to reasoil on the basis of their bellefs", is guaranteed by 
choosing Kripke structures for the representation ofbellef (cf., e.g., [16]). We will assume in 
the following that all these properties are mutually believed, Le., each agent's belief has these 
properties, each agent believes that each agent's belief has these properties and so on. It is a 
well-known fact that K = (W, r, K 1) is a KD45 Kripke structure if the accessibility relation 
"(i of each agent i is serial, Euclidean, and transitive (see, e.g., [25]). A relation"( ~Wx W 
is se rial iff for each 11. in W there is a V in W such that (11., v) E 1, Euclideaniff for all 11., V, w 
in W holds: if (11., v) E 1 and (11., w) E "( then (v, w) E "(, and transitive Hf for all 11., v, w in W 
holds: if (11., v) E 1 and (v,w) E"( then (u,w) E 1. 
. To keep notation simple we transform A'cCB-formulas into negation normal fprm.An 
A'cCB-formula (concept) is in negation normal form iff in the formula (concept) negation 
signs occur immediately in front of atomic concepts only. Concepts caribe transformed into 
an equivalent negation normal form by rules like -.(V R.C) -+ 3 R.-.C where Cis aconcept 
and R is a role (see,e.g., [19]). Building upon this, A'cCB-formulas can be transformed into 
negation normal form by the rules -.-.F -+ F, -'0iF -+ Oi-.F, -.OiF -+ Oi-.F, -.(C = D)-+ 
an : (Cn -.D)U( -.C n D), -.(C :j:. D) -+ C = D, and -.(a : C) -+ a : -.C where Fis an A'cCB-
formula, C, D are concepts, a is an object, and an is a new object.1t is easy to verify that an 
ACCB-formula is KD45-satisfiable iff its negation normal form is KD45-satisfiable (for details, 
see [21]). If Fis an A.ccB-formula in negation normal form it has a (possibly empty) leading 
sequence o· = 0il ... 0im of non-negated modalities where each Oij is either 0 orOand each 
index ij is an agent. We now replace each subsequence of modalities indexed with the same 
agent in o· by the last modality in this subsequence. The obtained A'cCB-formula iscalled 
the KD45 normal form F' of F. For example, the KD45 normal form öf 0t01 02020t(a :.G) 
is given by Ot020t(a : C). As an immediate consequence of Proposition 4.27 in [10], for each 
KD45 Kripke structure K = (W, r, K 1) and for each world w E W holds that K,1iJ 1= F iff 
K, w 1= F'. In the following we assume ea.ch A.ccB-formula to be in KD45 normal form (and 
thus especially in negation normal form). 
To formulate a calculus for testing KD45 satisfiability of A'cCB formulas we introduce the 
not ions of labeled A.ccB-formulas and of a world constraint system. A labeled A.ccB-formula 
consists of an A'cCB-formula . F~ogether with a label w, written as F 11 w. Thereby, w is a 
constant representing a world in which F holds. A world constraint is either a labeled A.ccB-
formula or a term w Mi w'. The constants w and w' represent worlds and Mi represents the 
accessibility relation of agent i. A world constraint system is a finite, non-empty set of world 
constraints. A Kripke structure K = (W,r,K1) satisfies a world constraint system W iff 
for ea.ch label w in W there is a world wK E W such that (i) K, wK 1= F for each world 
constraint F 11 w in W and (ii) (wK , vK) E "(i for each world constraint w Ni v in W. A 
world constraint system W is (KD45- )satisfiable iff there exists a (KD45) Kripke structure 
which satisfies W. For testing KD45-satisfiability of a set F I , ... , Fn of A.ccB-formulaswe 
firstly translate them into a world constraint system. The world constraint system W is 
induced by F I , ... ,Fn iff W = {Ft 11 wo, ... ,Fn 11 wo}, where Wo is a new constant(which, 
intuitively, represents the real world). Obviously, Fb ... , Fn a.re KD45-satisflable Hf W is 
KD45-satisfiable. KD45-satisfiability of a world constraint system W is tested by the frame 
algorithm which has a world constraint system as input that is induced by a finite number 
of A'cCB-formulas and which successively adds new world constraints to W by applying the 
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W -+<> {w Mi v, F 11 V,OiFI 11 v, ... , OiF~ 11 v, GI 11", DiGl 11 v, ... , Gm 11 V, D;Gm 11 V} U W 
if O;Fllw, OiFIllw, ... , OiF"IIW Me the world constraints with leading modal~ 
. ity Oi in W, DiGIII w, ... , DiGm 11 ware the world constraiJits with leading 
modality Di in W, there is no labelu in Wsuch that the world constraints 
F 11 u, 0;F1 11 u, ... ,O.F" 11 u, GI 11 U, ••• , Gm 11 U, DiGI 11 U, ••• , DiGm 11 u 
are exactly the labeled ACC8-formulas with label u in W, and V isa new 
label. 
W -+<>. {w Mi u} U W 
if OiFllw, 0;F1Ilw, ... , OiF"lIw are the world constraints with leading modal-
ity Oi in W, D;GI 11 W, ••• , DiGm 11 w are the world constraints with leading . 
modality 0; in W, there is a label u in W such that the world .constraints 
F 11 U, OiFI 11 U, ... , OiF" 11 U, GI 11 u, ... , Gm 1I u, D;GI 11 u, ... , D;Gm 11 u 
are exactly t.he labeled A.cCB-formulas with label u in W, andto~; u 1S , 
not in W 
W -+0 {w Mi v,GIIi v, DiGI1I v, ... ,Gm I/v,D;Gm 11 V} U W 
if no world constraint of the form O;FII w is in W, DiGl11 w, ... , DiGm IIw Me 
the world constraints with leading modality Di in W, there is no label u in 
W such that the world constraints Gillti, ... ,Gm Ilu, DiGlllu, ... , DiGm lIu 
are are exa.ctly 'the labeledA.cCB-formulas -with label uin W, and v is a new 
label. 
W -+0. {w Mi u} UW 
if noworld constraint of the förm OiF 11 w is in W, DiGI 11 w,; •. ;DiGm IIw 
are the world constraints with leading modality Di in W, there is a label u 
in W such that GI 11 u, ... , Gm 11 U, DiGl 11 u, ... , DiGm 11 u are are exactly 
the labeled A.cCB-forrnula.s with label u in W, and w Mi u is not in W. 
Figure 1: Propagation rules of the A.cCB frame algorithm. 
four propagation rules in Figure 1. Thus, the result of the frame algorithm with input W is 
a (modified) world constraint system W'. 
The intuitive idea behind these propagati6nrules is as follows: Firstly, for W -+<> W', 
if there is a world constraint OiF 11 w in W we add a world V such that(i) viii accessible 
from w by agent i and (ii) F 11 v holds. Furthermore, whenever OiFj IIw is in W weadd 
Fj 11 v because of property (P3 ), and whenever DiG" H w is in W we add both DiG" 11 v and 
G" 11 v because of property (P2 ) and the definition of Di. This rule is similar to the unsigned 
prefixed KD45 tableaux rules in [13]. Secondly, for W . -+0 W', if DiGI IIw, ... , D;Gm 11 w are 
in W but there is no world u accessible from w by agent i, we have to introduce a new warld 
v-accessible from w by agent i-where GI 11 v, . .. ,Gm 11 v and DiGI 11 v, ... , D;Gm 11 V holds. 
This is due to the properties (Pl)and (P2 ) of KD45 Kripke stmctures. Finally, the mIes 
-+<>. and -+0 0 are used to guarantee termination of appIying propagationrules. Termination 
of the frame algorithm is statedby the next proposition which is proved in [21]. 
Proposition 3.2 IJW is a world constraint system which is induced by afinite set oJ ACCB" 
Jormulas, there is no infinite .chain oJ applications oJ propagation mies to W. 
Thus, the application of the frame algorithm to a world constraint system W induced by 
a finite set of ACCB-formulas F I , ... ,Fn terminates and results a world · constraint system, 
say W'. In order to test KD45-satisfiability of W', far each label w in W' we compute the 
set of all those ACCB-formulas in W' which are labeled by w and which do not contain any 
modality. That means, such a set containsonly ACC-formulas and is therefore called the A.cC 
test setoJ label w. More formally, if W is a world constraint system, the ACC test set A( 10) of 
label w in W isgiven by the set {F I Fllw E W aIid F does not contain any modality}. The 
following theorem states that a finite set FI, ... , Fn of .A.CCB-formulas is KD45-satisfiable ift' 
the ACC test set A( 10) of each label in W' is satisfiable. Thereby, W' is the result of the 
frame algorithm with input {FI 11 wo, ... ,Fn 11 wo}. A proof is given in [21]. 
Theorem 3.3 Let FI , ... ,Fn be a finite . set oJ ACCB-Jormulas, tind let W be the world con-
straint system which is induced by F I , ... ,Fn • IJ W' is the result oJ the frame algorithin with 
input W, then the set Fb •• • ,Fn is KD./5-satisfiable iff the ACC test set A( 10) oJ each label 
w in W' is satisfiable. 
Summing up, we obtain an algorithm for testing KD45-satisfiability of ACCB-formulas 
FI , ... ,Fn which worksaS folIows: Firstly, the frame algorithm is applied to the ·world con-
straint system W which is induced by · FI , ... ,Pn •. Then, for each label w in theresulting 
world constraint system the ACe test set A( 10) is tested on satisfiability. If one of these 
test sets is unsatisfiable, the algorithm returns "KD45-unsatisfiable", otherwise it returns 
"KD45-satisfiable". An algorithm for testing satisfiability of ACC test sets has been given 
in [20]. 
4 Restricted ACC-TBoxes and Computing ACCB-Inferences 
In Section 2 we defined an A'cc-TBox as a set of terminological axioms of the form C = D 
and C =J D, where C and D are concepts. However, most of the existing terminological 
representation and inference systems (e.g., BACK [30], CLASSIC [7], K,'RIS [2]) only allow 
terminological axioms of the form A = C, where A is a primitive concept and C is a con-
cept. Such a terminological axiom is called (concept) definition of A.2 . Building upon this, an 
ACC-TBox is then defined as a finite set of terminologicaJ. axioms which satisfies the following 
restrictions (i) each atomic concept appears at most once as the left hand side of a termi-
nological axiom, and (ii) in this set cydes do not occur. Thereby, a set S of terminological 
axioms contains a cycIe ift' there exists a terminological axiom A = C in S such that A occurs 
in the concept C' which arises fr~m C by iterated substitutions of primitive concepts in C by 
the right hand si des of their definition in S. For eXample, if A and B are primitive concepts 
the sets {A = A} and {A = C n B, B = DU 3 R.A} of terminological axioms contain cy-
des. In the following we will call ACC-TBoxes satisfying the additional conditions described 
above restricted A.cC-TBoxes in order to distinguish them from the A.cC-TBoxes defined in 
Section 2. 
20ften so-called concept specializations of the form A !; C are allowed which abbreviate the terminological 
axiom A = C n A· where A· is a new primitive concept. 
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It can be shown thateach restricted ACC-TBox T can be transformed into an equivalent 
restricted ACC-TBox T' such that each right hand side of a concept definition in T' does only 
contain concepts which do not occur as a left hand side in T' (see, e.g., [19]). For example, 
if Ab A2 , A3 are primitive concepts, the restricted A.cC-TBox T = {At = A2 n ~,A2 = 
Cu D,A3 = 3 R.C} can be tra.nsformed intoT' = {Al = (CUD)n3 R.C,A2 = CUD,A3 = 
3 R.C}. Thus, each primitive concept A on the left hand side of a terminological axiom A= C 
in T' can be seen as an abbreviation for the concept C. With this it is easy to verifythat 
testing consistency of an ACC-ABox A w.r.t. arestricted A.ce-TBox T is equivalent to testing 
consistency of theAce-ABox A', which arises·from A by replacing each such abbreviation 
A in A by C, w.r.t. the empty ALC-TBox. This test is known to be PSPACE-complete (see 
[18]). Using sophisticated optimization techniques, the runtime of this algorithm caneven be 
compared with the runtime of polyilomial (but incomplete) consistency test as, e~g., used in 
CLASSIC. This is a result in [1]. An algorithm for testing consistency of ACC test sets whlch 
may contain terminological axioms as defined in Sec~ion 2 has been given in [20]. As an easy 
consequence of aresult by Fischer aild Ladner [12] this test is exp-time complete. Moreover, 
when using more expressive terii:linologicallogicsthan ACC this test becomes undecidable. 
For the terminologicallogic Ace:F this has been shown in [4]. . 
Let now S be a set of ACCs-formulas, W be the world constraint system whlch is iilduced 
by S, and W' be the result of the frame algorithm with input W. Because of the above given 
effects on efficiency and decidability of testing satisfiability of an ACC-TBox and an A.cC-
ABox it is an interesting question whether or notthe terminological axioms in eachA.cC 
test set A( w) of a label in W' define a restricted ACC-TBox. The answer to this question 
is not obvious: Consider thefollowing example in which the terminological axioms in each 
A.cC test set of a label in W' define arestricted A.cC-TBox though this is not the case for 
the set of terminological axioms occurring in S. Let S be the set {OleA = Cl, OleA =D)} 
where A is a primitive concept and C,D are concepts. Applying the frame algorithm to the 
world constraint system W = {OI(A = C) 11 wo,OI(A = D) 11 wo} whichis induced by S 
results a system W' which contains the ACe test sets {A = C}and {A == D}. Thus, t.he 
terminological axioms in each Ace test set of W' define an restricted ACC-TBox, respectively. 
On the other hand, starting with the set S = {OleA = C),OI(A = D)} leads to one non-
empty A.cC test set, namely {A = C,A = D} which does not define a restricted ACC-TBox. 
The following theorem shows that it can be decided syntactically whether or not applying 
the frame algorithm to a world constraint system W-which is induced bya finite set of 
A.cCs-formulas-results only ACC test sets whose terminological axioms define a restricted 
A.cC-TBox. Its proof is given in [21]. Thereby, we use the following notions. if 5 is the 
sequence 01 ••• On of modalities, then Sfj] denotes 0; and indexes (5) denotes 1, ... , n. 
Theorem 4.1 Let W be a world constmint system wh ich is induced by a finite set 01 ACCs-
lormulas and let W' be the result 01 the Imme algorithm with input W. Then there is a 
label w in W' such that the ALC test set A(w) contains the ACC-Iormulas Fb ... ,Fn iff 
there are sequences Sb'" ,Sn in W such that (i) SIFI 11 wo, ... ,SnFn 11 Wo are in W, (ii) 
indexes(SI) = ... = indexes(Sn), and (iii) there is no position j such that lor two sequences 
5' and 5" in {51," . ,Sn} holda S'fj] = S"fj] = Oij lor some agent i;. 
Summing up, there are syntactical conditions which-if satisfied-guarantee that only 
restricted ACC-TBoxes have to be tested in order to test KD45-satisfiability of a set of 
A.cCs-formulas. For eXa.n1ple, these conditions ccitild be given by (1) agents only have positive 
- 58-
beliefs, i.e., negation signs do not occur in front of O-operators, and (2) for each sequence 5 of 
modalities holds that the set of ACCB-formulas occurring in the scope of 5 define arestricted 
ACC-TBox. For practical applications, however, such conditions soom not reasonable and, 
even worse, when computing logical consequences (s~ below) such syntactical conditions in 
general cannot be maintained. Hence, an algorithm for testing satisfiability of restricted ACC-
TBoxes only seems not to be appropriate. Nevertheless, Theorem 4.1 probably helps one to 
obtain an efficient implementation for testing KD45-satisfiability of a set of AL:CB-formulas. 
We will now show how to use the KD45-satisfiability algorithm in order to test whetheror 
not a given ACCB-formula isa logical consequence from a set FI , ••• , Fn of AL:CB-formulas. 
Again, we are only interested in KD45 Kripke structures and thus define: F isaKD45 
consequence of FI , ••• , Fn iff for each KD45 Kripke structure K = (W, r~ Kr) and for each 
world w in W holds: if K, w 1= FI, ... ,Fn, then K, w 1= F. Firstly, let F be an AL:CB-formula 
of the form o·(C = D), o·(C t= D), or o·(a : C), where o· is an abbreviation for a(possibly 
empty) sequenceof modalities. Then, F isan KD45 consequence of FI,.~.,Fn iffthe set 
FI , ••• , Fn , [-,F]· of ACCB-formulas is not KD45-satisfiable, where[-,F]· denotes thenegation 
normal. form of -,F. Note, that -,F is an .A.ccB-formula if F iE; of the above described form. 
If, on the other hand, Fis of the form O·(aRb), where O· is an abbreviation for a (possibly 
empty) sequence of non-negated indexed 0 operators, we cannot use this test method since 
negation signs are not allowed in AL:CB-formulas which contain a role instance. However, as 
a consequence ofTheorem 4.1, it follows that 0i1 ••• O'm(aRb) is a KD45 consequence of a set 
FI , ••• , Fn of ACCB-formlllas iff 0il ... O'm(aRb) is one .of the ACCB-formulas in FI, ... , Fn . 
. For details, see [21]. . . 
Summing up, we have now given algorithms for deciding KD45-satisfiabilityof a given set 
of AL:CB-formulas,and, building upon this, for deciding whether or not a given ACCB-formula 
F is a KD45 consequence of a given set FI , ... , Fn of ACCB-formulas. 
5 Conclusion 
We have presented a two-dimensional. extension of the concept language ACC which allows 
both reasoning on the objective level and reasoning on the level of epistemic alternatives. 
In the obtained language .ACCB, a world agents are acting in can be describedby a set 
of terminological and assertional axioms . . Fur~hermore, the bellefs agents have about this 
world, about the bellefs of other agents, and about their own bellefs can be described by 
terminological and assertional axioms with aleading indexed 0 operator or a leading sequence . 
of indexed 0 operators. We presented sound and complete algorithms to check consistency 
of the represented bellefs and to decide whether an AL:CB-formula is logically entailed by a 
given set of AL:CB-formulas. Thus, it is possible to equip agents with a decidable component 
to represent bellefs that is much more expressive than representing bellefs via propositional 
logic. 
The main restriction of the presented language ACCB lles in the fact that modalities are 
only allowed in front of terminological and assertional axioms. As an extension one might 
think of modalities in front of concepts as well. Such a language would allow to represent 
facts like "the things agent i belleves to be expensive are exactly the things agent j believes 
to be cheap" by Oj(expensive) = Oj(cheap). Such an extended language, however, causes 
algorithmic problems that are beyond the scope of this paper and is currently in vestigated. 
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On the Relationship between Actions and Beliefs 
Claus-Rainer Rollinger 
Universität Osnabrück 
Institut fiir Semantische Informationsverarbeitung 
D-19069 Osnabrück 
* Extended Abstract 
(1) We have two different c1assification schemata for what we know: lmowledge vs. belief on 
the one hand and plans, intentions, goals, explanations, actions, situations, and events on 
the other hand. The first differs with respect to the certainty that something is true in the real 
world, and the second differs with respect to the function of what is known or believed to be 
true in the real world. 
(2) In Philosophy the standard definition ofKnowledge is the following: 
A knows p if and only if . 
- p is true and 
- A believes p and 
- A has good reasons to believe p. 
In AI we have great problems withp is true. Usually we cannot decide whether pistruein 
reality or not. One reason for this is the dynamic of reality not being under ourcontrol. If we 
do not claim that p has to be true, then good or very good reasons to know something and less 
good reasons to believe other things is all we have. 
(3) In AI the knowledge ofan agent about the world is seen as a mental model ofthe world 
which is incomplete and uncertain. Thatls why default logic, nonmontonic logic, fuzzy logic, 
and · modallogic have to be very tide connected with epistemic logic. . . . 
(4) It makes a big difference with respect tri whataction we will perfonn ifwe knowa . 
proposition p or ifwe (only) believe it. Ifa proposition that we believe 18 very important for us, 
actions are perfonned in order to change the epistemic status from believep to know p (or 
know not p). On the other band on the basis of observed actions we can infer whether an actor 
knows p or just believes p. 
(5) A says to B: I know p. 
B answers: I don't believe that. 
In this case the answer ofB is ambiguous: 1. B may not believe that A knows p and says 
nothing about the truth of p and 2. B doubts p and says that B is wrong in what he believes to 
know. The point ofinterest are the justifications of A and B for what they believe or know. 
These justifications relates the epistemic states to actions A and/or B have perfonned by 
themselves, or to actions they have observed, or to actions someone has told thein about. 
(6) Whether we knowp or believe p depends on the knowledge source p comes from. If the 
knowledge source for p is our own perceptional system we usually c1assify p as something We 
know. If someone who has heard it from a third party teils us p, then we are uncertain about p 
and will qualify p as something we only believe. 
• This is an extended abstract ofthe internal working paper (in German) C.-R Rollinger (1993): Zum 
Unterschied zwischen Glauben und Wissen, Universität Osnabruck. 49069 Osnabriick. 
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(1) Actions have to be seen in the context of plans and goals of the acting agents. Thus we are 
able to characterise actions by the following two principles: 
1. The actor can predict tbe eITert ofbis action on the basis ofbis mental model ofthe world 
and the action he will perform. The effect of an action is achange in the world that isobserved 
and thus changes the mental model. 
2. There has to be an alternative to the action. AtJeast it must be possible for the agent to 
omit the action. Otherwise its not an action but an event. ' ' 
(8) Can we know what will happen in the future? Of course we can. If we have a stone in our 
hand we know that it will fall down if we open the band. 
(9) The quality of a mental model (a model ofsome'part ofthe real world, a theory aböut 
this part of the world) determines the quality of the explanations of epistemic states arid the 
quality of the predieted effects of actions. 
(10) The agents act in the real world (they change it) on the basis of a mental model and 
observe the real world (the changes) in order to compare the predictions with the observations. 
If a difference is found, the mental model has to be optimised. Thus acting is. the same as 
learning by doing experiments. False predietions and/or explanationsca1l for theory revision. 
(11) A plan is a sequence of actions, leading tö a goal SUite. Selecting a plan as theQIle that 
will be performed, presupposes, that an preconditions of all actions of this plan can be fulfilled. 
But it's not the case that each single possibility has to be checked before performing the firS! 
action of the plan. 
(12) Understanding events means to assign meanings to observed events and to iniegrate ' 
them into some temporal event structure. ' There are no intentional states related to the 
meanings of events. 
(13) Understanding actions on the other side means to assign meanings to observations, hut 
to make explicit the goals of the actions and to identify the plans the actions are part of. At 
least the intentions ofthe agents have to be made explicit. This implies that themeanirtg ofan 
observed action has ail intentional part, a variable to be instantiated. By this actions can be 
differed from events. 
(14) The intentional effect ofa speech act is a specific change in the addressee's mental model 
that itself produces an action e.g. an answer. In this sense speech aets ate indirect actions. 
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A Fugue on the Then1es of A wareness Logic and 
Correspondence 
(preliminary version) 
Elias Thijssetand o Heinrich Wansing§ 
1 Introduction 
Kripke models for general awareness [FH88] in whieh no restrictions are imposed on the 
aeeessibility relation between worlds are ealled sieve models in [T92]. Sieve models form a 
very flexible and thetefore powerful generalization of ordinary Kripkemodels for normal 
modal propositionallogies. They are suitable for modelling episteinie logies whieh are free 
from the so-ealled paradoxes of logieal omniseienee ([FH88], [W90], [T92]) and nevertheless 
have 'empirieal content' in the sense of not eharacterizing every system of normal modal 
logie ([W89], [PW89]). Notwithstanding their modelling eapaeities, Konolige has raised 
eertain objections against sieve models. Konolige[K86, p. 246] states that in contrast 
to the possible worlds semanties for epistemieally interpreted modal logie, in the ease of 
models for general awareness "the eonnection between aeeessibility eonditions and belief 
is ruptured". We eonsider this reservation against Fagin and Halpern's logie of general 
awareness as boiling down to doubts whether there exists a eorrespondenee theory for 
awareness logie wrt sieve models. In this short note we present a non-eompositional 
translation from epistemie formulas into first-order logie as the essential ingredient of 
such a eorrespondenee theory and define a notion of bisimulation, whieh is appropriate 
for sieve models. 
In eombination, [W90] and [T92] show that the sieve model semanties is equivalent 
to Rantala's non-normal worlds semanties [R82a, 82b]. In order to further underline the 
power of sieve models, weshall present a eanonieal Rantala model for SI, a system whieh, 
as Cresswell [C92] pointed out, "is not so simple" and for which no relational semanties 
seems to be known. 
2 A wareness logic and sieve models 
The voeabulary of (one agent) awareness logie is that of classical propositional logie 
in {-', 1\, V, -, f-t} together with the unary modal operators A 'awareness', L 'implieit 
~Institute for Language Technology & AI (ITK), Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, 
The Netherlands, e-mail: thysse@kub .nl 
§ Institute of Logic and Philosophy of Science, U niversity of Leipzig, Augustusplatz 9, 04109 Leipzig, 
Germany, e-mail: wansing@rz.uni-Ieipzig.de 
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belief', and B 'explicit belief'. Well-formed formulas (wffs) are built up in the obvious 
way, starting from a set of propositional variables {PO,Pl, .. . }(finite or infinite). The set 
of all wffs is denoted by WFF. We write X[cp] to iildicate that cp is a subformula of x. The 
result of substituting tP for a marked occurrence of cp in X is denoted by X[cp : tP]. 
A sieve model is a structure M = (W, R, A, V) where W, the set of possible worlds, is 
non-empty, R ~ W x W, V: {pdi x W ~ {O, I}, and A : W ~ 2 WFF. Truth of a 
wff cp at w E W in M (M, w F cp) is defined as folIows: 
M,w F Pi iff V (Pi, w) = 1, for every i 
M, w F ,cp iff not M, w F cp 
M, w F cp t\ tP iff M, w != cp & M, W F tP 
M, w F cp V tP iff M, w != cp or M, w F tP 
M, w F cp -t tP iff M, w F cp => M, w F tP 
M, w F cp +-t tP iff M, w != cp <=> M, w F tP 
M,w F Acp iff cp E A(w) 
M,w F Lcp iff (Vw' E W)wRw' => M, w' 1= cp 
M,w F Bcp iff cp E A(w) & (Vw' E W) wRw' => M, w' F cp. 
A wff cp is said to be valid in a sieve model M = (W, R, A, V) (M F <p) iff (Vw EW) 
M, w F cp. If M = (W, R, A, V) is a sieve model, (W, R, A) is said to be the sieveframe 
on which M is based. Validity on a sieve frame F is defined as validity in every sieve 
model based on F. 
3 Correspondence for awareness logic 
In his critical comments on Kripke models for general awareness, Konolige argues that 
the connection between accessibility conditions and belief is destroyed, since "[i]n th 
case of awareness, the formal correspondence between accessibility conditions and sets 0 
awareness sentences breaks down" [K86, p. 246]. This explanation is not very precise 
Should there be a formal correspondence between properties of theaccessibility relation: 
R and properties of the awareness function A? This would then not be correspondenJ 
in the sense of modal correspondence theory. Or should axiom schemes for the awarenessl 
connective A correspond in the sense ofrrlOdal correspondence theory with properties: 
of R alone? To expect this would seem unwarranted, because the evaluation clause forl 
wffs Acp refers to A and not to R. And since there are no sets of awareness sentences 
in Kripke semantics for epistemically interpreted modallogic, it is not clear what breald 
I 
down where. Konolige continues to ask what, for instance, is required for BBp to be true 
if Bp is true. He claims that one has to impose the following two conditions: 
(l) Acp -t LAcp, 
(2) Bcp -t ABcp. 
This is in fact not entirely correct. The combination of (1) and (2) is not equivalent to th 
axiom of 'positive introspection' Bcp -t BBcp. For even if we require R to be transitive, 
as [FH88] do, thus obtaining Lcp -t LLcp, the equivalence does not hold for the logic 
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F: 
w f;;'\ .~.;..J 
{pA ·pr 0 
of general awareness. Indeed there are simple frames verifying Br.p ---+ BBr.p while not 
verifying (1), e.g. 
So F = ({w,v},R,A), with R = {(w,v),(v,v)}, A(w) = {pA .p} and A(v) = 0. 1 It is 
easily checked that F F .Br.p, thus F F Br.p ---+ BBr.p, yet F ~ Ar.p ---+ LAr.p. 
On the other hand Br.p ---+ BBr.p is equivalent, modulo the KD45 logic for L, to the 
combination of (2) with the weaker principle 
(1') (Lr.p A Ar.p) ---+ LAr.p. 
For the sake of the argument we will focus on conditions (1) and (2), which, according 
to Konolige, "are not affected by the structure of accessibility". "Hence", he concludes, 
"the nice formal analysis of introspective properties obtainable in Kripkesemanticsis not 
present in the logic of general awareness". It is not clear what Konolige means by "not 
affected by the structure of accessibility". Schema (1), for example, correspönds with a 
second-order condition on sieve frames, saying that Ais upwards monotone wrt R. To see 
this, consider any sieve model M = (W, R, A, V). M induces a first-order structure 
where [Pi] = {w E W I M,w FPd, and [Pcp] = {w E W I r.p E A(w)}. This construction 
gives rise to the following translation (.)U of wirs into the first-order language LI with the 
. binary predicate R such that [R] = Rand unary predicates Pi (i E w) and Pcp (r.p E WFF):2 
PiX 
.(r.p)U 
((r.p)UV(t/J)U), V E {A, V, ---+, f--?} 
Vy( Rxy ---+ [y / x 1 (r.p )U) 
Pcp X 
(Vy(Rxy ---+ [y/x](r.p)H) A PcpX) 3 
Observation Let M* be the first-order structure induced by the sieve model M. Then 
M,w F r.p iff M*,w F (r.p)U for all r.p E WFF. 
Applying (-)u to (1), we obtain 
1 F has been chosen such that it satisfies the conditions of seriality. transitivityand Euclidicity imposed 
by Fagin & Halpern. 
2This translation was stimulated by a similar translation for Rantala semantics due to Johan van 
Benthem (private communication to the second author). 
3Some technical details: Most of the parenthesis merely serves to make the scope of U unambiguous. 
Notice that the substitutions introduced in the clauses for Land B usually lead to renaming the quantified 
variable for embedded modals. (See the examples.) 
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(Aep --+ LAep)U 
(Aep)U --+ (LAep)U 
P<px --+ Vy(Rxy --+ [y/x](A<p)U) 
P<px --+ Vy(Rxy --+ P<pY) 
Universal quantification over the world of evaluation x and the unarypredicate P<p givel 
VxVP<p(P<px --+ Vy(Rxy--+ P<py)), which isequivalent with VxVyVPARxy --+ (P<px -l 
P<pY)). In other words, schema (1) is valid on a sieve frame F = (W, R, A) iffVxVy(xRy =:> 
A(x) ~ A(y)). For Konolige's exarnple Bep --+ BBep notice that, since Bep is interpreted 
as Lep /\ Aep, we cannot expect the positive introspection scheme for explicit belief tc 
correspond with a purely relational condition on sieve frarnes. Konolige's criticism simply 
is confused. 
Yet we may wonder to which ordinary condition(s) the above translation arnounts. 
(Bep --+ BBep)d 
= (Bep)U --+ (RBep)d 
= (Vy(Rxy --+ [y/x](cp)U) 1\ P<px) --+ (Vy(Rxy --+ (Vz(Ryz --+ [z/x](ep)U) /\ P<pY)) /\ PB<pX) 
Here the last step is obtained by [y/x](Bep)U = [y/x](Vy(Rxy --+ [y/x](cp)d) /\ P<px) = 
[y/x](Vz(Rxz --+ [z/x](ep)d) /\ P<px) = (Vz(Ryz--+ [z/x](ep)U) /\ P<pY). Universaily quantify-
ing over the free variables x, P<p, PB<p and ep produces the higher-order formula 
VxVcpVP<pVPB<p((Vy(Rxy ~ [yjx](cp)d)AP<pX) -+ (Vy(Rxy -+ (Vz(Ryz _ [zjx](cp)U)AP<pY))APB<p~ 
which can be decomposed into: 
(a) VxVepVP<pVPBAVy(Rxy --+ [y/x](ep)U) --+(P<px --+ PB<pX)) . 
(b) VxVyVepVP<p((Vu(Rxu --+ [u/x](ep)U) /\ Rxy) --+ (P<px --+ P<pY)). 
(c) VxVyVzVep((Vu(Rxu --+ [u/x](ep)d) /\ Rxy /\ Ryz) --+ [z/x](ep)d). 
Since R is assumed to be transitive in the logic of general awareness, (c) automatically 
holds. The other two conditions amount to restricted forms of upwards monotonicity (of 
A wrt R) and B-closure (of A), respectively: 
• If F,x ~ -,Lep (i.e. Lep is satisfiable on F in x) and ep E A(x) then Bep E A(x) . 
• If F,x ~ -,Lep, xRy and ep E A(x) then ep E A(y). 
These conditions are admittedly unusual and not even frame conditions in the strict sense, 
but adequately establish the correspondence. 
Moreover, there are no obstacles to a correspondence theory based on (.)d. The impor-
tant not ion of bisimulation, for example, can easily be modified so as to suit sieve models. 
Abisimulation C between sieve models M = (W, R, A, V) and M' = (W', R', A', V') id 
defined by requiring that 
wCw' implies A( w) = A( w') 
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in addition to the standard conditions defining bi simulations between Kripke models (see 
[vB9I,p.21O]). By induction on cp one Can show that epistemic formulas are invariant for 
bisimulations. 
Observation For any bisimulation C between two sieve models M, M': 
wCw' implies M, w F cp Hf M', w' F cp. 
One can then prove the following characterization: 
Theorem A first order formula cp( x) is equivalent to a (. )U_ translation of an epistemic 
formula iff cp( x) is invariant for bisimulations. 
PROOF. From the left to the right this is immediate by the above observation. The 
other direction is established by a simple reduction. Let cp( x) be invariant for bisimula-
tions between sieve models (or rather the induced first-orderstructures). Notice that a 
bisimulation between sieve models for thewffsof awareness logic ainounts to an ordinary 
bisimulation for the standard uni-modallanguage Lo with modal operator Land propo-
sitional variables Pa (with a E WFF or a E w). By bisimulation invariance for normal 
modal logic, the LI formula cp is equivalent to the standard translation of the La formula 
t/J. Then the following backward translation (.)~ from La into WFF, esseritially translating 
Px as AX (X E WFF), produces the desired formula 'ljJ~. 
Pi (i E w) 
AX (X E WFF) 
-,( 'ljJ)~ 
(('ljJ)~\7('ljJ')~), \7 E {A, V, --t, ~} 
- L('ljJ)~ 
It is easily checked that every sieve model M = (W, R, A, V) for WFF can be transformed 
into a standard Kripke model M' = (W, R, V') for La, where V' extends V such that 
V'(Px, w) = 1 {::} X E A( w), and vice versa. If M* is a first-order structure of the right 
similarity type, i.e. M* = (W, R, {[Pi]}i, {[P<p]}<p), then it can be viewed as being induced 
by a sieve model M of the above form. So M*, w l= cp {::} M', w l= 'ljJ {::} M, w l= 'ljJ~ {::} 
M*, w l= ('ljJ~)~. In all, cp is equivalent to ('ljJ~)~. Q .E.D. 
4 SI 
The first Lewis system, SI, is a system of non-normal modallogic. According to Cresswell 
[C92] various attempted formulationsof a relational semantics for SI turned out to be 
defective, and no semantics of such a kind seems to be known. In this section we show 
that SI is characterized by a suitable dass of Rantala models and thus by a dass of 
relational models. Although this is perhaps not the kind of intuitive semantics Cresswell 
is asking for, it may serve as a further indication of the power of Rantala models and 
hence of sieve models. SI can be axiomatized as follows (cf. [HC68], [C92]): 
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(1) every wff obtained by uniform substitution from any theorem of dassical . 
propositionallogic CPL 
(2) O<p --t <p 
(3) (O(<p --t 1jJ) /\ 0(1jJ -+ X)) -+ O(<p -+ X) 
(4) the necessitated versions of (1) - (3) 
(5) <p,<p -+ 1jJ/1jJ 
(6) f- O(<p ~ 1jJ)/ f- O(X[<p] ~ X[<p: 1jJ]). 
A Rantala model is a structure (W, W", R, V) where Wand W" are sets, W i= 0, R 
. ~ (W U W") x (WU W") and V is a function from WFF x(W U W") to {O, I} such that 
for every w E W and every wff <p, 1jJ: 
V( '<p, w) = 1 iff V(<p,w)=O 
V(<p/\1jJ,w) = 1 iff V(<p, w) = V(1jJ, w) = 1 
V(<p v 1jJ,w) = 1 iff V(<p, w) = 1 or V(1jJ, w) = 1 
V(<p-+1jJ,w) = 1 iff V(<p,w)=OorV(1jJ,w)=l 
V(<p~1jJ,w) = 1 iff V(<p,w)=V(1jJ,w) 
V(o<p, w) = 1 iff (Vw' E W U W,,) wRw' =} V(<p, w') = 1. 
The set W is called the set of normal worldsj elements from W" are called non-normal 
. . 
worlds. There are no constraints on evaluating formulas at non-normal worlds. If V( <p, w') 
= 1, we also write w' 1= <p, for any w' EW ÜW*. A wff <p is said tobe valid in a Rantala 
model M = (W, W", R, V) (M 1= <p) iff (Vw E W) w 1= <po In order to characterize SI, we 
have to define a suitable dass of valuations. A valuation V is said to be an SI valuation 
iff for every wff <p, 1jJ, X: 
(01) (Vw" E W*) w" 1= <p if<p is valid on the basis of CPL 
(02) - (Vw" E W") ((3w E W)wRw") =} w" 1= O<p -+ <p 
(03) (Vw" E W") ((3w E W)wRw") =} w" 1= (O(<p -+ 1jJ) /\ 0(1jJ -+ X)) -+ O(<p -+ X) 
(3) (Vw" E W,,) (w" 1= <p -+ 1jJ & w" 1= 1jJ -+ X) =} w* 1= <p -+ X 
(6) ((Vw E W)(Vw' E Wu W")wRw' =} w' 1= <p ~ 1jJ) =} 
(Vw" E W") (w" 1= X[<p] ~ X[<p : 1jJ]) & (w" 1= X[<p] {:} w" 1= X[<p : 1jJ]). 
The dass A of SI models is the dass of all Rantala models (W, W", R, V) such that 
V is an SI valuation and R is reflexive on W. A wff <p is said to be valid in A (A 1= <p) 
iff M 1= <p for every ME A. 
Theorem SI is characterized by A: f- SI <p iff A 1= <po 
PROOF. Soundness is shown by induction on the length of proofs in SI. Among other 
things we have to show that instancesof (6)preserve validity. Suppose for any SI model 
that (Vw E W)(Vw' E W U W,,) wRw' =} w' 1= <p ~ 1jJ.We must show that, given 
an arbitrary SI-model, for every normal world wand every world Wl such that WRWl: 
(*) Wl 1= X[<p] ~ X[<p: 1jJ]. If Wl is non-normal, then (*) holds by (6). If Wl is normal, we 
proceed by induction on the complexity of X. The only non-trivial case is X = 0X'. It is 
sufficient to show that (Vwz E W U W") WIRwZ =} (wzl= X'[<p] {:} Wz 1= X'[<p: 1jJ]). If Wz 
is normal, we use the induction hypothesisj if wz· is non-normal, we use again (6) again. 
In order to prove completeness we construct the canonical model M SI = (W, W* 1 R, V) 
as follows: 
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W = {w I w is a maximal SI-consistent set of wffs} 
W* = {w* I w* = {cp I Ocp E w} for some w E W} 
R = {(w, w*) Iw E W & w* = {cp I Ocp E w}} U {(w, w) Iw E W} 
V : WFF --+ {O, I} is (partially) specified by: 
(i) ('1w* E W*) V( cp, w*) = 1 {:} cp E w* 
(ii) ('lw E W) V(Pi, w) = 1 {:} Pi E w, for all propositional variables Pi and 
(iii) V satisfies the usual truth conditions on normal worlds. 
One can easily verify that in M SI W F cp iff cp E w for every wff cp and every (normal) world 
w (the truth lemma). Moreover, since SI contains CPL, it is easily shown that if IiSl cp, 
then there exists a maximal SI-consistent set which does not contain cp (the Lindenbaum 
lemma). Both lemmas can be used to show that M SI in fact is in A. Reflexivity of R 
on W is immediate. It remains to be checked whether V is an SI valuation. Consider 
(6). Suppose ('lw E W) ('lw' E W U W*) wRw' => w' F cp +--+ '1/;. Then, in particular, for 
every w* E W*, w* F cp +--+ '1/;, and hence for every w E W, w F 0 (cp +--+ '1/;). It follows 
by the truth lemma that O(cp +--+ '1/;) E w for every w E Wand so (by the Lindenbaum 
lemma) that rSl O(cp +--+ '1/;). With (6) this implies rSl O(X[cp] +--+ X[cp : '1/;]) (*) and 
so (reversing the above argument) O(X[cp] +--+ X[cp : ,p]) E w for every w E W, thus for 
every w E W: w F D(X[cp] +--+ X[cp : ,p]). The latter implies w* F X[cp] +--+ X[cp : ,p]. 
But, since wRw, we also have w F X[cp] {:} w F X[cp : '1/;]. Now applying (6) to (*) 
yields r D(DX[cp] +--+ DX[cp : '1/;]), i.e. w F D(DX[cp] +--+ DX[cp : ,p]) for aB w E W. 
Since again wRw this implies w F DX[cp] +--+ DX[cp : '1/;] for any w E W, and therefore 
w F DX[cp] {:} w F DX[cp : '1/;], and thus w* F X[cp] {:} w* F X[cp : '1/;]. The usual 
contrapositive argument establishes completeness. Q.E.D. 
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Abstract 
After defining the general concept of a know/edge representation and reasoning syste.m 
(KR.')) we show how with each KRS K a disjunctive KRS DK can be associated in a natural 
way. The fundamental case of this construction is the extension of fact bases to disjunctive 
fact bases which correspond to Belnap's [1977] system of episte7l1ic states. In disjunctive 
fact bases one can distinguish between exclusive and inclusive disjunctive information, and 
express various kinds of incomplete information which can only be queried by means of 
appropriate epistemic modal operators. Introducing a modal operator for definite knowledge 
in DK yields an extended KRS Dm K by a construction based on an operational proof 
theory and not on the usual Kripke style model theory. 
By adding rules to fact bases, resp. disjunctive fact bases, one obtains extended, resp. 
disjunctive, logic programs. We point out that there is a certain ambiguity in disjunctive 
rllle-based systems concerning the local versus global application of rules. We also present a 
formalization of the CWA in the proposed framework of KRSs, and compare it with that of 
Gelfond [1992] where epistemic modal operators are used to express the CWA. 
1 Introd uction 
The concept of a knowledge representation and reasoning system (KRS) consists essentially of 
two main components: an inference and an update operation manipulating knowledge bases 
a.s abstract objects, l together with a set of formal properties these operations may have. In 
general, there are no specific restrictions on the internal structure ofa knowledge base. We will 
see, however, that a computational design can be achieved by 'compiling' jncoming information 
into some normal form rat her than leaving it in the form of arbitrarily complex formulas. This 
is the case, for instance, in Belnap's KRS 2 which can be considered as the paradigm for KRSs. 
The concept of a KRS constitutes a useful framework for the classification and cOluparison 
of various AI systems and formalisIlls. It is more general than that of a logic (i.e. a consequence 
relation). A standard logic can be viewed as a special kind of KRS. On the other hand, by 
defining the inference and update operations procedurally, KRSs can serve as the basis for the 
operational definition of logics. There is even a strong analogy between the concept of a KRS 
an<! that of aGentzen sequent system. 
IThis with respect to KR fundamental distinction was first proposed in [Levesque 1984) where the resp . oper-
ations are called AS[( and TELL. . . 
2ef. [Belnap 1977]. 
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Both relational and deductive databases can be considered as computationaI paradig~s of 
real worId KRSs. They implement a form of nonmonotonic reasoning caused by the use of 
negation-as-failure expressing default-implicit negative information. On the other hand, rela· 
tional and deductive databases, as well as normallogic programs, are not capable of representing 
and processing explicit negative information. Trus shortcoming has led to the extensionöflogic 
programming by adding asecond negation (in addition to negation-as-failure) as proposed in-
dependently in [Gelfond & Lifschitz 1990+1991] and in [Pearce & Wagner 1990J and [Wagner 
1991]. We will call the general concept ofan operator expressing default-implicit negative in-
formation in the style of negation-as-failure weak negation, while the concept of an operator 
expressing explicit negative information will be called strang negation. 
The concept of a vivid KRS (VKRS) is a two-fold generalization: 
l. it extends already known logics, such as Belnap's 4-valued or Nelson's constructive logic,3 
by adding weak negation, and 
2. it extends already known knowledge representation systems, such as relational or deductive 
database systems, by adding strong negation. 
In the framework of a VKRS, cL specific meaning is assigned to the Clo.'~ed-World Assumptioll:4 
it connects the use of weak and strong negation in combination with partially and totally rep-
resented predicates. If the Closed-WorId A,ssumption holds for a predicate, its weak negation 
implies its strong negation, in other words, an atomic senten ce formed with such a predic<ite is 
already false if it is false by default. In the presence of disjunctive information the CWA can be 
related to epistemic introspection expressed by appropriate modal operators. We shall compare 
our approach to the .CWA in disjunctive fact bases with the modal one proposed in [Gelfoncl 
1992J. 
2 Knowledge Representation and Reasoning 
The language of KRSs consists of the logical operator symbols A, V, ('V, - and 1 standing for 
conjunction, disjunction, strong negation, weak negation and the verum, respec.tively; the precl-
icate symbols p, q, T, • •• ; the constant symbols c, d, .. . and variables x, y, . ... Notice that there 
are no functional terms but only variables and constants. Further connectives, such as epistemic 
modalities, and the (possibly restricted) quantifiers 3 and V can be optionally added to the 
language. 
An atom is an atomic formula, it is called proper, if it is not 1. Literals are either atoms or 
strongly negated atoms. Extended literals are either literals or weakly negated literals. We use 
a, b, . .. , I, k, ... , e, J, ... , and F; G, H, ... as metavariables for atoms, literals, extended literals 
and formulas, respectively.5 A variable-free expression is caHed ground. The set of all proper 
gronnd atoms (resp. literals, resp. extended literals) of a given language is denoted by At (resp. 
Lit, resp. XLit). lf not otherwise stated, a formula is assumed to be ground. If op-list is a set of 
logical operators, say op-list ~ {I, -, ('V, A, V, --+, 3, V, ... }, then L( op-list) denotes the respective 
set of weH-formed formulas. 
With each negation a complement operation for the resp. type ofliteral is associated: ä = ('Va 
anel ;.::;a = a, 1 == -I and =1 == l. These complements are also defined for sets of resp. literals 
3See [Belnap 1977], resp. [Almukdad& Nelson 1984]. 
4 CL [Reiter 1978]. 
51 will frequently just say "litera!" when I, precisely speaking, mean a proper ground litera! . 
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L ~ Lit, and E ~ XLit: Z = {I: 1 E L}, resp. E = {e: e E E}. We distinguish between the 
positive and negative elements of E ~ XLit by writing E+ := E n Lit and E- := {l : -l E E}. 
The inference relation of a KRS is not uniform, in general. Only certain formulas may make 
sense for representing vivid knowledge, that is, there will be a specific representation language 
LRepn and a KB will be a finite co11ection of elements of LRepn possibly constrained in some 
way determined by the set LKB of all admissible KBs: KB E LKB ~ 2Laepr. 
Likewise, since not every formula may be appropriate as a sensible query, the set of admissible 
queries is specified by LQuery. The inference relation of a KRS, thus, is in general not based on 
a single universal language applying to premises as we11 as to queries (resp. consequences), but 
on two, usua11y different, languages: ~ ~ LKB X LQuery. 
Moreover, the axiomatization of standard consequence seems to be overidealised and not 
adequate for COllllllonsense reasoning. This is no longer debated today in the case of the mono-
tonicity postulate which requires that a11 previously obtainable inferences remain valid whenever 
new information comes in. In many forms of cblllmbnsense reasoning, such as default reason-
ing, and in many computational systems, such as Prolog, monotonicity is violated, and one 
has to look for other principles replacing it, or one can just drop it and allow for unrestricted 
non Illonotonic.ity.6 
The basic. scenario of a KRS consists of two operations: an inference operation processing 
queries posed to the KB, ·and an update operation p.rocessing input fOrIllUlas entered by users 
or by other (e.g. sensorie) information suppliers. While in standard logies an update is a simple 
addition of a formula F E L to the premise set X ~ L, Le. X u {F}, a KRS restriets the 
a<hllissible inputs to elements of a speeific input language LInput, and an update is performed 
by processing the input formula in an appropriate way in order to add its information eontent 
to the KB. 
In general, a KB ean consist of any kind of data struetures capable of representing knowledge, 
e.g. a set, or multiset, or sequenee, of (logical) expressions, or a direeted graph, ete. Forthe sake 
of simplicity, I will assume that a KB E LKB is a finite set of expressions from a representation 
language, Le. LKB ~ 2LRe pr. There will always he an informationa11y 'empty' KB, denoted by 
0; whic.h is not necessarily equal to the empty set. 
2.1 Knowledge Representation Systems 
A KRS is a quintuple: 
( LKB, ~, LQuery, U pd, LIllput) 
where the inference relation ~ ~ LKB x LQuery is asscociated with a resp. inferenee operation C 
in the usual way: 
C(KB) = {F E LQuery : KB ~ F} 
and the update operation Upd takes a KB and an input formula F, and provides an appropri-
ately updated KB: 
Upd : LKB x LIllput --+ LKB 
An update lllay be simply an addition of a formula FE LUlput n LRepr to the KB: 
Upd(KB, F) = KB u {F} 
61t is an open debate if, and in what form, nonmonotonicity should be restricted in a KRS . The currently most 
poplliar proposal is Cautious Monotorlicity which will be called Le.mma Compatibility below. 
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But it mayaiso be necessary to process the inputformula in some way, especiallyifit is not an 
LRep~ expression. For instance, an RDS can be updated by a conjunction of atoms by simply 
adding all atoms to it. 
Updates may be constrained by integrity constraints. Following [Reiter 1990], we define 
a set of integrity constraints specified for a certain KB as any set of closedquery fOflüulas, 
Je ~ LQuery, such that an input FE LInput is considered illegal whenever Upd(KB, F) If G for 
some constraint G E JC. Update attempts violating a constraint have to be rolled back by the 
system. 
Notice that LInput and LRepr may be totally distinct (one may expect that an input formula 
is a kind of logical expression whereas a KB can be any kind of data structure). . 
The formulation of a KRS in terms of query and input processing was already implicitly 
present in Belnap's [1977] view of a KRS. In [Levesque 1984] it was proposed as a 'functional 
approach to knowledge representation,.7 
Standard logies, such as classical or intuitionistic logic, can be viewed as special (very ide-
alized) cases of KRSs. Here, the KB consists of a (possibly infinite) set of arbitrary first order 
sentences, and is usually called a 'theory'. The inference operation is monotonie. Updates are 
simple additions of formulas, and the representation language is equal to the query and input 
language, LRepr = LQuery = LInput. 
2.2 Some Formal Properties of KRSs 
lf the language of a KRS contains the constant 1 for truth, it holdsthat KB r 1, and Upd(KB, 1) = 
KB. 
Although it seems desirable, lem~llas are not always redundant and compatible in KRSs. 
In other words, there are reasonable cases of KRSs, such as disjunctive fact bases (see below), 
which are not cumulative. 
Lemma Redundancy (alias: Cut, Transitivity) 
KB r F & Upd(KB, F) r G => KB r G 
Lemma Compatibility (alias Cautious Monotorucity, due to [Gabbay 1985]) 
KB r F & KB r G ~ Upd(KB, F) r G 
Lemma Redundancy and Compatibility can be combined in the following condition of 
Cumulativity KB r F ~ C(Upd(KB, F)) = C(KB) 
Tbe following condition of Monotonicity seems to be too strong for commonsense reasoning. 
a specifically restricted KRS, however, it may hold. 
Monotonicity C(KB) ~ C(Upd(KB, F)) 
Clearly, Monotonicity implies Lemma Compatibilty. 
It will be useful to compare knowledge bases in terms of their information content, that is, 
to have an informational ordering between KBs such that 
KB 1 ~ KB:.l if KB:.l contains more information than KB 1 · 
7 However, Levesque is not so much concerned with the investigation of the formal properties of K RSs in 
general , bu trather with the modelling of the concept of llIeta-knowledge by means of an epistemic 1lI0dality on 
the basis of classical logic. 
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The informational ordering '::;' should be defined in terms of the structural components of 
knowledge bases and not in terms of higher-Ievel notions (like derivability). The informationally 
empty KB will be denoted by O. By definition, 0 ::; KB for all KBs. 
Definition 1 (Definite Information) A KB iscallcd definite with respect to a constructillc 
infc1'cncc relation 1--, if a disjunction callnot bc infcrred unlcss onc of its disjuncts can, 
KB I-- F V G => KB I-- F or KB I-- G. 
Notiee that if the DeMorgan laws hold (which will be the case in all systems under consideration), 
this iIllplies that a negated conjunction can only be inferred from adefinite KB if the negation 
of one of its conjuncts can, 
KB I-- f"V(F 1\ G) => KB I-- f"V F or KB I-- ,,-,C;. 
Definition 2 (Unique Representation) A KRS cnjoys the property of Unique Represen-
tat ion if thc information contained in a KB is uniquely reprcscntcd, i.c. if 
A standard logical systelil, where a KB is a set of well-formed formulas, does not enjoy the 
Unique Representation property. On the other hand, a relational database, for instance, is a 
unique representation. 
In general, i t will not suffice in order to infer - F that F fails (this will only be the case for 
definite KBs). However, the following restric.tion characterizes weak negation: 
(lnherent Consistency) KB I-- -F => KB If F 
Noti~e that this does not hold for classieal negation. In fact, Inherent Consistency is violated by 
any negation satisfying the classic.al principle cx contradicti01~c scquitur quodlibet, {F, "-' F} I-- G. 
Also strong negation, in gerreral, does not satisfy Inherent Consistency. Yet, it seems desirable 
that the following cohcrcllcc8 property holds: 
(Coherence) K B I-- "-' F => K B I-- - F => KB If F 
In general, more information does not mean more eonsequences. In other words: answers are 
not necessarily preserved under growth of information. Queries, for which this is the case, are 
called pC1".'~istcnt. 
Definition 3 (Persistence) A closcd qucry formula F is callcd persistent if KB l I-- F => 
KB 2 I-- F, whcncllcr KB l ::; KB2. If all F E LQuery arc pcrsistcnt, thc KRS and its infcrcncc 
1-clation I-- aJ'C callcd pcrsistcnt. An operator of thc qucry languagc is callcd persistcnt, if CllC1'y 
qUC1'Y f01"1ncd with it and with persistent subfonnulas is again pcrsistcnt. 
Definition 4 (Ampliative Input) An input f077nula F is called (i) ampliative9 if KB ::; 
Upd(KB, F), or (ii) reductive if KB 2': Upd(KB, F). A KRS and its updatc opcration Upd 
aJ'C callcd ampliative, if all inputs F E L!J.IPut a1'C ampliatitlc. 
If a KRS is monotonie, its update operation is .ampliative. Ampliative updating is the formal 
counterpart of persistent answering. 
8The name is adopted from [Pereira & Alferes 1992]. 
9The name is adopted from [Belnap 1977]. 
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2.3 Vivid Knowledge Representation Systems 
Depending on the specific requirements of an application, and on the computational resour 
available, different inference artd update operations constituting different KRSs may be appr 
priate. However, there are some minimal requirements any vivid KRS has to satisfy, namel~ 
Restricted Reßexivity, Constructivity and Non-Explosiveness. lO A KRS that satisfies these con~ 
ditions is called a basic VKRS. 
Additionally, besides a principal negation (called stmng), expressing explicit falsity, there 
should be a second negation ( called weak) wh.ich handles default-implicit negative information in 
the style of negation-as-failure. Thus, the query language, anel possibly also the input language, 
should contain rv and -. 
Some form of CWA, restricted to specific pred.icates (namely those which are totally repre-
sented in the knowledge base) then relates explicit withdefault-implicit falsity, i.e. strang with 
weak negation: an atomic sentence formed with a totally represented predicate is (explicitly) 
false if it is false by default, i.e. its strong negation holds if its weak negation does. The inferenc.e 
relation of a basic VKRS, thus, is extended in the following way: 
(CWA+) KB f- cwa rvp(t) if KB f- rvp(t), or pE CWA+ & KB f- -p(t) 
(CWA-) KB f- cwa p(t) if KR\- p(t), or p E CWA- & KB f- -rvp(t) 
In a VKRS, three kinds of predicates can be distinguished. The first distinction, introduce 
by Körner [1966], reflects the fact that many predicates (especially in empirical domains) have 
truth value gaps: neither p(c) nor rvp(c) has to be the case for specific instances of such inexac 
predicates, like color attributes which can in some cases not be determined hecause of vagueness. 
Other predicates, e.g. from legal or theoretical domaiI)s, are exact, and we then have, for 
instance, m(.5') V rv m(.5') and r( S) V rv r( .5'), stating that Susan is either married or unmarried and 
that she is either a resident of some city or she is not, depending on the information represented 
in the resp. database of that city. Only exact predicates can be totally represented . Therefore, 
the predicates subject to the CWA in a KB form a ~ubset of EXACT, the set of all predicates 
declared as exact in KB, CWA ~ EXACT. For an exact predicate p and any term t from its 
domain, the resp. tertiu7n non datur has to be derivable: 
KB f- cwa p(t) V rvp(t) 
no matter whether pis subject to the CWA or not. For a non-CWA predicate p, this can only 
be achieved by adding all instances of the resp. tertium non datur, {p( t) V rv p( t) : t E [fKB} to 
the KB which is not possible in definite KRSs where the input language does not contain V. . 
Definition 5 (VKB) A tJitJid KB, in its general f07·m, is a quadruple 
(EXACT, CWA, KB, JC) 
where EXACT is the set of exact predicates, CWA = (CWA+, CWA-) specijies the predicates 
subject to the Closed- World Assumption, and JC ~ LQuery is a set of integrityconstrairlts. A 
query F is deritJable from a V KB if 
Upd(KB,!\ {p(t) V rv p(t) : pE EXACT - CWA, t E UKB}) f- cwa F 
IOSee [Wagner 1993] . 
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Notice that in KBs of definite KRSs, like fact bases or extended logic programs,it is not possible 
to declare exact predicates not subject to the CWA. Therefore, in definite KRSs, EXACT = 
CWA. 
We shall in most cases neglect integrity constraints in this paper. In cases where CWA - is 
empty, we identify CWA with CWA +. If neither the 'CWA nor integrity constraints matter, we 
only mention KB. 
Definition 6 (VKRS) A basic VKRS extcnded by adding weak negation and the above CWA 
rules is calied a (Juli) V K RS. 
If a VKRS enjoys the properties of Lemma Redundancy and Compatibility, it will be called 
cumulative. In certain respects, a cumulative VKRS is preferable to a non-cumulative one since 
it is more regular. However, there seems to be a trade-off between regularity and the capability to 
capture all aspects ofcomIllonsense reasoning. In particular, the price for cumulativity seems to 
be a more cau tious inference operation not allowing for certain inferences suggested by respective 
commonsense reasoning schemes. 
In a VKRS we have the following DeMorgan-like rewrite rules in order to simplify complex 
formulas: 
-(F AG) ----+ -Fv -G "'''' F ----+ F 
'" (F A C;) ----+ ",Fv",C; - "'''' F ----+ -F 
-",(F A G) ----+ -",FA-",C; ",-F ----+ F 
-(F V G) ----+ -F A-G --F ----+ F 
",(FVG) ----+ ",FA",G -",-F ----+ -F 
-",(F V G) ----+ - '" F V - ",'G 
For indudive definitions, then, it is sufficient to treat the cases of the verum (1), of extended 
literals (c), of conjunctions (A), and of disjunctions (V). All other cases are covered hy the above 
rewrite rules. 11 
In the sequel we frequently use the fact that forlllulas F E L( 1, -, "', A, V) can be normalized 
ar.cording to the following definition: 
DNS( 1) 
DNS(e) = 
DNS(F A G) 
DNS(F V G) 
{0} 
{{e}} 
{l( U L : K E DNS(F), L E DNS(G)} 
DNS(F) U DNS(G) 
This formulation is inspired by a similar one (without weak negation) m [Miller 1989]. The 
disjunctive normal form of a formula G E L(1, -,"', A, v) is obtained as 
DNF(G) = V 1\ J( 
KEDNS(G) 
A formula F is called definite if its disjunctive normal set is a singleton: DNS(F) = {E} . 
We will use the following notation for a KRS: let K denote a KRS where only the query 
hut not the input language contains weak negation, ·then K+ denotes its weak-negation-free 
fragment not allowing for weak negation in queries, and K- denotes its extension hy adding 
weak negation to the inpu t language. 
11 For their justification see {Wagner 1993]. 
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3 Fact Bases 
A K B consisting of ground literals (viewed a.s positive and negative facts) is actually a sligh 
generalization of a vivid knowledge base in the restricted sense of Levesque [1988], where on] 
positive facts, Le. ground atoms, are allowed. For example, Xl = {rvb(S),m(P,L)}represent 
the information that Susan is not blonde,and thatPeter is married to Linda. 
Definition 7 (Informational Ordering) Let X and X' be fact bases, i.e. X, X' ~ Lit 
Then X' is an informational exte~~sion of X, ,c;ymbolically X' ~ X, if X' 2 x. 
As a kind of natural deduction from positive and negative facts an inference relation 
between a set of proper ground literals X and a ground formula FE L(l, -, "", A, V) is defined 
X f- I if I E X 





X f- F A G if X f- F & X f- G 
X f- F V G if X f- F or X f- G 
For example, X t f- ""b(S) 1\ -""b(L). Notice that according to trus definition both a literalland· 
its complement I are acceptable at the same time, and independently from each other. This kind 
of inference is called liberal, as opposed to certain neutralization-based inference procedures (see 
e.g. [Wagner 1993a)) where contradictory information is discarded. 
Observation 1 A liberal inference relation is not coherent, i. e. X f- rv p does not imply that 




In addition to a standard disjunction V, an exc1usive disjunction, I, can be 
(F 1\ -G) V (G 1\ -F) 
FOT' instance, {p, q} f- P V q, but {p, q} If p I q. Notice that I is not per8i8tcnt. 
Defi nition 8 llpdating by extended literals is dejined as insC1'tion, resp. deletion: U pd( X, l) := 
X U {l}, re8p. Upd(X, -l) := X - {l}. More gcnerally, Upd can be defirled for set8 (corre-
sponding to conjunctions) ofextended literals, E ~ XLit, as Upd(X, E) := X U E+ - E-.t2 
Notice that new information which is inconsistent with the already represented one does not lead 
to an explosion of X, 01' in other words, destroy the information content of X. 
For example, if we learn that Peter gets divorced from Linda and marries Susan, we perform the 
following update: Upd(X t , -m(P, L) 1\ m(P, S)) = {""b(S), m(P, S)}. Such a sequence of basic 
inpu ts (insertions and deletions of atoms or literals ) is also called a knowledge ba8e transactio7l. 
Definition 9 The KRS (2Li t, f-, L(I,-,""jl\,V), Upd, XLit) is denoted by V
o
-' 
Claim 1 Vo- is a cumulative VKRS. 
Proof: See [Wagner 1993]. 
12Thus, an input formula can be any definite formula F. 
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4 The Disjunctive Extension of a KRS 
Let K be adefinite KRS, that is, KBs in K are definite, and hence, any input forlllula is 
also definite, implying that the input laguage does not allow for disjunctions. Thedisjunctille 
extension of K, symbolically DK, is defined as the KRS (L~B' f- d , L~uery' Updd, LilPut) 
where L~B := 2LKB and for Y E L~B' 
Y f-d F fel for all X E Y : X f- F 
In the sequel, we will not write d as superscript, resp. subscript if it is clear from context. The 
elements X E Y ~ LKB of a disjunctive KB are also called (possible) situation descriptions. 
Notice that in DK, Y = 0 is not a meaningful KB: it trivially eonfirms every sentence. The 
'empty' KB of DK contains as its only eleÜleht the empty set: 0 = {0}. 
The informational ordering of KBs is extended from K to DK: 
Definition 10 (Informational Ordering) Let ~ be an in/ormational ordering 0/ KBs in 
K, then an O1-dering 1"elation between the disjunctive K Bs 0/ D K can be defined accor-ding to 
y ' > Y gg V X' E Y ' 3X E Y : X' > X _d_
Finally, a disjunction operator is added to the inpu t language of K, LilPut := Llnput(V), and 






Updd(Y, F 1\ G) 
Updd(Y, F V G) 
U pdd(Y, F I Ci) 
{Upd(X,e): X E Y} 
. - Updd(Updd(Y, F),G) 
Updd(Y, F) U Updd(Y, G) u Updd(Y, F 1\ Ci) 
= Updd(Y, F) u Updd(Y, G) 
All other inductive cases are handled by the above rewrite rules f~r complex forlllulas. 13 Notiee 
that the definition of disjunetive update, (Uv), is inclusille (as is standard disjunction). 
Again, new inputs contradicting the KB do not lead to an explosion or totalloss of informa-
tion as in classical logic. Classical behavior can be achieved by lllodifying (U e), now discarding 
those situation descriptions which become inc.onsistent after being updated: 
. Updcl(Y,e) = {Upd(X,e): XE Y & Upd(X,e) is consistent} 
If Y f- I then Updc/(Y, I) = 0 is an 'exploded' KB in the sense that everything follows from O. 
A vivid alternative to this hypersensitive ineonsistency handling mechanislll of classical logic is 
the principle of minimal inconsistency proposed in [Priest 1989]: 
Updmi(Y,e) = {Upd(X,e): XE Y & Upd(X,e) is minimally inconsistent} 
which is nonexplosive and leads to a restricted form of disjunctive syllogism. Inconsistency 
handling is further discussed in [Wagner 1993a+h]. 
Since in 'real world' KBs the amount of disjunctive information can be expected to be smaIJ, 
and for reasons of cOlllputational efficiency has to be small, c.ompared to the amount of definite 
information represented in a typical KB, one could choose to represent a disjunctive KB as a 
pair (X, Y) where X E LKB contains the definite and Y ~ LKB the disjunctive information, and 
(X, Y) f- F .§. X f- F, or X U X' f- F for all X' E Y 
Thus, jf Y ~ LKB is a disjunctive KB, then its 'folding' is ( n Y, {X - n Y : X E Y} ) 
IJ(I\l!) requires that F 1\ Gare weakly consistent. Alternatively. the update operation can be defined by means 
of the disjunctive normaJ set which also works fOT weakly inconsistent inputs. 
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4.1 Disjunctive Fact Bases 
Following Belnap [1977] we call a set Y of partial interpretations (represented as sets ofliterals) 
an epistemic _<;tate. Since an epistemic state is able to represent disjunctive information, it can 
also be viewed as a disjunctitle fact base where - in addition to Belnap's considerations - we also 
allow for weaknegation in the query and in the input language. 
Definition 11 VB: = DVo ' The weak-negation-free fragment of the disjunctive extension oll 
fact bases, V;, is called Belnap's KRS. 
Example 1 {{p}, {rvq}} f- (p V rvq) A -(p A rvq). Howet1er, neither p nor "'q,and neither 
-p nOf' -rvq are derivable. 
Example 2 Let Yl = {Xl} where Xl = {rv b( S), m( P, L)}. If we learn that not both Petef' 
and Linda are blonde, we perform the following update: 
Y2 := Upd(Yl , rv(b(P) A b(L))) = {Xl U {rvb(P)}, Xl U {"'b(L)} Xi U {",b(P), ",b(L)}} 
We obtain, for instance, Y2 1( -",b(L), and also Y2 2: Yl • 
4.1.1 Belnap's KRS 
Observation 3 In VIi, K Bs are not unique repf'esentations: C(Y) = C(y l ) does not imply 
that}r = V'. For instance, C({{p}}) = C({{p}, {p,q}}). 
Claim 2 vt is a monotonie basic VKRS. 
Proof: See [Wagner 1993]. 
Observation 4 In Belnap '.'I K RS, one cannot express exclusive disjunctions. In the epistemic 
states of VIi only the minimal elements count, . 
C(Y) = n{C(X): X EY} = n{C(X): X E Mil1(Y)} 
Therefof'e, exclusive and inclusive disjunctive il1fof'matioH cal1Hot be distil1guished: 
{ {p}, {q}} ~ {{p}, {q}, {p, q} } 
4.1.2 Belnap's KRS with Weak Negation 
Claim 3 In VB' [( Bs· aJ'e tmique representatiol1S. 
Proof: See [Wagner 1993]. 
Claim 4 VB is a non-cumulative VKRS. It does Hot satisfy Lemma Compatibility. 
Proof: See [Wagner 1993]. We only show the failure of Lemma Compatibility by means üf a. 
simple example: 
{{p}} f- p V q 
but Upd({{p}},pVq) = {{p},{p,q}}I(-q 
while {{p}} f- -q 0 
Not only are lemmas no lünger compatible by the addition of weak negation to Belnap's KRS, 




1. Thc infcrcnce operation of VB i.<; not pcr.<;i,~tent, in gcnC1'al. HOWCVC7', qucry f07'7nula.<; 
without wcak ncgation and cxclusivc disjunction arc pcrsistcnt. 
2. In VB' Upd is no longcr ampliativc, that i,~, Y i Upd(Y, F), in gencral. Howcvcr, input 
fonnula.<; FE L(l, "',1\, V) arc ampliatitlc. 
4.1.3 Representing Three Kinds of Predicates 
Among the exact predicates one can distinguish betweeri those which are totally represented 
in a KB and those which are not. Exact and totally represented predicates are subject to the 
CWA. For example, the local KB of some city knows all residents of the city, i.e. the CWA holds 
for 1', hut it does not know of every resident whether she is married or not because she might 
have married in another city and tliis information would only be retrievable if all city KBs were 
intercollnected as a distributed KB. Consequently, the CWA does not apply to m. 
The CWA helps to reduce disjunctive complexity which is exponential in the numherof exact 
non-CWA predicates: if n is the number of graund atoms which can be formed by means of 
predicates dedared as exact but not subject to the CWA by KB, then KB contains at least ;311 
possible situation descriptions (211 if incoherent situation descriptions are discarded). 




married( Mary), residente MarYl, hlonde( Mary) 
"'married( Susan), '" hlonde( Susan) 
LookingAt( Mary, Peter) 
LookingAt( Peter, Susan) 
The interesting queries we can ask this KB anel the resp. answers are: 
1. Does a married person look at an unmarried one ? Yes, but the KB does not know who. 
2. Does a resident look at a non-resident? Yes, Mary at Peter. 
3. Does a blonde person look at a non-blonde one? No. The KB is cOlllpletely ignorant 
ahout the blondeness of Peter: neither is he blonde, nor is he non-blonde, nor is he blonde 
or non-blonde. (Hemight be in-between.) 
Notice that the explicit form of KB obtained hy updating hy all tertium non datur disjunctions 
specified implicitly through the EXACT declaration of resident and marricd would yield 36 = 729 
update steps, resp. possible situation descriptions, which is reduced to 33 = 27 by the CWA 
declaration of 7·c.<;idcnt. 
If all predicates are assumed to be exact, the resp. 'completion' of a disjunctive fact hase hy 
adding all instances of the tertium non datur leads half way to dassical logic: if all X E Y are 
consistent, then 
Upd(Y,;\{p(t)V"'P(t):tEl1y})rF itf Yrc/F 
where F E L( "',1\, V) and r cl denotes classical derivability. The second half consists of the cx 
contradictionc sCqUitU7' quodlibet principle according to which all inconsistent X E Y have to he 
discarded (see the definition of Updc/ ahove). 
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4.2 Adding an S5-like Modal Operator for Definite Belief 
The query language of D K can be extended by adding the modal operator B for definite belief, 
yielding the modal query extension Dm K. For X E Y E L~B' we define14 
(B) X f- BF if for all X' E Y : X' f- F 
(",B) Xf-",BF if for some X' E Y: X' f- rvF 
( -B) X f- -BF if for some X' E Y : X' f- - F 
(-",B) Xf--",BF if for all X' E Y : X' f- - '" F 
In this setting, two different possibility operators are definable: 
EF '" B '" F 
CF -B '" F 
EF captures the situation where there is some evidence in favour of F, whereas CF captures 
the situation where rv F cannot be inferred, Le. where Fis - in this sense - consistent. 
Observation 6 The modal operators Band E arc persistent, wherea,c; C is not. 
Observation 7 (Definite vs. Indefinite Existence) By means of B, dishonest atBJU7IC. 
tive iHformation can be djstinguished from honest one: if F V G iB dishonest on the basis 01 Y, 
then Y f- B F V Ba. Likewi,c;e, indefinite existential que11es can be distinguished from definite 
ones, as f01' in8taT~ce in Dm~ wllere, Jor X = ({pr c), q(d)), (pr d), q( d)}}, we obtatil XI- 3xp(x) 
as weil as X f- 3xq(x), hut only X f- 3x Bq(x), whe1'eas X f/ 3x Bp(x). Gelfond [1992} p1"OpoSC.' 
to usc such existential queries aB integrity conBtraintB rcquiring that a K B knowB definitcly, or 
indejinitcly, ce1'tain entities satisfying certain prcdicates. 
Observation 8 (Representing and Querying th~ Unknown) While the problem whcther 
some fact p is unknown in a fact base can be simply decided by answering the query -p /\ - "'p 
this doe,c; not w01'k in a disjunctitJe fact baBe. Instead, the indctenninacy query can be rcfonnu· 
lated in th1'ee different tIersions which are also discussed in [ThijsBe 1992jwherc they are namcd 
'simple', 'strong', and 'semi-strong ignorance " 1'cBpecti1,ely. In the following three examples wc 
exp,'ess complete knowledge, Bp, about p, . and ·thrce diffe1'ent forms of inc01i~plete knowledgc, 
-Bq /\ -B"'q, about q: 
1. Complete ignomnce wrt q reprcsented by 
{{p}} f- p /\ -q /\ - "'q 
2. Strong ignorance wrt q: 
{{p}, {p,q}, {p,"'q}} f- Bp/\ Eq/\ E"'q 
3. Semi-st1'Oug ignomnce wrt . q: 
{ {p}, {p, '" q}} f- Bp /\ E '" q 
or symmetrically, 
{{p}, {p,q}} f- Bp/\ Eq 
"Strictly speaking, we should rather write Y. X I- F, specifying the set of 'possible wor/ds' Y along with the 
'actual world' X (as usuaJ in possible worlds semantics), instead of X f- F. We prefer, however, the more economic 
notation, keeping the context Y in the background whenever it is clear. 
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Observation 9 (Honest and Dishonest Disjunctive Information) Knowing p V q sub-
sumes four (!) cases, two of them 'honest' and two 'dishonest '. In the case of a dishonest 
disjunction, more information i,<;, in fact, known than expressed by the resp. disjunction: 
• Honest disjunctive inforrnation: 
Qnly knowing p V q, and nothing more about p or q. 
{{p}, {q}, {p,q}} ~ (pV q)/\ -Bp/\ -Bq 
Knowing that either p or q but not both, and not knowing which of them: 
{{p}, {q}} ~ (p I q) /\ -Bp /\ -Bq 
• Dishonest disjunctive information: 
Knowing exactly one of both item .. <;: either p, or q . . This corresponds to the K B { {p} }, 
,'esp, {{ q}}, and to the query p /\ -q, resp. q /\ -p, 
Knowing both p and q which cO''1'esponds to the K B {{p, q} }, and to the query p /\ q. 
Observation 10 (Modal Inputs) Epistemic states camwt represent arbitmry subjective (i.e . 
modal) knowledge. Fo,' instance, updating by dishonest di..<;junctive information, Upd(O, BpVBq), 
is not possible. For thi .. 'l pu"pose, oue had to exteud the framework and take sets of epistemic 
statcs as [( Bs (yielding the S5 extension S5K). Updating by subjective literals, howetJer, is 
stmightforward: 
.- Upd(Y,e) 
Y U Upd(Y, e) 
Upd(Y, Be) 
Upd(Y, Ee) 
Upd(Y, Ce) Y U Upd(Y, - ,,-,e) 
Example 3 Let rhb, re .. "ip. lhb, denote the facts 'right hand b1'Oken', resp . 'left hand b1'Oken'. 
In thc bcginning we only have the infonnation that the right hand is b1'Oken. We thm leam that 
thC1'C is a serious possibility that the lcft hand is b,'okcn as weil: 
Upd({{rhb}}, Elhb) = {{rhb}, {rhb,lhb}} 
Finally howeve,', as the result of an examination, we a7'e happy to be told that there is HO 
conclusive el1idence that the right hand is broken, i.e. it is consistent that it is not brokeu: 
U pd( {{ rhb}, {rhb, lI~b}} ), C "-' rhb) = {{ rhb}, {rhb, lhb}, {}, {lhb}} 
5 Logic Programs as Rule Knowledge Bases 
With each KRS K a 1'Ule-based extension, RK, can be associated. In RK a knowledge base X E 
LKB is supplemented by a set R ~ LilIput x LQuery containing rules r = (Conclusion, Premise) 
with Conclusion E LInput and Premise E LQuery, also written as 'Conclusion - Premise' , 
These rules are mappings between KBs, 
r : L!{B --r LKB 
since - in the standard case - their application is defined as 
r(X) = { ~pd(X, Conclusion) if X ~ Premise 
otherwise 
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Definition 12 A mapping f : A --+ A from apreorder (A,::;) into itself is ealled monotonie 
if f(x)::; f(y) wheneverx::; y. It is ealled ampliative ifx::; f(x). A rule is ealledlllonotonic 
(7'CSp, ampliative) if it is a monotonie (resp. ampliative) mapping. 
Observation 11 The rule F - G is monotonie if its eonclusion F is ampliative, and it.~ 
p,'cmise G is pe1'sistent. 
The semantics of an alllpliative rule knowledge base (X, R) is determined by the definition of a 
preferred elosure of X under R, being a knowledge base Z E LKB extending X and elosed under 
all rules of R: 
1. Z ~ X 
2. r( Z) = Z for all r E R 
In general, however, there may be severalpreferred elosures, or none. We denote their eolleetion 
by R(X), lf there are several preferred closures, a valid eonsequenee lUust be inferrablefrolll all 
of them: 
C((X,R)) n{C(Z) : Z E R(X)} 
In the simplest ease, where all rules are monotnonic, the preferred closures are the minimaIones 
(like, e.g" in Iogic programs without negation-as-failure). 
Observation 12 (Local vs. Global Rules) .... . /il the ease of a disjunetive KB Y ~ LKB, a 
loeal dos ure of (Y, R), eorresponding to the loeal applieation of rules, can be dejined as the set 
of all infonnationally minimal X E LKB satisfying the rules of R as eonstraints: 
Rloc(Y) Min{X' : X' ~ X for some X E Y, sueh that 
f07' all rules F - GER, X' r F whenever X' I- G} 
Syntactically, a disjunetive logie program ean bc inte7'pf'cted either as a KB of RDV, 07' as a 
. 0 . 
K B of D RVo ' In the latter ease, rules are loeal, while in the former ease they an: global. F01' 
instanec, the program 11 = {p V q, r ~ p, r - q} has two readings: 
J. As a KB of DRVo ' i.e. as 
{{p,r - p,r - q}, {q,r _ p,r - q}, {p,q,r - p,r - q},} 
f1'07n whieh r is inferrable. 
2. As a KB of RDVo ' i.e. as 
({{p}, {q}, {p,q}}, {r - p,r - q}) 
f1'07n whieh r eamwt be infeN'ed, sinee R(Y.) = Y. Howeve7', using the loeal closure one 
gels 
Rloc(Y) = {{p, r}, {q, r}, {p, q, r}} 
and, as in D RVo' r ean be inferred. 




Observation 13 (Disjunction in the Premise) The following property, 
(07') Upd(KB, F) f- H & Upd(KB, Ci) f- H ~ Upd(KB, F v G) f- H 
docs not hold in RDK whcrc K is any KRS. 
In most proposals on the semantics of clisjunctive logic programs,15 rules are interpreted locally 
in a model-theoretic fashion, like implications. While this could be called a constraint scmantics 
of rules, since they are read as a kind of constraints on models, the interpretation of rules as 
mappings proposed here amounts to an operational semantics. 
Determining the 'right' preferred closures R( X) is especially difficult if the dependency 
graph of R contains loops involving weak negation, or in other words, if R is not weakly 
wellfounded. t6 In this case the concept of a stablc clOSU7'C generalising the stable model se-
mantics of [Gelfond & Lifschitz 1988] offers help. 
By means of stable closures, a general form of negation-as-failure, called stablc ncgation, 
can be added to the premises of rules of any ampliative RKRS provided that it has unique 
closures R(X) for any rule knowledge base (X, R). Instead of rules F (-- G we allow for rules 
F (-- Gt, ... ,Gi,notGi+l, ... ,notGm , where not is a newly introduced operator (not occuring 
in the query anel input language, that is, F, G and all Gk do not contain not). 
Definition 13 (Stable Closure) For any RKB (X, R) and any Z E LKB dcjinc RZ as thc 
sct of not -f7'CC mlcs obtained from R by 
1. 1'cmoving all 7'ules containing a premisc not G such that Z f- G, and 
>} delcting in the rcmaining rules all prcmiscs of thc form not G. 
Z 'E LKB is called a stable closure of (X, R) if Z = RZ(X). 
5.1 Extended Logic Programs 
Extended logic programs correspond to rule knowledge bases of RVo ' For instance, the following 
program 
fit = {m(P,L), rvb(S), rvm(x,y) (-- -m(x,y)} 
corresponds to the rule knowledge base (Xl, R l ) in R~ such that Xl is as above, and R I 
{rvm(x,y) (-- -m(x,y)}. We obtain as the uruque preferred closure 
RI(Xd = {rvb(S), m(P, L), rvm(P, S)}, 
and consequently, (Xl, R1) f- rv m( P, S). In the case of a weakly wellfounded (Le. locally strati-
fied) program fi = (X, R), there is a unique preferred closure R(X), obtained by applying the 
rules of R in the order given by the natural stratification of R. This closure is also a supported, 
perfect, wellfounded and stable model. In the general case, the stable closures of TI can be 
regarded as its preferred closures. 
l~See, e.g., [Gelfond & Lifschitz 1991], or [Lobo, Minker & Rajasekar 1992]. 
16The notion of weak wellfoundedness, corresponding to local stratifiability, is introduced in [Wagner 1993]. It 
excludes 'negative loops' while simple wellfoundedness, also defined in [Wagner 1993], excludes in addition positive 
loops , and strong wellfounde.dne.ss, defined in [Wagner 1993a], excludes in addition 'complementary loops'. 
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5.2 Extended Disjunctive Logic Prograrns 
Extended disjunctive logic programs com~spond to rule knowledge bases of RDVo' resp. RVR . 
For instance, the follüwing program about broken left hands (lh) and right hands (rh), 
lh_broken V rh_broken 
lh_usable f- -lh_broken 
rh_usable f- -rh_broken rr 2 = geL50$_compensation f- rh_broken 
geL50$_compensation f- Ih_broken 
go_to_work f- ~(rh_broken A lh_broken) 
corresponds to the rule knowledge base (Y2 , R2 ) where · 
Y2 = {{lh_broken}, {rh_broken}, {lh_broken, rh_broken} } 
In the case where the rules of Ih are global, none of them is applicable, so the closnre of Y2 is 
Y2 itself and we can neither concIude that any. hand is usable, nor that compensation can be 
obtained (we had to tell the insurance company which hand is broken), nor that we areexpected 
to go to work. We would not get compensation because (Or) fails if the resp. rules are read 
globally. 
The local closure of (Y2 , R2 ), in ab breviated form, is: 
{{lhb,rhu,50,gtw}, {rhb,lhu,50,gtw}, {lhb,rhb,50}} 
and thus, 50 $ are obtained as compensation. 
5.3 Epistemic Specifications 
Gelfond [1992] has proposed to extend the framework of logic programming by the addition 
of epistemic modal operators in the premise of rules. An epistemic specification, in this sense, 
corresponds to a rule knowledge base of RDm Vo' It specifies an epistemic state, called world 
vicw in [Gelfond 1992], as a collection of belief sets: Y ~ 2Lit is an epistemic state specified by 
rr if each X E Y is a belief set of rr with respect to Y, i.e. 
Y= U a(rrY'x,Y) 
XEY 
where rrY,x is the following not -eliminating transformation of rr: 
1. remove from rr an rules containing premise formulas not G such that X I- C, 
2. delete in the remaining rules all premise formulas of the form not G, 
alld a( rr, Y) collects an minimal literal closures of rr with respect to Y in the following sense: 
let rr be a specification not containing negation-as-failure, then X ~ Lit is a minimal litera! 
closure of rr with respect to Y if X is a minimal set satisfying X I- F whenever Y, X I- G for all 
rules F f- G E rr. 
Tbis definition sililplifies that of [Gelfond 1992] where a two-step reduction of rr is defined: 
first modal operators are eliminated from rules with respect to the epistemic state Y, yielding 
rr Y , and then, with respect to single belief sets X E Y, negation-as-failure is eliminated, yielding 
the resp. (rrY)x. In this way one gets the fixpoint equation 
Y = U a«rrY)x) 
XEY 
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If rr does not contain modal operators, or does only contain them in the scope of negation-as-
failure, then for every X E Y s:;;; 2Lit , rrY,x = (rrY)x. 
Notic.e that meanwhile Gelfond has changed his original definition, now defining the falsity 
of modal fOflllUlas as non-satisfiability (instead of strong falsifiability) and no longer allowing 
subjective fOflllUlas prefixed by negation-as-failure. This change, however, is not essential for 
our discussion. 
5.4 The Closed-World Assumption in Disjunctive Fact Bases 
The above definition . of the CWA rule reducing the derivabilityof a strongly negated atom 
formed with a CWA predic.ate to the derivability of its weak negation is applicable in every KRS 
with strong and weak negation. lt is, therefore, more general than the definiton of the CWA 
given in [Gelfond & Lifschitz 1990] for extended logic programs (corresponding to the rule-based 
extension of fact bases) which was modified in [Gelfond 1992] in order to account properly for 
disjl1nctive information. We shall (liscuss this now by means of an example. 
In [Gelfond & Lifschitz 1990+1991] it was proposed to express the CWA for a predicate p 
by the rule 
rv p(x) ~ not p(x) 
where not denotes stable negation as defined by the stable model semantics. Consider the 
following example. A member of the scientific council lUUSt be both a lecturer and an active 
research er. Sl1ppose we know that Peter is a lecturer, l( P), and we also know that Tom is a 
lecturer or a researcher, I(T) V r(T), and forbothpredicates the CWA holds, then, according to 
[Gelfond & Lifschitz 1991] we get the following 'disjunctive database': 
rr _ { ~~;? V r(T) 
,- rvl(x)~notl(x) 
rvr(x) ~ notr(x) 
which has two answer scts,17 namely {1(P), rvr(P), I(T), rvr(T)} and {1(P), rvr(P), r(T), rvl(T)}: 
amI consequently, rvr(P) as weIl as rvl(T) V rvr(T) can be inferred, that is, we get the answer 
no not only to the query 'Does Peter belong to the sdentific coundl ?' but also to 'Does Tom 
belong to the sdentific council ?'. 
However, as Gelfond argues in [1992], the fact that r(T) does not hold in some answer set, 
does not guarantee that a rational reasoner does not have a reason to belief r(T). Such a 
reason may be given by the existence of another answer set containing r(T). Gelfond, therefore, 
proposes to express the. CWA for a predicate p in the presence of disjunctive information hy 
means of an epistemic modality defined within his framework of epistcmic specificatio71s in the 
following way: 
rvp(x) ~ not Ep(x) 
wheI:e the premise requires that there is no possible evidence for p( x) in none of the answer sets. 
We thus obtain the following cpistemic specificatio71 a.s the correct formalization of our problem: 
rr _ { :~;? V r(T) 
"2 - rvl(x) ~ not El(x) 
rvr(x) ~ not Er(x) 
17Recall that S <;; Lit is an answer set of a 'disjunctive database' 0 if S E 0'(0$) where n$ is the Gelfond-
Lif~chitz transformation eliminating not from 0, and 0'(0) collects all minima! litera! closures of O. 
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11:2 has the unique world view 
{{I(P), rvr(P), I(T)}, {1(P), rvr(P), r(T)}} 
yielding the conclusion that rv r( P), but not that rv I(T) V rv r(T),and hence as desired only the 
query 'Does Peter belong to the scientific council ?' gets the answer no, while the same query 
with respec.t to Tom gets the answer unknown now. 
This is exactly the same result as in the corresponding disjunctive fact base obtained by 
stipulating the CWA for the predicates land r, and compiling the facts that Peter is a lecturer 
and that Tom is a lecturer or a researcher: . 
YI = ({l,r}, Upd(O,I(P)A(l(T)Vr(T)))) 
({I, r}, {{I(P), I(T)}, {1(P), r(T)}, {1(P), I(T), r(T)}) . 
By means of (CWA+), we get the following dosure: 
{{I(P), I(T), rvr(P)}, {1(P), r(T), rvr(P)}, {1(P), I(T), r(T), rvr(P)} 
yielding the same answers as above to the queries whether Peter and Tom belong to the scientific 
couneil. 
6 Conclusion 
We have shown how the framework of databases and logic programs can be constructively 
extended with respect to disjunctive information and modal queries, resp. subjective knowledge. 
In these extensions there are different design options how to model the interaction of negations 
and the other operators. And it is not obvious at all what is the 'right' generalization ofnegation-
as-failure and the CWA in these settings. We hope, however, that the proposed framework of 
vivid knowledge representation systems helps to realize and evaluate the different design options 
and lllodelings. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Wie Levesque gezeigt hat, läßt sich die Interaktion mit einer Wis-
sens basis funktional mit Hilfe von Operationen ASK und TELL be-
schreiben, die es erlauben, Anfragen an das System zu stellen und 
neue Informationen hinzuzufügen . · Insbesondere stellt Levesque her-
aus, daß eine epistemische Interaktionssprache die Expressivität deut-
lich erhöht, selbst wenn die Wissensbasis nur aus Formeln der Lo-
gik 1. Ordnung (FOL) besteht und keine epistemischen Operatoren 
enthält . Interessanterweise lassen sich jedoch dabei epistemische ASK-
und TELL-Operationen auf herkömmliche nicht-epistemische Opera-
tionen reduzieren. 
Die Interaktionssprache für Wissens basen der Konzeptsprache Clas-
sic, die mit Abstrichen als FOL-Fragment angesehen werden kann, be-
steht bisher nur aus Classic-Ausdrücken zusammen mit metalogischen . 
Konzepten, um die Ausdruckskraft zu erhöhen . Das im Workshop-
Beitrag dargestellte Projekt hat eine epistemische Erweiterung von 
Classic (K-Classic) zum Inhalt, mit dem Ziel, eine mächtigere Interak-
tionssprache für Operationen wie ASK und TELL zu erhalten. Die 
Erweiterung in der Mächtigkeit der Interaktionssprache besteht darin, 
daß nicht ausschließlich die Domäne Interaktionsgegenstand ist, son-
dern auch das Wissen der Wissensbasis über die Domäne zum Interak-
tionsgegenstand werden kann. Neben der Sprachdefinition ist unter 
anderem zu überprüfen, ob ähnlicbe Reduktionsverfahren von episte-
mischen auf nicht-epistemische Operationen wie im Levesqueschen An-
satz möglich sind. Außerdem wird auf Integritätsbedingungen einge-
gangen, die als epistemische Anfragen formuliert stets die Antwort 'ja' 
erhalten müssen, und insofern als spezieile ASK-Operationen anzuse-
hen sind. Schließlich kann mittels epistemischer Ausdrücke als Argu-
mente der TELL-Operation u.a. die Closed World Assumption lokal 
für Konzepte und Rollen durchgesetzt werden. 
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1 Eine epistemische Erweiterung von Classic als Interak';' 
tionssprache itir Classic-Wissens basen 
Wie Levesque in [Levesque 84] gezeigt hat, läßt sich die Interaktion mit einer Wissensba-
sis funktional mit Hilfe von Operationen ASK und TELL beschreiben, die es erlauben, 
Anfragen an das System zu stellen und neue Informationen hinzuzufügen. Insbesondere 
stellt Levesque heraus, daß eine epistemische Interaktionssprache die Expressivität deut-
lich erhöht, selbst wenn die Wissensbasis nur aus Formeln der Logik 1. Ordnung (FOL) 
besteht und keine epistemischen Operatoren enthält. Interessanterweise lassen sich jedoch 
dabei epistemische ASK- und TELL-Operationen auf herkömmliche nicht-epistemische 
Operationen reduzieren. 
Die Interaktionssprache für Wissensbasen der Konzeptsprache Classic, die mit Abstrichen 
als FOL-Fragment angesehen werden kann, besteht bisher nur aus Classic-Ausdrücken zu-
sammen mit met alogischen Konzepten, um die Ausdruckskraft zu erhöhen. Uns geht es in 
diesem Projekt um eine epistemische Erweiterung von Classic (K-Classic) mit dem Ziel, 
eine mächtigere Interaktionssprache für Operationen wie ASK und TELL zu erhalten. 
Neben der Sprachdefinition geht es uns unter anderem darum zu überprüfen, ob ähnliche 
Reduktionsverfahren ·von epistemischen auf nicht-epistemische Operationen wie im Leve-
squeschen Ansatz möglich sind. Außerdem wird auf den Einsatz epistemischer Ausdrücke 
als Integritätsbedingungen und als Argument der TELL-Operation eingegangen. 
2 Classic 
Classic ist eine bei AT &T entwickelte und in Common LISP, neuerdings auch in C im-
plementierte Konzeptsprache. Bezüglich Syntax und Semantik der in Classic enthaltenen 
Sprachkonstrukte sei auf [Resnick et al. 91] und [Brachman et al. 90] verwiesen. Ober-
stes Designziel bei der Konzeption von Classic ist Effizienz im Subsumptionsverhalten 
gewesen, die durch eine vergleichende empirische Studie ([Heinsohn et al. 92]) im wesent-
lichen auch bestätigt worden ist. Das vergleichsweise günstige Laufzeitverhalten geht 
jedoch zu Lasten der Expressivität der Sprache, indem beispielsweise eine wesentliche 
Quelle von Ineffizienz, nämlich Disjunktion als expliziter konzeptbildender Operator (vgl. 
[Donini et al. 91]), nicht Bestandteil von Classic ist. Disjunktion ist in Classic nur auf 
der Ebene der Individuen mit Hilfe des ONE-OF -Operators möglich. Ebensfalls nur sehr 
eingeschränkt sind die Möglichkeiten, Negation auszudrücken, entweder wiederum über 
das ONE-OF-Konstrukt (Individuen schließen sich implizit gegenseitig aus) oder mit Hilfe 
von DISJOINT-PRIMITIVE. 
Neben der vergleichsweise stark eingeschränkten Expressivität vön Classic ist eine weitere 
Folge der Priorisierung der Effizienz, daß der verwendete Subsumptionsalgorithmus zwar 
korrekt, aber nicht vollständig ist, so daß nicht alle Subsumptionen erkannt werden (vgl. 
zum Beispiel [Heinsohn et al. 92]). Als eine Ursache für die Unvollständigkeit wird unter 
anderem die für Termsubsumptionssprachen untypische minimale Trennung von konzep-
tuellem (T-Box) und assertionalem (A-Box) Wissen identifiziert. Beispielsweise können 
Konzepte (T-Box) unter Rückgriff auf Individuen (A-Box) definiert werden, und zwar 
durch Aufnahme der Konstrukte (FILLS R individuuml ... individuumn ) und (ONE-OF 
individuuml . .. individuumn ) in die Konzeptdefinition. 
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3 Motivation iür eine epistemische Erweiterung von Classic 
Die Motivation für eine epistemische Erweiterung von Classic besteht in den folgenden 
Zielen: 
• Die Möglichkeiten für ASK-Operationen sollen erweitert werden, indem auch Anfra-
gen an eine Wissens basis darüber möglich werden, was dieser Wissensbasis bekannt 
beziehungsweise unbekannt ist. Nicht der in der Wissensbasis modellierte Weltaus-
schnitt ist Gegenstand der Anfragen, sondern das, was der Wissensbasis über diesen 
Weltausschnitt bekannt ist. Dieser Unterschied ist relevant, solange das Wissen der 
Wissensbasis über den Weltausschnitt unvollständig ist. 
• Als Sonderfall von ASK-Operationen soll die Durchsetzung von Integritätsbedingun-
gen in der Wissensbasis ermöglicht werden. Integritätsbedingungen sind epistemi-
sehe Anfragen über den Zustand einer Wissensbasis, die zu jedem Zeitpunkt mit 'ja' 
beantwortet werden müssen, damit die Integrität der Wissensbasis garantiert ist. 
• Es sollen TELL-Operationen möglich weiden, die den Zustand einer Wissensba-
sis insbesonder~ dahingehend verändern, daß einzelne Konzepte oder Rollen als ge-
schlossen gelten in dem Sinne, daß ihre Extension vollständig bekannt ist . Mittels 
solcher TELL-Operationen wird somit eine lokale Closed World Assumption durch-
gesetzt, die neue (vor allem allquantifizierte) Inferenzen ermöglicht. 
• Classic enthält Triggerregeln, Regeln des inhalts "wenn ein Individuum unter ein 
Konzept C subsumiert wird, so auch unter ein Konzept D" . Wie [Donini et al. 92] 
aufzeigen, ist die Semantik derartiger Regeln mit Hilfe eines epistemischen Operators 
formalisierbar . 
4 Syntax und Semantik von K-Classic 
4.1 Syntax von K-Classic 
Zur Darstellung der Syntax und Semantik von K-Classic übernehmen wir weitgehend die 
Terminologie aus [Donini et al. 92]. Im folgenden stellen C Konzepte (einstellige Prädi-
kate) , A primitive Konzepte und PRolIen (zweistellige Prädikate) dar. () sei ein Alphabet 
von Symbolen ai . n stehe für eine natürliche Zahl, g und j für natürliche Zahlen oder Zei-
ehen ketten . 
Unsere epistemische Erweiterung von Classic sieht syntaktisch folgendermaßen aus: 
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C, Ci ---+ A 
CLASSIC-THING 
(AND Cl . .. Cn ) 
(ALL R C) 
(AT-LEAST n R) 
(AT-MOST n R) 
(SAME-AS (Rl R2 ..• Rn) (Ri R~ ... Rm)) 
(PRIMITIVE C j) 
(DISJOINT-PRIMITIVE C g j) 
(ONE-OF al a2 .. . ~) 
(FILLS R al a2 ... ~) 
(KC) 
R ---+ P I (K P) 
Classic enthält außer den genannten konzeptbildenden Operatoren auch die Test-Prädikate 
TEST-C und TEST-H, die Schnittstellen zur LISP-Umgebung darstellen, sowie die primi-
tiven Konzepte THING und HOST-THING, die die Welt der LISP-Objekte subsumieren. 
Diese Konstrukte werden der Einfachheit halber nicht berücksichtigt: 
4.2 Semantik von K-Classic 
PI und P2 seien Parameter, Elemente. einer Domäne 8, l' eine injektive Abbildung von 
o auf~. I sei eine Interpretation, die jedem Konzept eine Teilmenge aus 8 und jeder 
Rolle eine Teilmenge aus 8 x 8 zuordnet, wobei Zuordnungen auch für durch konzept-
bildende Operatoren formierte Konzepte entsprechend der Semantik dieser Operatoren 
vorgenommen werden . Da es sich bei K-Classic um eine epistemische Sprache handelt, 
bestehen Modelle aus zwei Teilen, einer Interpretation I, die die reale Welt repräsentiert, 
und einer Menge von Interpretationen W, die daS Wissen des Systems beschreiben. Kurz 
gesagt weiß das System genau die Sätze, die in allen Interpretationen in W wahr sind 
(dies entspricht der Mögliche-Welten-Semantik der Logik K45, siehe [ßalpern 92]). Eine 
epistemischeInterpretation ist ein Paar (I, W), wobei I eine Interpretation und Weine 
Menge von Interpretationen ist, so daß die folgenden Gleichungen erfüllt werden: 
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(AND Cl C2 ... Cn)Z'W CI,W n CI,W n CI,W I 2 . . . n 
(ALL R C)I,W = {pI E Ä I V'P2(PI,P2) ERI,W - P2 ECI,W} 
(AT-LEAST n R)I,W = {pI E Ä II{Pz E Ä I(PI,P2)ERI ,W}/ ~ n} 
(AT-MOST n R)I,W {pI E Ä I /{PZ E Ä I (PI,PZ) ERI,W}/ ~n} 
(SAME-AS (RI R2 ... Rn) 
(PI,P2) ERf'W A(P2,Pa) ER;'W (R~ R2 ... Rm))I,WI {PI E Ä I 
A . . . A (Pn-I,Pn) ER;'W A 
( ') RtZ,W A(' ') ~,W PI , P2 E I P2, P3 E 
A . . . A (Pm-I,Pm) ER;;W 
-> Pn = Pm} 
(PRIMITIVE C j)Z'W C CI,W 
(DISJOINT-PRIMITIVE C g j)I,W C CI,W A 
«DISJOINT-PRIMITIVE C g j)Z'W 
n (DISJOINT-PRIMITIVE C g j')I,W =- 0), j "# j' 
(ONE-OF al az .. . a.,..)I,W {1(al),1(a2), .. . ,1(a.,..)} ~ Ä 
(FILLS R al a2 ... a.,..)Z'w = {p E Ä I {(p, 1(ad), (p, 1(a2)),· .. , (p, 1(a.,..))} ~RI,W} 
(K C)Z'w n.7EW (c.7,W) 
(K p)I,W = n.7EW (p.7,W) 
(K C) wird also in Wals die Menge derjenigen Parameter interpretiert, die in allen Model-
len von W zur Extension des Konzepts C gehören. Im Zusammenhang mit einer K-Classic 
Wissens basis interessiert als W insbesondere die Menge aller Modelle der Wissensbasis re-
lativ zu einern gegebenen ß.2 Informell besteht (K C) dann aus den Objekten, von denen 
in der Wissensbasis bekannt ist, daß sie Instanzen von C sind ((K P) analog). 
4.3 Ein Beispiel für K-Classic 
Wir zeigen an einern kleinen Beispiel, daß K-Classic gegenüber Classic als Interaktions-
sprache einen Gewinn an Expressivität bringt .. Angenommen, in der Wissensbasis ist 
notiert, daß Mary zwei Kinder hat, John und Peter, und daß John und Peter männli-
chen Geschlechts sind. Die Individuen J·ohn und peter sind demnach Rollenfüller der Rolle 
child in der Definition des Individuums mary, beide Individuen werden vorn Konzept male 
subsumiert. Die Definition von mary enthält dann den Bestandteil 
(AND (FILLS child peter) 
(FILLS child john)) 
I In Classic sind beim SAME-AS-Operator aus Effizienzgränden nur Attribute, d.h . funktionale Relationen 
zugelassen. 
~Der Einfachheit halber kann als Domäne das Herbrand-Cniversum angenommen werden, was der Menge 
aller Parameter entspricht. 
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Unter der Voraussetzung, daß die Rolle child für das Individuum mary nicht geschlossen 
ist, würde die Anfrage 
(ALL child male)(mary) 
die Antwort 'unknown' bekommen, da nicht ausgeschlossen werden kann, daß es noch 
andere, der Wissensbasis nicht bekannte Rollenfüller für die Rolle child gibt, die nicht 
vom Konzept male subsumiert werden. Die Anfrage 
(ALL (K child) male)(mary) 
wird mit 'yes' beantwortet, da alle bekannten Rollenfiiller der Rolle child in der Definition 
von mary unter das Konzept male fallen. Eine Anfrage 
(AT-MOST 2 child)(mary) 
würde die Antwort 'unknown' erhalten, daünhekannt ist, ob Mary nicht noch mehr Kinder 
hat. Dagegen würde auf die Anfrage 
(AT-MOST 2 (K child))(mary) 
die Antwort 'yes' gegeben werden, da nicht mehr als 2 ihrer Kinder bekannt sind. Es 
lassen sich also durchaus Beispiele dafür aufzeigen, daß eine epistemische Erweiterung von 
Classic zu einer größeren Expressivität der Interaktionssprache führt. 
5 ASK 
5.1 Die Semantik des ASK-Operators 
Ist E eine Classic-Wissens basis und M (E) die Menge aller Modelle von E und a eme 
K-Classic-Anfrage, so ist die Semantik des ASK-Operators definiert als: 
ASK[E, a] = yes genau dann, wenn für jedes Modell I E M(E) a wahr in (I, M(E)) ist. 
Für K-Classic gibt es zwei Verfahren zur Realisierung epistemischer ASK-Operationen. 
5.2 Ein constraintbasiertes Verfahrel1 zur Beantwortung epistemischer 
Anfragen 
Eine Aussage a ist für jedes Modell I E M(E) wahr in (I,M(E)) genau dann, wenn es 
für die Wissensbasis Eu {-.a} kein epistemisches Modell gibt. In [Donini et al. 92] wird 
der aus [Schmidt-SchaußSmolka 91] bekannte tableaux-basierte Algorithmus verwendet, 
Eu {-.a} auf ein Constraintsystem abzubilden, das genau dann unerfüllbar ist, wenn es 
für Eu { -.a} keinepistemisches Modell gibt. Zur Feststellung der Erfüllbarkeit eines Con-
straintsystems werden sukzessive die unmittelbar konstituierenden Bestandteile komplexer 
Constraints als eigenständige Constraints hinzugenommen (Vervollständigung), und zwar 
in einer Weise, daß die Erfüllbarkeitseigenschaft durch diese Erweiterung nicht berührt ist. 
- 98-
Bei Unerfüllbarkeit eines Constraintsystems manifestiert sich schließlich ein syntaktisch er-
kennbarer Widerspruch in der Constraintmenge, der mit Hilfe sogenannter Clash-Regeln 
festgestellt werden kann. Vervollständigungsregeln und Clash-Regeln haben sprachspezi-
fischen Charakter. 
Im Zusammenhang mit K-Classic entsteht das Problem, daß die Sprache nicht Negation 
als expliziten konzeptbildenden Operator enthält. Um eine K-Classic-Anfrage negieren zu 
können, ist K-Classic um die Negation auszuweiten. Für die so erweiterte Sprache haben 
wir Vervollständigungsregeln und Clash-Regeln ~rmittelt. 
Der wesentliche Vorteil des Verfahrens ist seine Vollständigkeit, der wesentliche Nachteil 
jedoch seine Ineffizienz. 
5.3 Reduktion epistemischer Ausdrücke auf ONE-OF-Konzepte 
Eine andere, effizientere Möglichkeit, epistemische Anfragen an eine Classic-Wissensbasis 
auszuwerten, besteht, wie in [Donini et al. 92] angedeutet3 , in sukzessiven Bottom-Up 
Ersetzungen von im Skopus eines epistemischen Operators liegenden Konzepten durch 
jeweils ein ONE-OF-Konzept mit den in der Wissensbasis bekannten Instanzen des Kon-
zepts. Die Ergebnisse solcher Bottom-Up-Ersetzungen hängen somit vom Zustand der 
Wissensbasis ab. Sind beispielsweise in der Wissensbasis die Individuen al, ~, ... , an als 
Instanzen des Konzepts C bekannt, und sind die Individuen b1 , b2, ... , bm als Instanzen 
des Konzepts (ALL P (ONE-OF al a2 ... an)) bekannt, so würden sich für eine Anfrage 
(K (ALL P (K Cl)) (c) folgende Transformationen ergeben: 
(K (ALL P (K C))) (e) -> 
(K (ALL P (ONE-OF al .. , an))) (e) -> 
(ONE-OF b 1 . . . bm ) (e) 
Soweit im Skopus des epistemischen Operators ein Konzept liegt, erhält man durch die 
einzelnen Transformationen in ONE-OF -Konzepte K-Classic-Ausdrücke und letzten Endes 
einen Classic-Ausdruck. Im Prinzip wird ähnlich dem Reduktionsverfahren von Levesque 
vergegangen. Die Korrektheit des Verfahrens kann entsprechend durch Riickbezug auf die 
Levesquesche Reduktionsabbildung gezeigt werden. 
Ein Vorteil des Verfahrens ist, daß es zum großen Teil in Classic selbst realisiert werden 
kann, indem ein ClaSsic-Konzept im Skopus des K-Operators in die Classic-Wissensbasis 
eingeführt wird, anschließend der Subsumptionsgraph neu aufgebaut wird, und die Menge 
der bekannten Instanzen des Classic-Konzepts zu einem ONE-OF-Konzept zusammen-
gefaßt wird. Allerdings können in Classic einmal in die Wissens basis eingetragene Kon-
zepte in der gegenwärtigen Implementierung nicht wieder entfernt werden, so daß die 
Wissensbasis allmählich aufgebläht wird. Die Implementierung ist insoweit zu h1odifizie-
ren, daß Konzepte nach Bearbeitung einer epistemischen Anfrage wieder gelöscht werden 
können (der Subsumptionsgraph muß dann erneut angestoßen werden). 
Liegt im Skopus des epistemischen Operators eine Rolle, so kann die Verarbeitung nicht in 
Classic erfolgen . Bei einer Anfrage der Form (AT-LEAST n (K P)) beispielsweise sind alle 
~außerdem persönliche Kommunikation mit Werner l\utt 
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Individuenpaare zu ermitteln, die in der Wisserisbasis in der Relation P stehen. Man erhält 
damit Individuenpaare (ai, bi), die nicht als Argumente des ONE-OF-Operators auftreten 
können. Es gibt in Classic kein Pendant zum ONE-OF-Operator für Individuenpaare, 
mit dessen Hilfe sich eine Menge der Form ((al, bd,· .. , (an, bn)) ausdrücken ließe, d.h. 
eine Rolle extension al definiert werden könnte. Daher kann ein Konstrukt der Form (K 
P) nicht unmittelbar auf einen nicht-epistemischen Ausdruck reduziert werden. Selbst 
wenn ein Sprachmittel zur extensionalen Definition von Rollen . zur Verfügung stünde, 
bräuchte man zusätzlich noch Projektionen und die Möglichkeit, die Projektionen Tests 
zu unterziehen, d.h. man bräuchte zusätzliche rollenbildende Operatoren. Eine solch 
umfassende Erweiterung von Classic würde andere Schwierigkeitennachsichziehen, etwa 
daß neue Regeln zum Erkennen von Inkonsistenz oder zur Subsumption formuliert werden 
müssen. 
Die Lösung des Problems besteht darin, einen Teil der Verarbeitung mittels (relativ ein-
facher) LISP-Programmierung vorzunehmen. Es wird hierbei ausgenützt, daß Konstrukte 
. . 
der Form (K P) nur innerhalb bestirrimter, unmittelbar umschließender Konstrukte auf-
treten können. .Ein solches Konstrukt ist beispielsweise (AT-LEAST n (K P)). Nach 
Feststellung der (K pl,·-\-f(E) entsprechenden Menge von Individuenpaaren wird die Teil-
menge der ersten Projektion berechnet, deren Elemente jeweils mindestens n bekannte 
Rollenfüller (in der zweiten Projektion) haben. Diese Teilmenge der ersten Projektion 
ist wiederum eine als ONE-OF-Konzept darstellbare Individuenmenge. Der gesamte Aus-
druck (AT-LEAST n (K P)) kann somit schließlich durch ein ONE-OF-Konzept ersetzt, 
und die weitere Verarbeitung in Classic fortgesetzt werden. Die möglichen, ein Konstrukt 
(K P) unmittelbar umschließenden Konstrukte stellen wegen ihres konzeptuellen Charak-
ters Individuenmengen dar, die mit einem ONE-OF-Konzept dargestellt werden können. 
In der gegenwärtigen Implementierung wird der epistemische Operator allerdings nicht 
auf den ArgumentsteIlen des SAME-AS-Operators zugelassen, da es nur für sehr spezielle 
Fälle sinnvolle Beispiele gibt. 
Ein Nachteil des Verfahrens ist, daß der inClassic implementierte Subsumptionsalgorith-
mus, wie eingangs festgestellt, unvollständig ist. Um korrekte und vollständige Antworten 
zu erhalten, wäre eine Reimplementierung des Subsumptionsalgorithmus erforderlich. 
6 Integritätsbedingungen 
Integritätsbedingungen stellen Forderungen bezüglich der internen Beschaffenheit einer 
Wissensbasis dar, die zu jedem Zeitpunkt, in jedem Zustand der Wissensbasis erfüllt 
sein müssen. Aussagen über den Zustand einer Wissensbasis sind Aussagen über die 
Wissensbasis, d.h. die Wissensbasis selbst wird zum Interaktionsgegenstand. Derartige 
Aussagen können daher in natürlicher Weise mit einem epistemischen Operator formuliert 
werden. Integritätsbedingungen können entsprechend als epistemische Anfragen formuliert 
werden, eine Sichtweise, die auf [Reiter 88] zurückgeht, und zwar Anfragen, die zu jedem 
Zeitpunkt, in jedem Zustand der Wissensbasis die Antwort 'ja' erhalten müssen, damit 
die jeweilige Integritätsbedingung erfüllt ist. Integritätsbedingungen können daher als 
Spezialfall epistemischer ASK-Operationen aufgefaßt werden. 
lntegritätsbedingungen können zum Teil durch entsprechende Kunstgriffe quasi in die 
Modellierung eingebaut werden. Dies erfordert allerdings viel Erfahrung, ist meistens 
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umständlich und steht dem Prinzip entgegen, möglichst direkt eine Domäne deklarativ 
zu modellieren, ohne dabei technische Constraints im Auge behalten zu müssen. Von 
daher ist es vorzuziehen, Integritätsbedingungen als epistemische Anfragen zu formulie-
ren, die von der Wissensbasis separiert werden, aber nach jeder Veränderung im Zustand 
der Wissensbasis ausgewertet werden. Bei den Beispielen für Integritätsbedingungen in 
[Reiter 88] zeigt sich, daß K-Classic allein zur Formulierung vieler Integritätsbedingungen 
nicht ausreicht. Dies wird deutlich in folgender Integritätsbedingung: 
Für ein Individuenpaar, das in der Relation mother steht, muß das erste Indi-
viduum von dem Konzept person, das zweite Individuum von den Konzepten 
person und female subsumiert werden. 
'<Ix, y Kmother(x, y) :> K(person(x) /\ person(y) /\ female(y)) 
In Classic kann eine Konzeptdefinition (etwa durch Triggerregeln in Kombination mit 
einem Test-Prädikat und einer geeignet definierten LISP-Funktion) so ausgerichtet wer-
den, daß die Integritätsbedingung für alle Instanzen des Konzepts erfüllt ist. Es gibt 
in Classic jedoch keine allgemeine Möglichkeit, das Vorkommen einer Rolle oberhalb ei-
nes bestimmten Konzepts in der Subsumptionshierarchie - in diesem Fall oberhalb des 
Konzepts person - zu untersagen. Die genannte Integritätsbedingung (oder allgemeiner 
Typspezifizierungen für Rollenargumente ) kann für eine Classic-Wissens basis nicht global, 
d.h. unabhängig von einer einzelnen Konzeptdefinition, durchgesetzt werden. Es gibt 
also zahlreiche Integritätsbedingungen, die mit Modellierungskniffen nur sehr schwer oder 
gar nicht für eine Classic-Wissensbasis umgesetzt werden können, aber als epistemische 
Anfragen problemlos ausgedrückt werden können. 
Die als Beispiel angeführte Integritätsbedingung illustriert auch, daß man mit bloßem 
K-Classic bei den Integritätsbedingungen nicht auskommt. Viele Integritätsbedingungen 
stellen Implikationen dar, d.h. sie erfordern eine ASK-Sprache, die auch Negation und 
Disjunktion , sowie Variablenquantifzierung als Sprachmittel zur Verfügung stellt. Es ist 
somit eine neuerliche Ausweitung der ASK-Sprache um derartige Junktoren erforderlich. 
Offenbar können nicht alle Bildungen, die eine so mächtige ASK-Sprache hervorbringt, 
als Argumente von ASK-Operationen für eine Classic-Wissensbasis gehandhabt werden. 
Hierbei steht eine möglichst allgemeine Definition der im Zusammenhang mit Classic hand-
habbarenKlassen von Integritätsbedingungen noch aus. Die zugrundeliegende Intuition 
einer solchen Definition ist, daß eine epistemische ASK-Operation mit einer Integritätsbe-
dingung als Argument in letzter Konsequenz auf Tests reduzierbar sein muß, ob bekannte 
Individuen in einem Konzept (oder einer Relation) sind oder nicht. 
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7 TELL 
7.1 Die Semantik des TELL-Operators 
Mit dem TELL-Operator können neue Informationen zur Wissensbasis hinzugefügt wer-
den. Wir betrachten hierbei nur den monotonen Fall, d.h. durch das Hinzufügen von 
Informationen zur Wissensbasis verlieren die in der Wissensbasis enthaltenen Aussagen 
nicht ihre Gültigkeit . Ist M(E) wieder die Modellmenge einer Classic-Wissensbasis E und 
assertion eine zur Wissensbasis hinzuzufügende Aussage, so ist die Semantik des TELL-
Operators: 
TELL: M(E) x M(assertion) t-+ M(E) n M(assertion) 
Die Modellmenge der um assertion erweiterten Wissensbasis entspricht der Schnittmenge 
der Modellmengen von E und assertion. . 
Bei einer so restriktiven Repräsentationssprache wie Classic erhebt sich stets die Frage, ob 
das Ergebnis einer TELL-Operation mit einem epistemischen Argument in Classic adäquat 
repräsentierbar ist. Im folgenden geben wir beispielhaft Typen epistemischer Aussagen an, 
die als Argument einer TELL-Operation zu einem in Classic darstellbaren Ergebnis führen . 
7.2 Open World Semantik in Classic und die Durchsetzung einer lokalen 
Closed World Assumption 
Classic liegt , wie allen Konzeptsprachen, eine Open World Semantik zugrunde. Es wird 
nicht davon ausgegangeu,- daß alle in einer Wissensbasis bekannten Instanzen eines Prädi-
kats die einzig möglichen sind (vgl. [Resnick et al. 91]). Beispielsweise ist aus dem 
Umstand, daß alle bekannten Personen männlich sind, nicht folgerbar, daß alle Personen 
männlich sind. Ist umgekehrt ein Individuum nicht als Instanz eines Konzepts bekannt, 
wird nicht ausgeschlossen, d~ das Individuum dennoch Instanz des Konzepts sein könnte. 
Es gibt in Classic jedoch eine sehr spezielle Möglichkeit , lokal eine Closed World Assump-
tion einzuführen. Für ein bekanntes Individuum kann eine Rolle geschlossen werden in 
dem Sinne, daß nach Schließung der Rolle alle Rollenfüller der Rolle für das Individuum 
als bekannt gelten. Individuen, die nicht als Rollenfüller der Rolle für das Individuum 
bekannt sind, können demnach keine Rollenfüller sein. Eine derartige Schließung einer 
Rolle für ein Individuum kann vom Anwender über eine LISP-Funktion veraniaßt werden, 
oder vom System aus der Attributeigenschaft der Rolle oder über vorhandene Zahlenre-
striktionen geschlossen werden. Formalisiert werden kann diese in Classic nur informell 
beschriebene Aktion als eine TELL-Operation mit dem epistemischen Argument 
"Iv P(a, V) :J KP(a, V) 
Eine Gruppe von in Classic repräsentierbaren TELL-Operationen stellen Operationen zur 
Einführung einer lokalen Closed World Assumption für ein Konzept oder eine Menge von 
Rollenfüllern dar. Ein Konzept beispielsweise kann durch eine TELL-Operation mit dem 
Argument 
"Ix C(x) :J KC(x) 
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geschlossen werden. Technisch wird diese Operation realisiert, indem in die Definition 
des Konzepts C ein ONE-OF-Konzept mit der Menge der bekannten Instanzen von C als 
Extension eingefügt wird. Eine andere Variante stellt die Aussage 
"Ix C(x) :::> KD(x) 
dar, wobei die Menge der bekannten Instanzen des Konzepts D die möglichen Instanzen des 
Konzepts C festlegt. In diesem Fall wird für das Konzept C eine abgeschwächte Form der 
Closed World Assumption eingeführt.· Urite·rscheiden sich die auf beiden Seiten des Impli-
kationszeichens vorkommenden Prädikate, kann es bei der Ausführung der entsprechenden 
TELL-Operation zu Konsistenzproblemen kommen. Ist nämlich in der Wissensbasis eine 
Instanz des Konzepts C bekannt, ohne auch als Instanz des Konzepts D zu gelten, so 
führt die Ausführung einer TELL-Operation mit obigem Argument zur Inkonsistenz der 
. Wissensbasis. Die TELL-Operation führt nur dann nicht zur Inkonsistenz, wenn für die 
Wissensbasis E die Voraussetzung 
erfüllt ist. Es handelt sich hierbei um eine Integritätsbedingung, die in der Wissensbasis 
erfüllt sein muß, damit die TELL-Operation mit obigem Argument nicht die Konsistenz 
der Wissensbasis gefährdet. Als Integritätsbedingung kann die Voraussetzung als epi-
stemische ASK-Operation auf ihre Gültigkeit überprüft werden. Unter dem Aspekt der 
Konsistenzerhaltung können epistemische ASK- und TELL-Operationen in Relation zu-
einander gesetzt.werden. Es bleibt zu sehen, inwieweit diese Relation formal spezifizierbar 
ist. 
7.3 Komplexe Updates und Triggerregeln 
Andere TELL-Operationen mit epistemischem Argument erlauben komplexe Updates ähn-
lich dem Konzept der Triggerregeln in Classic. Die Bedeutung des Regelformats der Trig-
gerregeln in Classic ist in der Classic-Literatur nur informell beschrieben als "ist ein In-
dividuum eine Instanz eines Konzepts C, so gilt das Individuum auch als Instanz eines 
anderen Konzepts lY'. Die Semantik läßt sich als' TELL-Operation mit dem Argument 
"Ix KC(x) :::> D(x) 
formalisieren, wobei allerdings diese TELL-Operation nach jedem Update der Wissensbasis 
ausgeführt werden muß. 
Offenbar gibt es zwei Möglichkeiten der Formalisierbarkeit von Triggerregeln. Neben der 
genannten Formalisierung als epistemische TELL-Operation läßt sich die Semantik der 
Regeln auch als epistemische ASK-Operation, genauer als Integritätsbedingung, erfas-
sen. Demnach wird eine Triggerregel spezifiziert durch eine Integritätsbedingung, die in 
der Wissensbasis nach Ausführung der Triggerregel erfüllt ist. Eine Wissens basis nach 
Ausführung einer Triggerregel des in Classic realisierten Formats erfüllt die Integritätsbe-
dingung 
"Ix KC(x} :::>KD(x) 
- 103-
(vgl. die Formalisierung in [Donini et al. 92]). Während die Formalisierung als epistemi-
sehe TELL-Operation die Aktion bei der Ausführung der Triggerregel akzentuiert, spezifi-
ziert die Formalisierung als epistemische ASK-Operation (beziehungsweise Integritätsbe-
dingung) den Zustand der bei Ausführung der Triggerregel resultierenden Wissensbasis. 
Wird obige TELL-Operation nicht nach jedem Update der Wissens basis ausgeführt, so 
erhält man eine Variante der Triggerregeln in Classic. Ähnlich gibt es eine Reihe von Va-
rianten der obigen epistemischen Aussage, die jeweils als Argument einer TELL: .. Operation 
eine Variierung des in Classic realisierten Konzepts der Triggerregeln darstellt. Beispiele 
hierfür sind 
Vy KC(y) :) P(a, y) 
und 
VxVy KP(x, y) :) Q(x, y) 
Durch Variierung epistemischer Argumente von TELL-Operationenund Variierung in Hin-
sicht auf einmalige, mehrmalige oder ständige Ausführung der TELL-Operation ergibt sich 
eine im Vergleich zu dem in Classic realisierten Regelformat allgemeinere Konzeption von 
Triggerregeln. Die zweifache Formalisierbarkeit ist auch für diese allgemeinere Konzeption 
gegeben. 
7.4 Bei Einschränkung auf Mengen bekannter Individuen realisierbare 
TELL-Operationen 
Einige Typen epistemischer TELL-Operationen führen an sich zu nicht in Classic dar-
stellbaren Ergebnissen, 'weil sie-Konsequenzen für (noch) nicht derWissensbasis bekannte 
Individuen involvieren . Ein solches Beispiel ist die globale Schließung einer Rolle P: 
"Ix, y P(x, y) :) KP(x, y) 
Für später der Wissensbasis bekanntwerdende Individuen wäre aus einer solchen TELL-
Operation zu folgern, daß diese Individuen keinen Rollenfüller der Rolle P haben. Es 
gibt jedoch keine Möglichkeit, in einer Classic-Wissensbasis etwas zu notieren, das die 
Wissensbasis bei Bekanntwerden eines neuen Individuums genau diese Schlußfolgerung 
ausführen läßt (in anderen Konzeptsprachen größerer Expressivität wird dies kaum anders 
sein). Eine zunächst nicht in Classic repräsentierbare TELL-Operation wie die genannte 
wird jedoch ausführbar, wenn sie durch Aufnahme einer epistemischen Prämisse in das 
Argument auf Mengen bekannter Individuen eingeschränkt wird: 
"Ix, y KC(x) /\ P(x, y) :) KP(x, y) 
Die Rolle P ist demnach nur für die bekannten Instanzen des Konzepts C zu schließen, was 
in Classic darstellbar ist. C kann dabei auch das eingebaute Prädikat CLASSIC-THING 
sein, d.h . KC entspräche der Menge aller in der Wissens basis bekannten Individuen. 
7.5 Im Ergebnis in Classic nicht darstellbare TELL-Operationen 
Daß epistemische TELL-Operationen Konsequenzen für der Wissensbasis (noch) nicht 
bekannte Individuen haben können, ist ein Beispiel dafür, daß das Ergebnis von TELL-
Operationen nicht in Classic repräsentierbar ist. Ein anderes Beispiel ist die Asymmetrie 
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der Notation von Rollen in Classic. Assertionen bezüglich Rollen werden ausschließlich 
beim Rollenträger notiert. Beim Rollenfüller kann nicht notiert werden, für welche Indi-
viduen und welche Rollen er Rollenfüller ist. Aus diesem Grunde sind beispielsweise Exi-
stenzaussagen über Rollenfüller in Classic möglich (mit Hilfe des AT-LEAST-Konstrukts), 
nicht aber über Rollenträger . So erklärt sich, daß eine TELL-Operation mit dem Argu-
ment 
3V P(a, V) /\ --.KP(a, V) 
in Classic im Ergebnis darstellbax ist, mit dem Argument 
3x P(x, b) /\ --.KP(x, b) 
jedoch nicht. In der Asymmetrie in der Darstellung von Rollen liegt auch begründet, 
daß eine TELL-Opera~ion mit der Aussage 
'<IV P(a, V) ::> KP(a, V) 
im Ergebnis repräsentiert werden kann, nicht aber mit dem Argument 
'<Ix P(x,b) ::> KP(x,b) 
7.6 Redundante oder zu Inkonsistenz führende TELL-Operationen 
Bereits Levesque (vgl. [Levesque 84]) hatte festgestellt, daß bestimmte Klassen epistemi-
scher Aussagen als Argumente von TELL-Operationen entweder redundant sind oder zu 
Inkonsistenz führen. Es handelt sich hierbei insbesondere um subjektive Aussagen etwa 
der Form' 
KC(a) 
Der Wissensbasis wird mitgeteilt; daß ihr bekannt ist, daß a eine Instanz des Konzepts 
C ist. Ist in der Wissensbasis das Individuum a als Instanz des Konzepts C bekannt, 
so ist diese Mitteilung redundant. Ist a dagegen nicht als Instanz von C bekannt, so 
kommt es durch die TELL-Operation zum Widerspruch, d.h. die Modellmenge der aus 
der TELL-Operation resultierenden Wissensbasis ist leer. TE LL-Operationen mit der-
artigen Argumenten machen ausschließlich Aussagen über das Wissen der Wissensbasis, 
deren Wahrheitsgehalt unabhängig von Domänenzusammenhängen ist. Syntaktisch sind 
die subjektiven Aussagen daxan erkennbar, daß alle in ihnen vorkommenden Prädikate im 
Skopus eines K-Operators liegen. Aber auch gemischte Aussagen, wie beispielsweise 
'<Ix C(x) ::> --.KC(x) 
können als Argumente von TELL-Operationen ein ähnliches Verhalten zeigen. 
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7.7 Probleme bei der Realisierung epistemischer TELL-Operationen für 
Classic 
Zwei Probleme stellen sich im Zusammenhang mit der Realisierung epistemischer TELL-
Operationen: 
1. Ähnlich wie bei den Integritätsbedingungen ist eine Sprache zu definieren, die alle 
die epistemischen Aussagen umfaßt, die als Argumente von TELL-Operationen zu 
in Classic darstellbaren Ergebnissen führen und nicht redundant oder Inkonsistenz 
bewirkend sind. Hierbei ist nicht klar, ob es vor dem Hintergrund der geringen 
Expressivität von Classic wirklich gelingt, allgemeine Constraints für die Beschaf-
fenheit epistemischer Argumente für im Ergebnis darstellbare und 'sinnvolle' TELL-
Operationen zu formulieren. Schlimmstenfalls läßt sich nur eine Liste von Aussage-
typen oder Templates zusammenstellen, die instantiiert als Argumente zu handhab-
baren TELL-Operationen verwendet werden können. 
2. Obwohl die meisten der als handhabbar befundenen TELL-Operationen relativ ein-
fach mit den in Classic zur Verfügung stehenden Update~Möglichkeiten realisiert 
werden können, ist noch unklar, inwieweit eine allgemeine Abbildung spezifiziert wer-
den kann, die ausgehend von der syntaktischen Form eines Arguments adäquat die 
Classic Update-Funktionen instantiiert und zur Ausführung bringt, also die TELL-
Operation eigentlich erst realisiert. 
8 Zusammenfassung 
Wir haben an einem Beispiel verdeutlicht, daß eine epistemische Erweiterung von Classic 
zu größerer Expressivität der Interaktionssprache führt. Es können so viele Anfragen 
an eine Classic-Wissens basis über das, was der Wissens basis bekannt beziehungsweise 
unbekannt ist, gestellt werden, die als reine Classic-Anfragen nicht formulierbar wären. 
Ein Verfahren zur Beantwortung epistemischer Anfragen wurde in prinzipieller Anlehnung 
an das Reduktionsverfahren von Levesque realisiert. 
Integritätsbedingungen können als spezielle epistemische ASK-Operationen aufgefaßt wer-
den. Zur Formulierung nicht trivialer Integritätsbedingungen reicht K-Classic allein offen-
bar nicht aus. Hier ist noch das Format einer Erweiterung der Ailfragesprache um solche 
Konstrukte wie Disjunktion und Negation festzulegen. 
TELL-Operationen ermöglichen u. a. die Durchsetzung einer lokalen Closed World As-
sumption für Konzepte und Rollen und führen zu einer allgemeineren Konzeption der in 
Classic realisierten Triggerregeln. Wegen der Eingeschränktheit von Classic als Repräsen-
tationssprache sind nicht alle TELL-Operationen mit beliebigem Argument in ihrem Er-
gebnis in Classic darstellbar. Auch für die TELL-Operationen ist eine Sprache der hand-
habbaren Argumente zu spezifizieren. 
-106 -
Literatur 
[Brachman et al. 90] R. J. Brachman, D. L McGuinness, P. F. Patel-Schneider, 
L. A. Resnick, Living with Classic: When and How to Use 
a J(L-ONE-Like Lanuage, in: J. Sowa (ed.), Principles of 
Semantic Networks, Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo 1990. 
[Donini et al. 91] F. M. Donini, M. Lenzerini, D. Nardi, W. Nutt, The comple-
xity 0/ concept languages, in: J. Allen, R. Fikes, E. Sandewall 
(eds.), Proc. of the 2nd International Conference on Prin-
ciples of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning KR-91, 
Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo,1991,151-162. 
[Donini et al. 92] F. M. Donini,M. Lenzerini, D. Nardi, W. Nutt, A. Schaerf, 
Adding Epistemic Operators to Concept Languages, in: Pro-
ceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Principles 
of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, Morgan Kauf-
mann, San Mateo 1992, 342-53. 
[Halpern 92] J. Y. Halpern, Y. Moses, A guide to completeness and com-
plexity tor modallogics 0/ knowledge and belief, in: Artificial 
Intelligence 54 (1992), 319-379. 
[Heinsohn et al. 92] J. Heinsohn, D. Kudenko, B. Nebel, H.-J. Profit1ich, An Em-
pirical Analysis 0/ Terminological Representation Systems, 
DFKI-Research-Report RR~92-16, Saarbrücken, Mai 1992. 
[Levesque 84] H. J. Levesque, Foundations 0/ a /unctional approach to 
knowledge representation, in: Artificial Intelligence, 23:155-
212, 1984. 
[Reiter 88] R. Reiter, On Integrity Constraints, Proceedings of the 
2nd Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about 
Knowledge, Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo 1988, 97-111. 
[Resnick et al. 91] 1. A. Resnick et al., Classic Description and Re/erence Ma-
nual For the Common Lisp Implementation Version 1.2, 
1991. 
[Schmidt-SchaußSmolka 91] M. Schmidt-Schauß, G. Smolka, Attributive concept descrip-









Der Unterschied zwischen Glauben und Wissen. den die Philosophie im Rahmen der 
epistcmischen Logik behandelt, spielt in deI KI in verschiedenster Hinsicht eine wichtige Rolle. 
Die mit dieser Unterscheidung verbundene Differenzierung macht es uns möglich, die 
verschiedensten Aspekte der Unexaktheit (Unvollständigkeit, Unsicherheit. Vagheit, Defaults) 
zusammenzufassen und natürlichsprachlich auszudrücken. Wir betrachten insbesondere Wissen 
und Glauben in Relation zu Handlungen und zeigen eine Beziehung zwischen den Erklärungen 
von Handlungen und den Gründen auf, die dafür ausschlaggebend · sind. daß ein Sachverhalt 
geglaubt bzw. gewußt wird. Dabei sind gute Gründe von weniger guten zu unterscheiden, was 
durch die in der Begründung verwendeten Schlußweisen sowie durch den Status der beteiligten 
Wissens elemente möglich wird. 
Es macht nicht nur für Sally einen großen Unterschied, ob sie glaubt, daß sie schwanger ist, oder 
ob sie weiß, daß sie schwanger ist. Sally's Glauben oder Wissen wird ihre nächsten Handlungen 
entscheidend beeinflussen. So wäre es nicht verwunderlich, falls sie nur glaubt schwanger zu sein, 
wenn sie Handlungen vollzieht, die ihr Gewißheit verschaffen, die sie also in einen Zustand 
versetzen, in dem sie entweder weiß, daß sie schwanger ist, oder in dem sie weiß, daß sie es nicht 
ist. Diese Handlungen sind unsinnig, wenn sie bereits weiß. daß sie schwanger ist. Wenn Sally nun 
in einer Apotheke einen Schwangerschaftstest kauft, dann hat der Apotheker gute Gründe 
anzunehmen, daß sie glaubt, schwanger zu sein, dieses aber nicht weiß: An diesem Beispiel können 
wir bereits zwei wichtige Beobachtungen machen: 
(1) Wenn A glaubt, daß p, dann kann dieses ganz andere Handlungen von A zur Folge haben. 
als wenn A weiß, daß p. 
(2) Aus den Handlungen von A läßt sich von einem Beobachter B u.U. erschließen, ob A weilt 
daß p, oder ob er glaubt, daß p. 
Dabei stehen die jeweiligen Handlungen in engem inhaltlichen Bezug zu p. Zwei Arten von 
Handlungen können voneinander getrennt werden: Einerseits die Handlungen, die "dazu 
beitragen", aus dem Glauben von p Wissen über p zu machen, und andererseits diejenigen 
Handlungen, die unter dem Aspekt einer globaleren Zielverfolgung auf der Grundlage von p 
möglich sind. Je nachdem wie wichtig p für die Zieleneichung ist, wird daruber befunden werden, 
ob es ausreicht, p zu glauben, oder ob es als notwendig erachtet wird, p zu verifizieren. Da ein 
großer Alternativenraum von potentiellen Handlungen die Regel sein dürfte, ist es von Bedeutung 
für ein handlungsfähiges Subjekt, entscheiden zu können, ob p gewußt oder geglaubt wird. 
Offensichtlich sind wir in der Lage Handlungen auszuführen, die uns im Hinblick auf p in die Lage 
versetzen, nach Ausführung der Handlungen p zu wissen bzw. -, p zu wissen. Diese Handjungen 
stellen dann die Begrtindungsbasis des Gewußten dar. Wird Sally nach Vollzug eines 
Schwangerschaftstests gefragt, wie sie denn wissen könne, daß sie schwanger sei, kann sie auf 
diese Handlung und deren positives Ergebnis verweisen. 
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(3) Wenn A weiß, daß p, dann kann er auch Gründe für pangeben. 
Begründungen werden also eine wichtige Rolle spielen, wobei wir bislang noch nicht in der Lage 
sind, Glauben von Wissen unterscheiden zu können. Denn auch der Glaube von Sally wird nicht 
. . 
gänzlich unbegründet gewesen sein. Beim Wissen müssen die Gründe allerdings bessere sein als 
beim Glauben, weshalb man auch von guten Gründen spricht Was gute Gründe von weniger 
guten unterscheidet wollen wir später diskutieren. 
(3') Wenn A weiß, daß p, dann muß er gute Gründe für p angeben können. 
Der Zusammenhang zwischen Plänen, Handlungen, Begründungen, Glauben und Wissen wird im 
folgenden weiter ausgeführt werden, wobei sprachliche Handlungen im Vordergrund stehen 
werden. Zunächst aber werden wir uns mit dem Wissens begriff auseinandersetzen. 
1 Der Wissensbegriff in der Philosophie, der KI und der KOb'11itionswissenschaft 
In der Philosophie ist es durchaus gängig, Wissen derart zu definieren, daß der Wahrheit des 
Gewußten eine wichtige Bedeutung zukommt 
(4) A weiß p gdw. gilt: P ist wahr, A glaubt p und A hat gute Gründe, p zu glauben. 
Das heißt, daß in (4) der Unterschied zwischen Glauben und Wissen über den Wahrheitsbegriff 
festgelegt wird. Das Problem hiermit ist, daß irgendwie festgestellt werden muß, was wahr ist. Da 
dieses nicht von einer neutralen Institution festgelegt werden kann, sondern dadurch, daß 
Wahrheit empirisch über den Erfolg bzw. Mißerfolg von Handlungen bestimmt wird, hilft uns 
diese Definition nur dann weiter, wenn wir bereit sind, den Wahrheitsbegriff durch einen 
empirischen Bestätigungsbegriff zu ersetzen. Die Frage ist, ob dieser von den glllen Gründen 
abgegrenzt werden kann, oder aber, ob wir gwe Gründe von weniger guten Griindell 
unterscheiden werden können. 
In der Künstlichen Intelligenz werden dem Begriff Wissen mindestens zwei Bedeutungen 
zugeordnet: 
(5a) Wissen = Repräsentation + Zugriff + Modifikation 
(5b) Aussagen über die Welt, die gewußt werden, im Gegensatz zu den Aussagen, die (nur) 
geglaubt werden. 
Wissen umfaßt in (5a) alles, das repräsentiert, auf das zugegriffen und das modifiziert werden 
muß. Also auch. das, was über die Welt geglaubt wird. Geglaubtes Wissen (im Sinne von (5a)) 
unterscheidet sich von gewußtem Wissen durch Unterschiede in der Repräsentation, im Zugriff 
und in der Modifikation. Der Unterschied bezieht sich in erster Linie auf die Dimension der 
Sicherheit, mit der wir davon ausgehen, daß die Welt bestimmte Eigenschaften etc. hat. 
Im Rahmen der wahrscheinlichkeitstheoretischen Ansätze zur Behandlung von Unsicherheit bzw. 
Vagheit (z.B. Zadeh 1971 oder Shafer 1976) kann sehr hohe Sicherheit für p gleichgesetzt werden 
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mit p wird gewußt, während eine geringere Sicherheit für p als p wird geglaubt interpretiert 
werden kann. Problematisch ist neben der Frage, wo die numerischen Werte herkommen, daß 
hierbei der Übergang von Glauben zu Wissen über Schwellwene geregelt wird. 
Die symbolischen Ansätze hingegen (Default-Logiken, Nichtmonotonie) ennöglichen eine 
Unterscheidung zwischen Glauben und Wissen auf die folgende Art: Ein per Default abgeleitetes p 
wird geglaubt. Gibt es eine Begründung von p ohne Default, wird p gewußt. Fraglich ist der 
Status der Axiome (der nicht begründbaren Aussagen»). 
Beide Familien von Lösungsvorschlägen sind allerdings nur flir die Behandlung einzelner Aspekte 
der Inexaktheit geeignet. Unsicherheit, Vagheit, Unvollständigkeit und Standardannahmen müssen 
als unterschiedliche Dimensionen der Inexaktheit behandelt werden (Rollinger 1984). Bislang sind 
wir nicht in der Lage, die Bezüge zwischen diesen Dimensionen zu verstehen2• 
In der Kognitionswissenschaft wird Wissen verstanden als mentales Modell der Welt3, auf dessen 
Grundlage Probleme gelöst, Handlungen geplant und das aufgrund von Erfahrungen und 
Erkenntnisgewinn modifizien wird. Diese Sichtweise ist eng verwandt mit der Sichtweise der 
Künstlichen Intelligenz, wobei in der Kognitionswissenschaft die kognitive Adäquatheit von 
Repräsentation, Zugriff und Modifikation eine vorrangige Rolle spielt. 
Vor dem Hintergrund der Frage nach einem fonnalisierbaren Unterschied zwischen Glauben und 
Wissen wollen wir im weiteren betrachten, was Handlungen sind und in welchem Zusammenhang 
Handlungen und Erklärungen stehen. 
2 Handlungen 
Zunächst wollen wir die notwendigen Bedingungen fonnulieren, die eine Handlung von einem 
Reflex, einem Ereignis unterscheiden: 
(6) Handeln setzt die Existenz eines Modells der Welt voraus, mit dem Wirkungen (zukünftige 
Ereignisse) vorausgesagt werden können. Diese Wirkungen müssen intendiert sein. 
(Prinzip der Wirkungs vorhersage) 
(7) Es muß darüber hinaus die Möglichkeit der Unterlassung einer Handlung gegeben sein. 
(prinzip möglicher Alternativen), so ist Z.B. die unterlassene Hilfeleistung ein strafbarer da 
willentlicher Akt~. 
I Wenn ich weiß. daß Vögel üblicherweise t1icgcn können. und daß Tweety ein Vogel ist. dann glaube ich. daß 
Twccty fliegen kann. 
2 Wic formalisiere ich z.B. den (sichcrlich bestchcndcn) Zusammenhang (Äquivalenz ?) zwischen folgendcn 
Aussagen: "Ich bin mir sicher. daß Harry eine Portion Spagctti gcgessen hat." und "Ich bin mir unsicher. ob Harry 
eine große Portion Spagetti gegessen hat". 
3 Man ist sich dabei nicht einig darübcr. ob diescs nur für das Kurzzeitgedächtnis gilt. oder auch für das 
Langzcitgedächtnis bzw. das Hintergrundwissen. wobei davon ausz'ugehen ist. daß die Repräsentationen zumindesl 
sehr gut kompatibel sein müssen. Auch ist unklar. wieviele Arten VOll mentalen Modellen es gibt. bzw. wie d:Lo; 
Wissen über mentale ModeUestrukturiert ist. 
4 Zur Veranschaulichung ein Beispiel von S. Kanngießer. der mit dcm Altemativenbegriff wesentlich zu dcr 
Definition beigetragen hat: Der Stein. der fallen gelassen wird. wird fallen (Wirkungsvorhersage). und hat keine 
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Wir finden hier noch keinen Ansatzpunkt für eine Unterscheidung zwischen Glauben und Wissen, 
und der Standpunkt, daß zukünftige Ereignisse nicht gewußt werden können, da die Zukunft nicht 
deterministisch vorhergesagt werden kann, wird offensichtlich nicht bezogen. Wenn wir einen 
Stein anheben und dann loslassen, dann wissen wir, daß er fallen wird und nicht in der Luft stehen 
bleibt. Derartig empirische Tatsachen haben wir nicht nur in Bezug zu den Naturgesetzen 
entwickelt 
Einen solchen Ansatzpunkt fmden wir erst, wenn wir einerseits die Intentionalität als wesentlichen 
Bestandteil von Handlungen und andererseits Handlungen als Bestandteile von Plänen berrachten. 
Laut (Searle 1986) hat ein intentionaler Zustand zwei Bestandteile: 1. einen (propositionalen) 
Gehalt (wie z.B. "ins Zimmer gehen") und 2. einen psychischen Modus (Typ) (wie Z.B. 
"beabsichtigen, .. . ", "hoffen, ... "). Glauben und Wissen können demnach als Typ eines 
intentionalen Zustandes verstanden werden, was allerdings nichts weiter austrägt, solange wir 
. nicht die Beziehungen zwischen den verschiedenen Typen sowie deren Eigenschaften kennen. 
(8) Handlungen haben ausgezeichnete Beschreibungen (Searle 1986) 
Handlungen als solche zu erkennen gelingt uns aufgrund der Kenntnis der relevanten 
Eigenschaften einer Handlung. Hierzu sind insbesondere die Vor- und Nachbedingungen von 
Handlungen zu zählen. Eine nur geglaubte aber relevante Vorbedingung führt zu einer ebenfalls 
nur geglaubten Wirkungsvorhersage. 
3 Erklärungen und Handlungen 
Das Verstehen von Handlungen5 bezeichnet den Prozeß der Erklärungskonsrruktion auf der 
Grundlage (naiver) Theorien. Eine Handlung läßt üblicherweise aufgrund der Ambiguität des 
Verstehens mehrere Erklärungen zu. Mittels Erklärungen können z.B. Handlungen von 
Ereignissen abgegrenzt werden : 
(9) Das Verstehen von Ereignissen erfordert in ersterLinie die Zuordnung einer Bedeutung 
zu einem beobachteten Ereignis (lauter Knall -> Donner), und in zweiter Linie die 
Einordnung in einen (ev. beobachteten) Ereignisablauf im Hinblick auf Ursache - Wirkung. 
(10) Das Verstehen von Handlungen erfordert die Explikation der Handlungsziele und der 
Pläne, in denen die Handlungen eine Rolle für die Zielerreichung spielen. 
Grundlage der Erklärungskonstruktion sind (naive) Theorien (problemlösungswissen) sowie das 
Wissen über die faktische Beschaffenheit der Welt. Die gefundenen Erklärungen sind wiederum 
die Grundlage rur eigenes Handeln. Handeln stellt in Verbindung mit der Beobachtung der 
erzielten Wirkung(en) eine Beziehung !-wischen dem Weltmodell und der Realität her. Handeln ist 
demnach auch immer (gezieltes) Experimentieren. Da der Mensch in der Realität agieren muß, um 
Möglichkeit, sich zu entscheiden, ob er fallen will oder niCht, pie Hand. die ihn fallen gelassen hat. hätte auch 
anderes mit dem Stein tun können, zum Beispiel ihn nicht fallen lassen (mögliche Alternativen). 
5 Hier ist nicht gemeint das Erkennen einer Handlung über deren ausgezeichnete Eigenschaften. Verstehen meint 
hier die Gründe zu bestimmen, aufgrund derer eine Handlung vollzogen wurde. 
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seine (Grund-) Bedürfnisse befriedigen zu können, und Erkenntnisgewinn dazu beirrägt. die 
Bedürfnisbefriedigung zu optimieren, kann jedes Handeln als Experiment zur Bestätigung der 
(naiven) Theorien interpre~iert werden. Der aktive Eingriff in die Realität stellt sicher, daß die 
Wirkungen von Handlungen zu einem (mehr oder minder) selbstgewählten Zeitpunkt beobachtet 
werden können, der Lernprozess kann somit selbst gesteuert werden. Die Selbststeuerung ist dann 
nicht gegeben, wenn das eigene Handeln ausgeschlossen wird und man sich ausschließlich auf die 
Beobachtung von Handlungen und ihren Wirkungen zurtickzieht 
Die Qualität einer Theorie (eines Weltmodells) mißt sich damit an der Qualität der Erklärung 
einerseits und der Qualität der Wirkungsvorhersage andererseits. Sollte sich eine Erklärung bzw. 
eine Wirkungsvorhersage als mangelhaft erweisen, dann bilden diese Einschätzungen die 
Grundlage zur Revision der Theorie. 
Da die Welt nicht still steht und der Mensch abhängiger Bestandteil der Welt ist. können 
zukünftige Weltzustände nur angestrebt werden. Dies drückt sich einerseits durch unterbestimmte 
Beschreibungen der angestrebten Zustände aus, und andererseits dadurch, daß nicht alle 
Abhängigkeiten kontrolliert werden können. 
Die Entscheidung für eine bestimmte Handlungssequenz als Abwägung (aller) verschiedener 
Intentionen und damit verbundenen Zielzuständen bedingt die Einschätzung, daß für alle 
Einzelhandlungen die Haridlungsvoraussetzungen erreicht werden können 
(V oraussetzungsprinzip)6. 
Handlungsmuster (Scripts) spielen auch auf der Sprachebene eine wichtige Rolle, nicht nur auf der 
Weltebene. so wie bei (Schank / Abelson 1977). Nicht jede Sprechäußerung wird vollständig neu 
geplant. sondern orientiert sich an Mustern. die aus sehr vielen vorherigen Erfahrungen aufgebaut 
worden sind. 
Die intendierte Wirkung einer Sprechhandlung ist die Modifikation eines Weltrnodells. eines 
mentalen Modells / Zustands, eines Informationszustandes7 • D.h. sprachliches Handeln ist 
indirektes Handeln: Zuerst wird ein mentales Modell modifiziert. und erst dann kann diese 
Modifikation eine Handlung auslösen (z.B. wieder eine Sprechhandlung). 
4 Begründbarkeit 
Der Unterschied zwischen Glauben und Wissen wird also nur deutlich werden. wenn wir wissen. 
was eine Begründung bzw. eine Erklärung ist. Berrachten 'wir folgende verallgemeinene Situation 
gegensätzlicher Auffassungen: 
6 Das Voraussetzungsprinzip gilt auch für die Planung einzelner Teiläußerungen. Es muß geprüft werden. ob der 
Hörer alle Voraussetzungen erfüllt. um eine Äußerung verstehen zu können. Ist dem nicht so. dann müssen zuvor 
die Äußerungen getätigt werden. die die Voraussetzungen beim Hörer schaffen, die wiederum das Verstehen der 
ursprünglich intendierten Äußerung ennöglichen. Beispiel: A kann "Frida hatte einen Unfall." gegenüber B nur 
dann äußern, wenn er der Meinung ist, daß B Frida kennt und weiß, wer mit Frida gemeint ist. Erfüllt B diese 
Voraussetzung nicht. dann muß A dieser Äußerung die Mitteilung vorausschicken, daß Frida z.B. die Freundin 
seines. B's Sohnes ist 
7 Eine nicht intendierte Wirkung (unsystematische Nebenwirkung) ist z.B. das Aufschrecken eines Hasen, der am 
Wegesrand sitzt und die Aufmerksamkeit des Sprechers bislang nicht erregt hat. 
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AzuB: (1) Ich weiß, daß p. 
B: (2) Das glaube ich nicht. 
(2) ist mehrdeutig: Es kann einerseits bedeuten, daß B nicht glaubt, daß A p weiß, p aber damit 
nicht in Frage stellt. Es .kann aber auch bedeuten, daß p angezweifelt wird, und damit natürlich 
auch, daß A p weiß. Wir kommen zu dem Begriff der Begriindbarkeit, wenn wir uns überlegen, 
welche Reaktionsmöglichkeiten A nun offenstehen (hier nur drei wichtige Schemata): 
A: (3a) Ich war an (der Herstellung von) p beteiligt. 
(3b) Ich habe prnit eigenen Augen gesehen. 
(3c) Eine an der Herstellung von p beteiligte Person (die wir beide für 
zuverlässig halten) hat es mir berichtet. 
Jede dieser Reaktionen ist geeignet. B sowohl davon zu überzeugen, daß Aberechtigtermaßen 
behaupten kann, p zu wissen, als auch B von p selbst zu überzeugen. In allen drei Fällen werden 
gute Gründe genannt, die A berechtigen, p als gesichenes Wissen einzustufen, wobei bei (3c) 
bereits die Glaubwürdigkeit einer dritten Person bemüht wird, was einen Sicherheitsverlust 
bedeuten müßte. Wenn keine derartige Begrundungabgegeben werden kann, dann wird es auch 
nicht gelingen, den Zweifel zu beseitigens. Die Äußerung der Gründe wiederum verpflichtet B 
allerdings nicht dazu, seine Meinung zu ändern. Wenn er A als in dieser Sache redlich einstuft (daß 
A ihn also nicht anlügt), dann kann er (in Abhängigkeit von seinem eigenen Wissen über die Sache 
und seinen eigenen Handlungszielen) z.B. wie folgt reagieren: 
B: auf (3a+b) 
auf (3c) 
(4a) Das hast Du nur geträumt. 
(4b) Mir hat diese Person aber -, p erzählt. 
usw. 
Die Begründbarkeit spielt bei allen Handlungen, und somit auch in der Kommunikation eine 
wichtige Rolle. Sie ist die Basis für einen Abgleich unserer mentalen Modelle mit der Realität. 
5 Was sind gute Gründe? 
Eberle hat neben den epistemischen Operatoren Glauben und Wissen die Relation IA(P,q) "aus p 
erschließt die Person A rational q" (Eberle 1974) eingeführt, u.a. um diese Frage zu beantworten. 
Diese Relation macht es möglich, einen Bezug zwischen Glauben und Wissen folgender An 
herzustellen: Wenn p von A geglaubt wird, und A q aus p rational erschlossen hat, dann wird auch 
q von A geglaubt, aber nicht gewußt. Wird p hingegen gewußt, dann wird auchq von A gewußt 
werden. Diese Vorgehensweise ist sehr ähnlich derjenigen, die wir oben im Hinblick auf die 
Default-Logik angedeutet haben. 
8 Einen besonderen Status haben die Elemente unseres Wissens, die nicht begründet werden können. dil! aber 
dennoch als gewußt eingestuft werden. "Bille bleibe Zuhause, ich weiß. daß du heute einen Unfall haben wirst." 
Hier wird die Stärke der Ahnung als große Sicherheit begriffen und deshalb als Wissen anikulien. das nicht 
rational begründet werden kann. 
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(11) Die Gründe werden mit den Einstellungen zu den in der Begründung verwendeten 
Propositionen entweder gut, wenn sie alle gewußt werden, oder weniger gut, wenn 
mindestens eine verwendete Proposition geglaubt wird. 
Ein anderer Ansatzpunkt, eingeschränkt auf die Festlegung dessen, was gute Gründe für das 
Wissen über Handlungsziele, Pläne und Intentionen anderer Aktanten sind, scheint möglich, wenn 
wir die oben skizzierte Handlungstheorie ausnützen~ Betrachten wir folgendes Beispiel: 
(12) a. Harry weiß, daß Sally morgen zu ihm kommt. 
b. Harry glaubt, daß Sally morgen zu ihm kommt. 
Es ist in (12) die Rede von einer zukünftigen Handlung von Sally. Diese Handlung muß einerseits 
zu einem intentionalen Zustand von Sally in Beziehung stehen, und andererseits müssen die 
Vorbedingungen für die Handlung erfüllbar sein. Harry ist dann berechtigt, (l2a) zu behaupten, 
wenn er gute Gründe dafür angeben kann, daß Sally morgen zu ihm kommt. Entscheidend scheint 
die Kenntnis der Intentionen von Sally zu sein. Wenn er von Sally selbst mitgeteilt bekommen hat, 
daß sie kommen will, bzw. wenn er bei einer solchen Mitteilung von Sally an einen Dritten 
zugegen war, dann ist Harry tatsächlich im Besitz der Kenntnis der Intention von Sally. Wenn die 
Intention jedoch erschlossen werden muß, dann ist es entscheidend, ob es ein rationaler9 Schluß 
war, der die Intention von Sally aufgedeckt hat, oder ein abduktiver1o• Wenn nämlich aus der 
Beobachtung von Einzelhandlungen auf den Plan, das Handlungsziel und den dazugehörigen 
intentionalen Zustand eines Aktanten geschlossen wird, dann sind dieses in der Regel abduktive 
Schlüsse. 
Wenn Harry Sally vor zwei Tagen gebeten hat, morgen zu kommen und Sally sich ihm 
gegenüber nicht festgelegt hatte, weil SIe auch Lust hatte, am nächsten Tage nach Berlin zu 
fliegen und dort Fred zu besuchen, und wenn Harry von Fred erfahren hat, daß Sally in 







Prüfen der Handlungsvoraussetzungen 
Eine besonders wichtige Rolle spielen hierbei die Pläne, da diese die Umsetzung von Intention in 
(eine Sequenz von) Handlung(en) signalisieren. Da weder die Existenz einer Intention (die sich in 
dem gesamten Netz aller Intentionen behaupten muß), noch die Existenz eines Plans alleine die 
tatsächliche Ausführung einer Handlung determiniert und die Realisierungsabsicht nur abdUktiv 
erschlossen werden kann, wird ein solcher abduktiver Schluß keinen guten Grund darstellen 
können, Wissen zu rechtfertigen. 
(13) Damit kann festgestellt werden, daß ein guter Grund für das Wissen über die Handlungen 
eines anderen Aktanten dann vorliegt, wenn die Intention, der dazugehörige Plan und die 
9 Es ist die Frage, ob ein rationaler Schluß nOlwendigerweise ein deduktiver Schluß sein muß. Wir müssen uns 
auch fragen. ob eine Kausalbeziehung nicht per Induktion seinen Weg in ein Wissenssystem gefunden haI. Es 
könnte ja sein, daß morgen Montag ist und SaHy immer montags zu Harry kommt. 
10 Ein abduktiver SchluOß liegt dann vor, wenn im Rahmen partieller Definitionen von der Konklusion auf die 
Prämissen geschlossen wird. 
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Realisierungsabsicht des Aktanten rational erschlossen oder auf anderem Wege festgestellt 
werden konnte, nicht aber durch Anwendung der Abduktion. 
6 Das mutuelle Wissen 
Ein ganz anderer Aspekt kommt im Hinblick auf die Unterscheidung zwischen Glauben und 
Wissen ins Spiel, wenn wir die Wissenszustände zweier Kommunikationsparmer betrachten. Die 
Rolle der Partnennodellierung ist hinlänglich bekannt. Wichtigster Untersuchungsgegenstandist 
das Wissen, das der eine Gesprächspartner über den anderen akkumulieren kann und bei der 
Planung seiner weiteren Handlungen (auch Sprechhandlungen) ausnutzt. Der etwas weitere 
Begriff des mutuellen Wissens umfaßt nun nicht nur das Wissen über den Gesprächspartner, 
sondern auch das, was gemeinsam gewußt wird, also nicht eingeschränkt auf einen 
Kommunikationspartner. Dieses mutuelle (von Sprecher und Hörer geteilte) Wissen (im Sinne von 
(5a» ist von einer objektiven Wane aus leicht zu bestimmen: Es sind diejenigen Aussagen über die 
Welt, die in der Schnittmenge zweier Wissenssysteme liegen. 
Da in einer Kommunikation weder der Sprecher noch der Hörer diese objektive Position 
einnehmen kann, kann hier nur die Rede sein von dem, was der Sprecher über da~ Wissen des 
Hörers vermutet (glaubt), bzw. welche seiner Wissenselemente er dem mutuellen Wissen und 
damit auch dem Wissen des Hörers zurechnet und welche nicht. Der Hörer vermutet 
Entsprechendes über das Wissen des Sprechers. Von diesem geglaubten Wissen ist das zu . 
unterscheiden, was von beiden deshalb gewußt wird, weil es z.B. im aktuellen Dialog geäußert 
worden ist und auf der conversational record (Thomason 1990) vermerkt wurde. Da aber diese 
conversational records von den an einer Kommunikation Beteiligten geführt werden, haben die 
Einträge auf der record den Status des Gewußten, ebenso wie gewußt wird, daß ebendieses auch 
von dem Gesprächspartner gewußt wird. Die Unterscheidung in Wissen und Glauben hilft hier, 
Erlebtes von Vermutungen zu trennen. ll 
Eine mögliche Charakterisierung des Wissens eines Sprechers über einen Hörer wird mit (14) 
versucht l2 : 
(14) MK(des-Sprechers, über-den-Hörer, ti) = 
{ w I K(Sprecher , w , ti) 1\ 
B (Sprecher, K (Hörer, W , ti» 1\ 
B (Sprecher, B (Hörer, K (Sprecher, w , ti» 1\ 
B (Sprecher, B(Hörer, B' (Sprecher, K (Hörer, w , ti)))} 
MK (mutuelles Wissen), ti (zu dem Zeitpunkt ti), K (Wissen), B (Glauben), 
11 Es ist von Bedeutung, welcher der epistemischen Operatoren Glauben (ß) und Wissen (K) tatsächlich im 
Hinblick auf das Wissen über das Wissen des Gegenübers gerechtfertigt ist, wenn es z.B. um mögliche Reaktionen 
auf Präsuppositionsverletzungen geht, da die Frage zu entscheiden sein wird, welches Wissen dem Sprecher trotz 
der Präsuppositionsverletzung zugebilligt wird (da der Hörer weiß, daß der Sprecher es weiß), und über welches 
Wissen der Sprecher möglicherweise nicht verfügt. Die Reaktion des Hörers hängt durchaus davon ab, ob der 
Sprecher glaubt, daß der Hörer über ein bestimmtes Wissen verfügt, ob er es weiß, oder ob er nicht davon ausgeht. 
11 Vergleichbare Ansätze über mutual knowledge sind z.B. die Arbeiten von Clark und Carlson (1982), Sperber 
und Wilson (1982), Joshi (1982) in (Smith 1982). 
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w (Wissenselement). 
Die Ereignisse / Zustände, die ich weiß und von denen ich glaube, daß mein 
Gegenüber sie weiß und von denen ich glaube, daß mein Gegenüber von ihnen 
glaubt, daß ich sie weiß, und von denen ich glaube, daß mein Gegenüber von ihnen 
glaubt, daß ich von ihnen glaube, daß er sie weiß. 
Es ist (in der KI) üblich, spätestens hier abzubrechen und Axiome wie (15) zum Einsatz zu 
bringen, die in gewisser Weise aus dem unendlichen Regreß herausfUhren:· . 
(15) "A weiß, daß A weiß, daß p" ist äquivalent zu "A weiß, daß p" (Hintikka 1962) 
Von (14) zu trennen ist der Teil meines Wissens über die Ereignisse / Zustände, die ich weiß und 
von denen ich glaube, daß mein Gegenüber sie weiß und von denen ich glaube, daß mein 
Gegenüber von ihnen glaubt, daß ich sie nicht weiß (usw.): 
(16) MK(des-Sprechers, über-den-Hörer, ti) = 
{ w I K (Sprecher, w, ti)l\ 
B (Sprecher, K (Hörer, w ,ti) 1\ 
B (Sprecher, B (Hörer, -, K (Sprecher, w , ti»)} 
7 Ausblick 
Wenn es darum geht, eine umfassende Theorie des Verstehens und der Interpretation sprachlicher 
Äußerungen zu entwerfen, dann wird die hier behandelte Unterscheidung zwischen Glauben und 
Wissen im Rahmen einer Handlungstheorie ein zentrale Rolle spielen, weil (um mit Searle zu 
sprechen) sich der psychische Modus eines intentionalen Zustandes in der pragmatischen 
Realisierung·einer sprachlichen Äußerung immer wiederfinden wird. Egal ob es darum geht, einen 
Sprechakt festzulegen, Präsuppositionen zu überprüfen, die Intention eines Sprechers zu 
erschließen, oder die eigene Reaktion zu planen, es wird immer entscheidend sein, was gewußt 
und was geglaubt wird. So muß z.B. die Entscheidung darüber, ob eine Aussage als 
Präsupposition mitgeteilt kohärenzstiftend sein soll, oder ob mit ihr (als rhetorischem Mittel) 
jemandem etwas auf eine Art mitgeteilt werden soll, die es schwer macht zu widersprechen, 
berücksichtigen, was jeweils gewußt bzw. geglaubt wird. Ohne eine fundierte Kenntnis dieses 
Unterschieds wird es nicht gelingen, zufriedenstellende(also einerseits adäquate und andererseits 
implementierbare) Theorien über die pragmatischen Aspekte der Sprachbeherrschung zu 
entwickeln. 
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